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“…and generally it never happens that anything 
goes back to what it used to be.”
Mikhail Bulgakov
“It is not given to man to know what is right and 
what is wrong. Men always did and always will err, 
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Should wrongdoers be punished? Should society take care of the ones 
who suffered from wrongdoings? These questions stem from our intuitive 
and most basic understanding of justice. Common sense tells us that the 
majority of us would answer these questions affirmatively without much 
hesitation. However, it is enough to think about the abundance of existing 
normative systems – even without going beyond the civilizational circle of 
the broadly understood West – to quickly learn that, in practice, there are 
no universally applicable detailed answers to questions like these. In other 
words, different societies prefer different approaches to the provision of jus-
tice in situations when someone breaks the “rules of the game” established 
in a given society; not to mention the fact that the “rules” themselves often 
appear to be quite diverse.
Things become even more complicated when similar questions are asked 
in the context of extreme situations, when breaking the “rules of the game” 
stops being isolated accidents and turns into a systemic problem. Armed 
conflicts constitute a perfect – though not the only – example of such 
situations. When looking at a conflict retrospectively, historians manage 
to provide us with convincing explanations of pathways that led to the 
outbreak of violence; thus, they provide a point of reference for prescribing 
general responsibility. Things become much more challenging when trying 
to assess individual acts committed in the “fog of war.” Conflicts do not 
happen between angels and demons, but they engage people with their 
immanent ability to commit evil.1 To what extent can a given act of vio-
lence – whether committed by “us” or by “them” – be regarded as just? 
To what extent can a person be responsible for damage? Who should bear 
the costs of restoration? It is tricky to answer such questions. Furthermore, 
answering them in one way or another may have a direct impact on the 
prolongation of hostility or – on the contrary – contribute to establishing 
peace. In other words, the provision of justice to address large-scale violence 
 1 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, 






is inevitably associated with high political stakes. These considerations 
briefly reflect the scope of problems, which are in the center of attention 
of the concept of transitional justice. The latter contains both normative 
considerations and attempts to understand regularities associated with the 
practice of provision of justice in transgressive moments of history.
This book is devoted to the outlined problem of the provision of jus-
tice in the context of armed conflict that emerged in the east of Ukraine at 
the beginning of 2014. Allow me to remark at the very beginning that the 
notion of transitional justice does not appear often in the literature fully 
or partially devoted to Ukraine. The reason is simple: unlike many other 
post-communist states, Ukraine started implementing policies that could 
be categorized as transitional justice only in the aftermath of the notorious 
Euromaidan protests; i.e. at the end of 2013 and the beginning of 2014. 
During the extremely intense and turbulent months that followed, my sci-
entific attention was drawn by these practices, which addressed different 
types of wrongdoings: the ones committed during the already distant Soviet 
period, the ones associated with high-level corruption in the post-1991 
period, and the ones associated with the mentioned Donbas conflict. As time 
passed, the latter overshadowed all other “dimensions” of the Ukrainian 
transitional justice project. This is not a surprise, considering the urgency 
of Donbas hostilities and their impact on different aspects of social and 
political life in Ukraine. Policies designed and implemented by Ukrainian 
authorities with the aim of addressing injustices generated by the Donbas 
conflict constitute the main subject of research that became the foundation 
of this book.
When compared to other cases of transitional justice applied to address 
legacies of armed conflicts, the case under scrutiny in this book is quite 
peculiar. The reason is the unresolved nature of the Donbas conflict and the 
ongoing – although low intensity – violence that continued during the whole 
period covered by the book. As a result, the book essentially discusses the 
process of transitional justice policies “in-the-making.” It traces relevant 
decisions of Ukrainian authorities since the beginning of the conflict, which 
constitutes a “pathway” that inevitably determines the further development 
of attempts to construct a comprehensive approach to deal with the legacy 
of the Donbas conflict. The book covers the period from the beginning of 
the Donbas conflict to the beginning of 2019. Due to coincidence with the 
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presidency of Petro Poroshenko, this period of time can be regarded as a 
more or less logical stage of Ukraine’s modern history.
When preparing the book, I aimed at achieving two goals. The first one 
was to provide insight into aspects of the Donbas conflict that are covered 
by virtually no literature. The second was to expand our understanding of 
the relationship between transitional justice and conflict resolution pro-
cesses. Therefore, the book contributes to the better understanding of the 
dynamics of one of the most intensive armed conflicts happening in Europe 
since the Yugoslav Wars, but also to the better understanding of peculiarities 
in the application of transitional justice in conditions of ongoing armed 
conflicts.
The research underlying the preparation of the book had an explor-
atory nature. It primarily sought to study the evolution of the approach 
of Ukraine’s authorities to the design and implementation of policies that 
may be categorized as transitional justice, which address the legacy of the 
Donbas conflict, and at understanding the conditions that determined this 
evolution. The research was primarily based on the analysis of official 
documents that reflect the essence of policies, supplemented by the analysis 
of available data of various kind, which serve as a means to understand the 
conditions, in which the policies were developed.
By no means can this book be regarded as a work that covers all possible 
aspects of the problem under scrutiny. There are at least two important lim-
itations. First, the book does not address another important problem, which 
is closely related to the “situation in Donbas,” and which also constitutes 
the ground for the application of transitional justice, namely Russian annex-
ation of Crimea. The latter is mentioned only to the extent that is necessary 
to explain the processes that constitute the primary object of my inquiry. 
The problem of Crimea deserves a separate analysis, taking into account 
the significantly different circumstances, namely the undisguised involve-
ment of Russian military to conduct the occupation of the peninsula and 
its incorporation into the Russian Federation. What is important, I do not 
claim that the discussed warfare in Donbas is not a part of wider process, 
which can be called the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.
Second, due to the methodology, the book provides only a limited insight 
into how people involved in or affected by the conflict experience the polit-
ical processes under scrutiny, how do emotions that drive the expectations 
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of justice form, and to what extent are they satisfied. These are important 
issues that certainly deserve a separate study based on more appropriate 
methods.
Moreover, we should note that the analysis provided in this book should 
not be treated as a source of “absolute truth” about the Donbas conflict 
per se. I focus exclusively on a specific type of conflict-related policies, 
designed and implemented by Ukrainian authorities; I assess them from 
the perspective of normative principles that are expected to underlie tran-
sitional justice in conflict-affected societies. One of the consequences of the 
conflict’s hybridity – discussed in Chapter 2 – is the existence of multiple 
interpretations of conflict-related facts in the public sphere. It was not my 
goal to assess any of these facts and, as a result, the book does not contain 
claims regarding whether the policies under scrutiny were “correct” from 
the perspective of their correspondence with any specific way to understand 
the essence of the conflict. Throughout the book, readers will find references 
to works that provide better foundations for understanding the origins and 
the specificity of the Donbas conflict.
At this point, I must make a confession. While doing my best to follow 
the principles of academic objectivity, I certainly do not want to pretend 
that the fate of Ukraine and its people is indifferent to me. Instead, I have 
a strong conviction that good-quality research in this case can have a real 
practical value, as it may genuinely contribute to the process of recon-
ciliation of Ukraine’s divided society. Nevertheless, I invite all readers to 
approach this work critically and engage in a debate about the problems 
covered in the book. The truth is being born in a dispute, they say. In this 
case, the academic dispute may help solve the biggest conflict Europe has 
witnessed since the end of the Yugoslav Wars.
Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical aspects of transitional justice and 
provides the analytical framework for empirical research conducted in the 
following parts. Chapter 2 provides an overview of scope conditions, within 
which the process of setting up conflict-related policies that fit into the 
category of transitional justice was initiated and which to a certain extent 
determine the evolution of these policies. Scope conditions are understood 
as relatively permanent circumstances (boundaries), within which relevant 
decisions are taken by the Ukrainian authorities. Chapters 3–5 present the 
results of empirical research of the evolution of transitional justice policies 
Preface 19
that address the legacy of the Donbas conflict, aimed at achieving normative 
goals of transitional justice: truth-seeking, retribution, and restoration. The 
conclusion summarizes findings of the empirical research and also indicates 
the most important fields for further research.
I definitely recommend everyone to read the book as a whole. It was 
consciously planned to be brief in form so as to make its reading as easy a 
task as possible. However, chapters with empirical analysis (3, 4, and 5) are 
constructed in a way that allows their reading in separation from the larger 
whole of the book. In particular, they contain brief theoretical parts that 
are intended to introduce readers into the topic.
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Chapter 1.  Theoretical introduction: the 
essence of transitional justice and 
peculiarities of its application in 
the conditions of ongoing armed 
conflict
1.1.  Explaining the phenomenon of transitional justice
It would not be an exaggeration to state that the notion of justice – even 
if not called by its name – can be found in the heart any philosophical 
thought that focuses on the social nature of humans. From a psychological 
perspective, justice can be regarded as a sort of point of reference, which 
allows people to assess fairness of different forms of social interactions. 
The existing research suggests that humans possess an intuitive ability to 
recognize the harm of others.2 The innate understanding of fairness can be 
regarded as one of the main drivers of human motivation.3 However, the 
subjective understanding of justice simultaneously provides ample space 
for conflict: something that is just from the perspective of person A may be 
perceived as unjust by person B.4
Thus, it is no surprise that justice appears to be one of central concepts 
of political thought. To a significant extent, existing political orders are 
designed to provide and maintain a certain vision of justice, understood as 
the basis of a socioeconomic model.5 However, no institutionalized polit-
ical order is permanent. When the existing rules regulating functioning of 
a society break down as a result of different circumstances, the challenge 
of the provision of justice gains significant weight, and it simultaneously 
 2 Jonathan Haidt, The Righteous Mind:  Why Good People Are Divided by 
Politics and Religion (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012).
 3 Bernard Weiner, Social Motivation, Justice, and the Moral Emotions:  An 
Attributional Approach (Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006).
 4 Krystyna Skarżyńska, “Sprawiedliwość jako kryterium oceny systemu 
ekonomiczno-politycznego,” Civitas et Lex 5, no. 1 (2015), pp. 19–30.














Introduction: Essence of transitional justice24
becomes much less attainable. This is the central problem addressed by 
the concept of transitional justice, and this part of the book is devoted to 
explain the essence of transitional justice.
Along with the acceleration of the process of globalization in the second 
half of the twentieth century, we observe a dynamic development of inter-
national law, but also of attempts to formulate more or less universal prin-
ciples for dealing with important problems that humanity faces. One of 
such problems is to address the harms associated with large-scale violence. 
Obviously, this phenomenon is closely related to the unprecedented atroci-
ties committed during the Second World War. Nuremberg and Tokyo trials 
became a sort of points of reference for further attempts to formulate a 
comprehensive and systematic approach to deal with the aftermath of large-
scale violence; although they were not the first instances of international 
post-war trials. Probably the main legacy of these trials is the development 
of idea that the instances of injustice can be assessed from the perspective 
of some universal norms and values, which do not have to correspond to 
local codes. This idea is, in turn, closely related to the concept of human 
rights, which also rapidly developed after the Second World War. To put it 
simply, the idea that any human being possesses a certain, clearly defined 
set of rights, opens the possibility to address any case of their violation, 
regardless of when and by whom it occurred.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the discussed efforts to systematize the 
practice of addressing large-scale violence through judicial means intensi-
fied. The reasons for that seem twofold. The first reason was ideological: it 
was related to the spread of ideas of liberal peacebuilding and the wide-
spread opinion about the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy, which is 
inseparably connected to the concept of human rights. The second reason 
was more practical. According to Forsythe, modern attention paid to inter-
nationally organized criminal prosecutions was strongly affected by the 
desire of the West – led by the US Clinton administration – to appear con-
cerned about atrocities in the Balkans and Rwanda, while seeking to avoid 
a decisive military intervention.6
 6 David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights and Mass Atrocities: Revisiting Transitional 
Justice,” International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (2011), pp. 85–95.
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Furthermore, the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s is the 
moment of what Huntington describes as “democracy’s third wave.”7 Like 
in the case of armed conflict, the fall of autocratic regimes also released the 
expectations to address their injustices. A much wider scope of mechanisms 
was in action in these cases that went far beyond trials: vetting, truth 
commissions, but also such policies as the reconfiguration of public space 
to ensure the commemoration of victims of past injustices. Once again, the 
concept of human rights became a helpful tool to avoid spontaneity and 
act in accordance to some underlying principles.
The concept of transitional justice crystallized in the beginning of the 
1990s, encompassing all the abovementioned efforts. Since that time, tran-
sitional justice significantly evolved and today should be regarded as a set 
of policies – often called a toolkit – that includes:
full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to 
come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure account-
ability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement 
(and none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth seeking, institu-
tional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.8
This definition lacks precision. Having in mind that it is not my goal to 
present all nuances of the constantly ongoing theoretical debate regarding 
the essence of transitional justice, I propose focusing on the most essential 
features of the latter, which should help us to better understand the criteria 
that allow to place a given policy in the set of transitional justice.
Transitional justice is applied in situations that can be called extraor-
dinary. These are the situations when a political community is forced to 
operate outside of an existing institutional framework, which “describe 
political origins and account for originary and transgressive moments of 
symbolic and legal innovation and for constitutional creation.”9 The kind 
 7 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th 
Century,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991), pp. 384.
 8 United Nations, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies. Report of the Secretary-General,” September 23, 2004.
 9 Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max Weber, 
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of extraordinary that interests me in this book is the one characterized by 
the occurrence of large-scale violence. One might speak about situations 
when violence is personal and direct – when it is clear who commits violent 
acts, and against whom they are targeted – but also about situations when 
violence is indirect or structural; when it is built into the social structure 
and shows up as unequal power.10 In any case, the scale of violence is cru-
cial. Although it is hardly possible to set a clear quantitative threshold that 
would distinguish large-scale from small-scale violence, an indicator that 
may prove helpful for defining situations when extraordinary measures like 
transitional justice are applicable is whether we deal with the case when 
“crime becomes the rule [and] no justice system can adequately cope with 
the fallout – least of all one in a state of transition and fragility.”11
The provision of justice in such situations inevitably requires the involve-
ment of politics. Transitional justice policies are situated on a continuum 
between purely political and purely legal motivations of their applica-
tion. The design and implementation of transitional justice policies can be 
explained on a very general level by the interplay between three types of 
interests: Wrongdoers want to avoid prosecution, victims want to obtain 
compensation (not necessarily a material one), and political parties want to 
utilize the transitional justice policies to increase their share in electorate.12
Thus, the concept of transitional justice refers not to a specific type of jus-
tice but to a specific procedure of provision of justice in the situations when 
resting upon existing rules is impossible or undesirable. The “transitional” 
element of the concept refers to what was called above the extraordinary 
situation when – due to some sort of crisis – society undergoes a funda-
mental shift; a transition between political regimes or a transition from 
war to peace. To a certain extent, transitional justice can be regarded as a 
purposeful, politically motivated manipulation of law, aimed at the estab-
lishment of extraordinary measures to address the perception of injustice 
 10 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace 
Research 6, no. 3 (1969), pp. 170–71.
 11 Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils:  Amnesties and the Search for Justice 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 18.
 12 Jon Elster, Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective 
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existing in a society. Large-scale violence generates the demand for such 
measures, while politics generate the supply understood as specific design 
and implementation of relevant policies. The only element missing from 
the definition so far is moral background, which inevitably accompanies 
extraordinary policies, as they mark periods of political flux: what justifies 
the change? what makes us think that the status quo ante was unjust? 
how exactly do we define justice? what makes us construct policies that 
go beyond the constituted legal reality? Answering these and other similar 
questions requires a point of reference defined by a certain set of norms and 
values; something that may be called the normative anchor of extraordinary 
policies. Without such normative anchor, there is a risk of implementing 
into the set of transitional justice practices like victor’s justice.
Due to the context, in which the concept of transitional justice devel-
oped – transitions to democracy – theoretical considerations in this field 
became strongly linked with the literature on democratization. As a result, 
the general normative expectation prescribed to transitional justice is that 
it should contribute to building a more liberal political order than the one 
that led to the occurrence of the extraordinary situation. For example, Ruti 
Teitel, one of the key theorists of transitional justice, defines it as a concept 
that „seeks to clarify law’s relations to political development in periods of 
radical flux, as it demonstrates processes that reconstitute societies on a 
basis of political liberalisation.”13 I will return to the more specific norma-
tive goals of transitional justice applied in conflict-related societies later in 
this chapter.
To summarize, the notion of transitional justice refers on the one hand to 
what can be called an objective phenomenon of human longing for justice. 
On the other hand, it refers to normative concepts whose nature is inter-
subjective and which are defined by dominating beliefs, norms, and values 
specific to a society. This normative framework is aimed at channeling the 
natural pursuit of justice in the aftermath of large-scale violence into some 
sort of constructive effort.
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For obvious reasons, I do not pay attention to peculiarities of the post-
authoritarian “type” of transitional justice in this book, focusing only on 
the post-conflict one. At this moment, let me clarify something. Dealing 
with justice-related consequences of armed conflict is an object of interest 
also for another concept: jus post bellum. The latter is more legalist, it is 
focused on formulating principles on how to terminate war and establish 
a long-lasting peace, with less attention for the circumstances that actually 
lead to an armed conflict. Taking into account the obvious similarity of both 
concepts of transitional justice and jus post bellum, there appeared voices 
in favor of establishing closer connections between the two.14 I propose to 
regard jus post bellum as a subset of transitional justice. Steps that are usu-
ally regarded as elements of jus post bellum – like formulating principles of 
just termination of a conflict – are not covered in this book, because during 
the period under scrutiny there is no ground to talk about the termination 
of conflict. Moreover, there is a term post-conflict justice, which essentially 
refers to the same phenomenon as transitional justice applied in conditions 
of transition from war to peace. I will regard these notions as synonyms.
In the following parts of the chapter, I will focus on the main conclusions 
that can be drawn from existing literature. I will first focus on purely nor-
mative deliberations: what transitional justice should do? Then, I will ana-
lyze available empirical evidence: what transitional justice actually does?
1.2.  Transitional justice and armed 
conflicts: normative expectations
It goes without saying that any armed conflict generates resentment. In turn, 
resentment almost inevitably becomes a tool in ongoing politics. Therefore, 
a significant part of literature consists of normative considerations, which 
suggest how to design transitional justice mechanisms to deal with these 
resentments. The traces of this “school” of thinking about transitional jus-
tice can be found, among other places, in UN documents referring to the 
 14 Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg, eds., Jus Post Bellum and Transitional 
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problem of post-conflict justice,15 thus making it very influential from the 
perspective of practitioners.
Generally, it would be correct to say that normative considerations in 
the field of post-conflict transitional justice are essentially about avoiding 
any forms of what can be called rough revenge and, instead, channeling the 
emotions generated by injustices before and during the conflict into some 
form of constructive effort. In other words, the most fundamental and uni-
versal normative assumption that accompanies transitional justice policies 
implemented as a response to an armed conflict is that they should not only 
address the existing emotional demand but also provide some public good.
Obviously, in the case of an armed conflict, peace would be the most 
important public good. It is not always easy to identify the moment when 
peace starts. A well-known distinction between negative peace (essentially 
mere absence of violence) and positive peace (assuming the restoration of 
relationships in a society)16 demonstrates this ambiguity: it is hard to iden-
tify the moment when negative peace turns into the positive one. Therefore, 
I find the notion of reconciliation a more accurate way to understand the 
fundamental normative goal of transitional justice. Reconciliation itself is 
far from being unequivocal, taking into account its different levels (indi-
vidual, interpersonal, socio-political and institutional) and degrees (“thin” 
and “thick”).17 For the sake of clarity, in this work I base on the under-
standing of reconciliation proposed by Maddison: it is not any sort of ide-
alized state of affairs, when all antagonisms are eliminated, but a dynamic 
process of transferring a conflict into political field, “a mode of political 
 15 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights 
has elaborated a series of “manuals” devoted to specific transitional justice 
mechanisms: archives, truth commissions, reforms of the justice sector, moni-
toring legal systems, prosecutions, vetting, reparations, hybrid courts, amnesties 
and national consultations. These documents are available on the official web-
site of the OHCHR: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/PublicationsResources/Pages/
MethodologicalMaterials3.aspx.
 16 Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” pp. 167–91.
 17 Paul Seils, “The Place of Reconciliation in Transitional Justice,” ICTJ Briefing 
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engagement and agonistic struggle,” that tries to balance between short-
term stability and long-term aspirations.18
Achieving the fundamental goal of reconciliation requires the provision 
of at least two other public goods that can be regarded as auxiliary norma-
tive goals of transitional justice. The first one is justice itself. A good way 
to understand the essence of justice in a straightforward and intuitive way 
was proposed by Aleksander Solzhenitsyn: the virtue triumphs and the vice 
is punished.19 Leaving aside the question of how exactly should justice be 
granted, the fundamental causal claim that connects justice with peace says 
the following: achieving positive peace presupposes that leaving injustices 
that led to hostility with no response at all is not an option; it is hardly 
possible to build reconciliation on impunity.
Addressing impunity requires obtaining knowledge about what actually 
happened: what kind or wrongdoings were committed, by whom, and why? 
As a result, truth should be regarded as yet another auxiliary normative 
goal of post-conflict transitional justice. More specifically, we should speak 
about truth-seeking, having in mind that we write about a process of both 
revealing facts and their proper interpretation.
Ideally, transitional justice policies should be constructed in such a way 
that the mentioned normative goals reinforce each other, leading to an 
ultimate goal of long-lasting positive peace. However logically correct the 
presented relationships between the notions of peace/reconciliation, justice, 
and truth may look, they become less clear when relevant policies are ap-
plied in practice. In other words, any decision-maker seeking to construct 
a policy that would fit into the category of transitional justice will almost 
inevitably face several dilemmas. Let us take a closer look at them.
As the mentioned Solzhenitsyn’s definition of justice suggests, it has two 
functions. The first one is retributive: it refers to the punishment of vice. 
The second is restorative, which is closer to providing conditions for virtue 
to triumph; more specifically, it refers to the restoration of the state of 
 18 Sarah Maddison, Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation:  Multi-Level 
Challenges in Deeply Divided Societies (London, New  York:  Routledge, 
2017), p. 13.
 19 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in 
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affairs as it was before the vice entered the game. Even though one regards 
justice as a necessary prerequisite of peace, it is impossible to definitely 
settle, which of the mentioned functions is more conducive to achieving 
the ultimate goal of reconciliation. Trying to eliminate impunity, it is easy 
to provide “too much” or “not enough” justice. For example, any perspec-
tive of punishment can discourage parties of a conflict from constructive 
negotiations on peace agreement.20 Therefore, although justice seems to be 
a necessary condition of positive peace, it may hamper the attempts to put 
end to violence (achieving negative peace). On the other hand, transitional 
justice is by no means the only policy that accompanies final stages of an 
armed conflict, along with the period after its termination. In contempo-
rary post-conflict states, also the disarmament, demobilization, and rein-
tegration (DDR) programs are widely applied, paying special attention to 
perpetrators of violence. According to Waldorf, both DDR and transitional 
justice have many contact points and can be easily integrated into a com-
prehensive post-conflict strategy. Nevertheless, improper balance between 
them may bear the risk of turning ex-combatants into a privileged group; 
thus, once again hamper the reconciliation process.21 Similarly, the pro-
vision of compensation for damages – one of the most common way to 
provide restorative justice – may also induce controversies regarding the 
fairness of such practices. These problems are at the heart of what is referred 
to as a justice vs. peace dilemma.
The goal of truth-seeking is also not devoid of contradictions. They 
may appear in the process of establishing the very procedures of revealing 
the facts about the violence, their interpretations and their use by political 
players.22 Furthermore, some researchers provide convincing arguments for 
 20 It should be noted, however, that modern international criminal law sets a clear 
threshold for “minimal justice:” international crimes must be punished.
 21 Lars Waldorf, “Just Peace? Integrating DDR and Transitional Justice,” 
in Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground:  Victims and 
Ex-Combatants, ed. Chandra Lekha Sriram et al. (Milton Park, Abingdon, 
Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 65.
 22 Janine Natalya Clark, “Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation:  An 
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the value of forgetting.23 As a result, we may speak about the existence of 
justice vs. truth dilemma.
Last but not least, the development of transitional justice as a normative 
concept has led to what is usually referred to as a transformative turn. Here, 
the normative assumptions state that the implementation of transitional jus-
tice should support such institutions as good governance or the rule of law. 
These claims are clearly formulated from the positions that could be called 
liberal in a sense that they support the idea that any transitional policies 
should result in more inclusive political order that eliminates the possible 
systemic sources of inequalities of different types, namely problems that led 
to the outbreak of violence.
Along with normative considerations regarding what should be achieved 
by means of transitional justice, an international normative framework was 
developed to establish some standards of how the mentioned goals should 
be achieved.
First of all, the already cited report by the UN Secretary-General 
constitutes an attempt to create a comprehensive set of principles for tran-
sitional justice efforts conducted in post-conflict conditions. Being addressed 
primarily to the UN institutions engaged in conflict resolutions, it is clearly 
a good reference point for decision-makers responsible for formulating 
transitional justice policies in UN member states. Three issues are worth 
special attention here. First and foremost, the restoration of and respect for 
the rule of law should be regarded as the guiding principle of transitional 
justice policies. Second, any peace agreement should
reject any endorsement of amnesty for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity, including those relating to ethnic, gender and sexually based interna-
tional crimes, ensure that no such amnesty previously granted is a bar to prosecu-
tion before any United Nations-created or assisted court.24
Last but not least, respect for the rule of law is hardly possible without 
appropriate quality of procedures. Peace agreements should
 23 David Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).
 24 United Nations, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
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require that all judicial processes, courts and prosecutions are credible, fair, con-
sistent with established international standards for the independence and impar-
tiality of the judiciary, the effectiveness, impartiality and fairness of prosecutors 
and the integrity of the judicial process.25
In 2015, the European Union (EU) adopted the Policy Framework on 
Support to Transitional Justice as part of the implementation of the EU 
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015–2019. This docu-
ment primarily focuses on post-conflict situations; it goes in line with the 
abovementioned UN approach to transitional justice and does not for-
mulate any fundamentally different principles. The goal here is to formu-
late more concrete steps that the EU can take to engage in post-conflict 
situations.26
Neither the UN nor the EU normative frameworks for post-conflict tran-
sitional justice contain a concrete prescription, a catalogue of “dos and 
don’ts” – except from clear opposition to amnesty for international crimes, 
including in the context of peace negotiations – or an explanation how 
to construct policy to address a specific situation. On the contrary, both 
frameworks encourage eschewing one-size-fits-all approaches and, instead, 
favor taking into account the specificity of a context, underline the need to 
reform national criminal law to ensure that it complies with international 
law, and particularly support the functioning of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Therefore, the mentioned documents are far from being 
binding obligations for any government on how to construct transitional 
justice policies. They leave a significant field for political maneuvering, thus 
setting very wide and not always unequivocal boundaries for what may be 
regarded by the international community as acceptable. Nevertheless, one 
should assume that it is in the best interest of any decision-maker willing 
to secure a political support of the international community at least not to 
ignore the principles mentioned above.
In the European context, separate attention should be given to the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case law, which constitutes 
 25 United Nations, “The Rule of Law,” para. 64(e)
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much “harder” normative framework for post-conflict transitional justice; 
taking into account that the ECHR’s decisions are obligatory for members 
of the Council of Europe and therefore may directly impact the design of 
policies in countries subject to its jurisdiction. Obviously, in this case the 
impact on transitional justice is limited to the extent, in which relevant 
policies may affect the rights guaranteed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Basing on Brems’ research of ECHR27 verdicts in cases that 
referred to the practice of transitional justice, states have the following 
obligations: (1) perpetrators of terror and violent repressions must be pros-
ecuted; (2) room must be left for free debate about the past (the freedom 
of expression to seek historical truth); (3) no amnesty must be granted for 
perpetrators of human rights violations. A significant number of ECHR 
verdicts may also have limited utility in terms of setting up guidelines 
for dealing with the aftermath of the Donbas conflict, as they are more 
applicable for cases of post-authoritarian – especially post-communist – 
transitional justice. At least two types of normative expectations can be 
mentioned in this category: (1) the state is expected to provide restitution 
or compensation for the lost property, although not at all cost; (2) some 
restrictions of political freedoms (i.e. vetting) is acceptable, however in 
such case the state must ensure that the people affected enjoy all procedural 
guarantees under the Convention.
Summing up, transitional justice has become a permanent element of 
widely understood conflict resolution and peacebuilding strategies. Policies 
that fit into this category may be implemented on very different stages of 
transition from war to peace. Much is expected from the very fact of their 
implementation – not only that they serve as “moderators” among poten-
tially contradictory goals of peace, justice, and truth but also that they 
should help transform the political order of the state in order to eliminate 
possible sources of new conflicts. Such a huge scope of expectations opens 
the risk of leading to the domination of “faith-based” policy prescription, 
which are not based on robust empirical evidence that retributive (or any 
other) justice actually has an impact on the dynamics of the conflict. In the 
 27 Eva Brems, “Transitional Justice in the Case Law of the European Court of 
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following part, I will review the available empirical evidence of what tran-
sitional justice can actually do in post-conflict environments.
1.3.  Transitional justice and armed 
conflict: empirical evidence
There are several types of research that provide empirical evidence for how 
the application of transitional justice can influence the dynamics of conflict 
and post-conflict situations.
First and foremost, there are several positions based on quantitative 
methods. The most outstanding among them is the attempt to create a 
comprehensive analysis of different factors that impact the efficacy of tran-
sitional justice in a multitude of different circumstances by Olsen, Payne, 
and Reiter.28 Their study focuses primarily on transitional justice applied 
in post-authoritarian contexts, although it contains several conclusions 
that may be also relevant for post-conflict situations. The most important 
conclusion is probably the one that – despite expectedly greater constraints 
put on post-conflict states compared to post-authoritarian states – the prob-
ability of the use of transitional justice is similarly high in both contexts.29 
Furthermore, international involvement – primarily UN peacekeeping – 
increases the likelihood that country leaders will apply some mechanisms 
of accountability.30 Eventually, the authors summarize that it is hardly 
possible to clearly state which elements of transitional justice “toolkit” may 
appear the most efficient in terms of achieving policy goals. Instead, one 
should think in terms of balance among legal imperatives, public safety, 
and pragmatic considerations.31
Binnigsbo et al. worked on a different dataset with the aim to establish 
the links between transitional justice and conflict resolution.32 The results of 
 28 Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter, Transitional Justice in 
Balance. Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy (Washington: United States 
Institute of Peace, 2010).
 29 Olsen, Payne, Reiter, Transitional Justice, p. 129.
 30 Olsen, Payne, Reiter, Transitional Justice, p. 129.
 31 Olsen, Payne, Reiter, Transitional Justice, p. 154.
 32 Helga Malmin Binningsbø et al., “Armed Conflict and Post-Conflict Justice, 
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this research suggest that some forms of accountability are generally more 
probable in the case of conflicts over the government control than in the 
case of territorial conflicts. Moreover, civil wars lead to more amnesties than 
other types of conflict, which may indicate that those in power after civil 
wars often forgo accountability processes to secure conflict termination.33 
Statistics provide further evidence that bargaining elites are willing to make 
concessions for settlement. As a result, amnesties and restorative forms of 
justice occur more frequently in cases when there is no clear resolution of 
the conflict.34 In other words, these data show how the peace vs. justice 
dilemma is usually solved in different circumstances.
Rothe and Maggard conducted another quantitative research focusing 
exclusively on conflicts in Africa. The main conclusion in this case is that 
involvement of the UN or international NGOs enhance the probability of 
some form of post-conflict justice to be applied.35
The feature that links all such studies is that they provide evidence 
essentially reflecting the correlation between different types of conflicts 
and transitional justice mechanisms applied in their aftermath; between 
specific transitional justice mechanisms applied and the effect understood 
as long-lasting sustainable peace; between the involvement (or its lack) 
of different external and internal actors and the very fact of application 
of any type of transitional justice. However, as Sriram underlines, such 
findings usually do not show causation,36 which often remains a matter 
of authorial interpretation. In particular, this refers to the expected trans-
formative effects of transitional justice: there is no unequivocal empirical 
evidence to prove that the implementation of transitional justice inevitably 
reinforces democratic institutions. The causal connection may as well go 
 33 Binningsbø et al., “Armed Conflict,” p. 737.
 34 Binningsbø et al., “Armed Conflict,” p. 738.
 35 Dawn L. Rothe and Scott Maggard, “Factors That Impede or Facilitate Post-
Conflict Justice Mechanisms?”, International Criminal Law Review 12, no. 2 
(2012), pp. 193–217.
 36 Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Beyond Transitional Justice: Peace, Governance, and 
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in the other direction: the implementation of transitional justice may be 
dependent on institutional preconditions.37
On the other hand, there is a number of case studies, which provide 
much deeper insights, explain nuances of complex relations between dif-
ferent goals of transitional justice. For example, one can find good quality 
arguments supporting the claim that institutions associated with retributive 
forms of justice (tribunals) may have a positive impact on the restoration 
of post-conflict societies; suffice to mention the cases of Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone.38 Moreover, there are convincing arguments about the limitations 
of restorative forms of justice; basing on the case of South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission.39
The examples of South Africa and former Yugoslavia help Clark explain 
the ambiguous relationship between truth-seeking and reconciliation. Her 
main conclusion is that truth as such is not enough for reconciliation and 
that truth should rather be thought of as an element of a more comprehen-
sive strategy.40 Somehow similar conclusions emerge from the analysis that 
puts the idea of reconciliation under scrutiny:
mechanisms aiming at accountability do not automatically pave the road to 
reconciliation, conflict transformation and a stable peace.… post-war societies 
need a combination of approaches aiming at legal justice/accountability, truth 
recovery ..., compensation for victims, institutional reform ..., and restoration of 
trust in order to support relationship-building and healing.41
 37 Lars Waldorf, “Institutional Gardening in Unsettled Times:  Transitional 
Justice and Institutional Contexts,” in Justice Mosaics. How Context Shapes 
Transitional Justice in Fractured Society, ed. Roger Duthie and Paul Seils 
(New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 2017), https://www.
ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Book_JusticeMosaics_2017.pdf.
 38 Mba Chidi Nmaju, “The Role of Judicial Institutions in the Restoration of Post-
Conflict Societies: The Cases of Rwanda and Sierra Leone,” Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 16, no. 2 (2011), pp. 357–84.
 39 Cody Corliss, “Truth Commissions and the Limits of Restorative Justice: Lessons 
Learned in South Africa’s Cradock Four Case,” Michigan State International 
Law Review 21, no. 2 (2013), pp. 273–78.
 40 Clark, “Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation.”
 41 Martina Fischer, “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice,” 
in Advancing Conflict Transformation, ed. Beatrix Austin et al., The Berghof 
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The common problem of such empirical studies is that their conclusions – 
however important – are hardly generalizable. Each conflict has its own 
dynamics, defined by specific circumstances like underlying causes or 
engaged parties; there are no transitional justice mechanisms of the same 
type (trials, truth commissions etc.) that are perfectly comparable, due to 
different legal and political circumstances in which they are implemented. 
Taking all these doubts into account, the most recent transitional justice 
literature tends to move away from formulating universal law-like rules, 
but rather regard application of transitional justice as an element of a much 
larger puzzle of policies, which are in turn constrained by interests, values, 
and resources of parties directly or indirectly engaged in the conflict. Post-
conflict transitional justice is now understood as a policy that not only 
combats impunity and seeks reconciliation but also addresses the conditions 
that made such interventions necessary. As McAuliffe argues, to analyze 
such post-conflict justice comprehensively one should take into account the 
agency of all involved actors within the framework of a complex network 
of factors that impact their actions and perceptions of reality: state func-
tionality, domestic politics, economics, and specific post-conflict variables.42
Among the specific post-conflict variables, we should pay special at-
tention to the very process of peace negotiations that may eventually lead 
to the resolution of a conflict; this issue is usually omitted in normative 
considerations mentioned in the previous part. Some researchers underline 
that power-sharing agreements – one of the most common modalities of 
ending armed conflicts in the contemporary world – constitute a contra-
diction of the very idea of transitional justice.43 Power-sharing agreements 
are by definition about concessions in terms of security, territory, politics, 
and economics. Such concessions may hamper the interplay between the 
demand and supply of accountability mechanisms which, as mentioned 
above, constitute the main driving force of transitional justice policies. This 
 42 Pádraig McAuliffe, Transformative Transitional Justice and the Malleability 
of Post-Conflict States (Cheltenham, Northampton:  Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2017).
 43 Stef Vandeginste and Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Power Sharing and Transitional 
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problem has much in common with the described peace vs. justice dilemma. 
Obviously, it is hard, if possible at all, to provide any kind of universal 
solution to this dilemma.
However, if we primarily regard transitional justice as an outcome of the 
interplay of forces of political demand and supply, a different perspective 
opens. Focusing on the very process of peace negotiations, which eventually 
lead to some form of power sharing, the results of comparative research 
suggest that the durability of peace agreements depends to a much bigger 
extent on the quality of negotiation process. What matters in particular is 
the equality of the sides of the conflict, understood as nondiscriminatory 
treatment and equal opportunities of all interested groups to participate in 
negotiations. Scholars explain this effect by the trust established between 
the belligerents.44 Later research confirmed the importance of the quality of 
negotiations for the durability of peace.45 From the perspective of the topic 
of this book, these findings suggest that the more forward-looking the solu-
tion of the conflict – including provisions on transitional justice – the more 
plausible the durable agreement. In other words, the research suggests that 
too much focus on the past may be harmful from the perspective of the goal 
of peace. Moreover, we can hypothesize that building trust among former 
enemies may have an impact on the demand for some form of account-
ability. From this perspective, power sharing negotiations should not be 
regarded as an obstacle to transitional justice but as one of the factors that 
finds its reflection in both the demand and supply of transitional justice.
Therefore, when speaking about links between justice and peace, we 
should focus not only on the outcome of the final agreement or some form 
of resolution that puts an end to a conflict. We should also take into account 
the process of negotiations. Achieving the goal of peace is not influenced 
only by whether the variable of justice is “imprinted” in the final agreement, 
putting the conflict to an end, but also by how it is achieved.
 44 Cecilia Albin and Daniel Druckman, “Equality Matters: Negotiating an End to 
Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 2 (2012), pp. 155–82.
 45 Lynn Wagner and Daniel Druckman, “Drivers of Durable Peace: The Role of 
Justice in Negotiating Civil War Termination,” Group Decision and Negotiation 
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Summing up, existing empirical research obviously proves that transi-
tional justice policies became an important part of contemporary political 
reality. Extensive datasets present the abundance and differentiation of 
practices that fit into the discussed category. On the other hand, the same 
datasets present similar abundance of conclusions that sometimes go in 
different directions. As a result, they appear not as helpful in terms of 
formulating clear hypotheses regarding what transitional justice can help 
achieve in a given conflict-related context. Thus, for the sake of the fol-
lowing analysis, I agree with ever stronger voices that there is no kind of 
one-size-fits-all universal approach in the application of transitional justice 
in post-conflict settings to achieve and sustain the ultimate goal of reconcil-
iation, and thus there can be no one-size-fits-all kind of correct hypotheses. 
Taking into account the extraordinary – thus highly politicized – nature of 
transitional justice in general, we may legitimately expect that the imple-
mentation of such policies will not remain without impact on the political 
development of a given state.
1.4.  Summary and analytical framework for the 
research of a previously unstudied case
Let me summarize the above considerations and explain the most fun-
damental assumptions underlying the empirical research presented in the 
following chapters.
Putting aside normative considerations, existing empirical research 
appears to not be helpful in terms of formulating clear hypotheses for the 
analysis of a new, previously unexamined case of elaboration of transitional 
justice policies. The conclusions of quantitative research do demonstrate the 
impact of different approaches to transitional justice on the quality of the 
process of reconciliation and are indeed helpful when it comes to the ex-post 
explanation of effects of some variables in an outcome. However, these 
conclusions remain very general, as in the mentioned conclusion that UN 
peacekeeping increases the probability that some form of accountability will 
be applied in post-conflict situation. Moreover, they do not provide much 
ground for formulating expectations such as: which elements of “transi-
tional justice toolkit” will be applied in a given post-conflict situation? what 
will be the answer to peace vs. justice and truth vs. justice dilemmas? will 
 
 
Summary and analytical framework 41
the application of transitional justice support the peacebuilding process? 
how will it affect the political development of a society that applies it? On 
the other hand, more thorough case studies provide a good understanding 
of peculiarities of specific instances of transitional justice application in 
societies affected by conflicts but – for obvious reasons – the conclusions 
from such studies can hardly be generalized.
As mentioned above, the definition of transitional justice is very broad. 
The only law-like rule that seems to be valid in this field is that if a given 
society faces the problem of large-scale violence, there will be attempts to 
deal with the injustices it caused. It is precisely among such attempts that 
one should seek policies that fit into the category of transitional justice. 
If we exclude cases that follow the change of political regime and narrow 
down the field of interest only to instances of post-conflict transitional jus-
tice, we will still have to deal with a multitude of conditions, situations, 
and specific decisions that eventually lead to different modalities of dealing 
with injustices.
In other words, the supply of transitional justice in practice assumes a 
variety of different forms, and even seemingly similar transitional justice 
mechanisms like trials or truth commissions significantly differ from case 
to case. Thus, they appear in a potentially unlimited number of conditions 
and conjunctions, which leads to a certain model of transitional justice. 
As a result, the presence or absence of some conditions that led to, for 
instance, establishing a truth commission in one case, cannot be regarded 
as an absolute proof that in different case truth commission will become 
the main mechanism of transitional justice.
In other words, there are all reasons to regard transitional justice as an 
essentially complex phenomenon. The notion of complexity in this context 
is “first and foremost a matter of the number and variety of an item’s constit-
uent elements and of the elaborateness of their interrelational structure, be 
it organisational or operational.”46 Looking at the phenomenon under scru-
tiny through the prism of complexity theory requires regarding it in terms 
of a system, which has some important features. First of all, transitional 
 46 Nicholas Rescher, Complexity:  A Philosophical Overview, Science and 
Technology Studies (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p. 1.
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justice is dynamic: complex systems change with time. Furthermore, it is 
time-asymmetric, which means that although a situation in a given moment 
of time may be the logical consequence of former events, it is hard to pre-
dict the conjunction of all states of system’s elements and external influence 
in the future. Moreover, complex systems are emergent, which means that 
the structure of the system is formed by interaction of its components and 
by the conjunction of external conditions.47 In social reality, emergency 
may be significantly explained by the agency of elements that are part of a 
complex system; their ability to learn and adapt in response to interactions 
with others. A proper way to study complex phenomena is thus trying to 
understand rules that drive changes of the state of system over time.48 Last 
but not least, the functioning of complex systems is characterized by equifi-
nality: the existence of different, mutually non-exclusive explanations of the 
same outcome. These features perfectly fit the above considerations about 
the phenomenon of transitional justice, which therefore should be regarded 
as a set of different policies that share basic features, as explained earlier.
While the above elements of complexity theory appear to provide a useful 
way of looking at transitional justice, they also suggest that a level of con-
scious caution is needed when analyzing complex phenomena. According to 
Byrne and Callaghan, “hypotheses in the strict sense have very little place 
in complexity-informed research and that even models, which are not the 
same thing as hypotheses … most usefully emerge in dialogue with data 
of whatever form as opposed to being tested on data having been fully 
formed in advance of engagement with that data.”49 In other words, while 
trying to understand rules governing the evolution of a complex system, 
one should be careful with formulating any law-like claims predicting the 
future state of the system.
 47 Lasse Gerrits and Stefan Verweij, “Critical Realism as a Meta-Framework 
for Understanding the Relationships between Complexity and Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis,” Journal of Critical Realism 12, no. 2 (2013), pp. 169–70.
 48 John H.  Holland, Complexity:  A Very Short Introduction, Very Short 
Introductions (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
 49 David Byrne and Gill Callaghan, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences: The 
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The following chapters of the book will present an empirical analysis of 
transitional justice aimed at dealing with the consequences of the Donbas 
conflict. How the above theoretical considerations are reflected in my 
research?
First, I regard political order as a complex social system. An extraordi-
nary situation (conflict) plays the role of the so-called strange attractor50 
that significantly changes the system’s development trajectory. From this 
perspective, transitional justice can be regarded as one of the government 
reactions, an attempt to steer the system’s development dynamics during 
this extraordinary period of significant change of state and stabilize it to 
reduce unpredictability; a transit from the extraordinary that destabilized 
the “old ordinary” to the stable “new ordinary.” Thus, from a normative 
perspective, reconciliation is a desirable outcome, the feature of the “new 
ordinary” that should be achieved, but whose achievement is by no means 
automatic due to the problem of emergency.
Second, I focus on relevant steps and decisions taken by the Ukrainian 
government; regarded as the social agent interested in and able of designing 
relevant policies in attempts to steer the destabilized political order. The 
notion of government is used here in a broad sense, as a synonym of state 
authorities; not merely as the executive branch of power. Both notions are 
used interchangeably. Obviously, one can argue that government as such 
can easily be presented as a complex system that consists of interacting 
agents. Aware of this, I nevertheless assume the existence of a fundamental 
level in the cohesion of values and interests of actors who constitute a 
government, and therefore I regard the latter as an entity characterized by 
agency. Of course, it is a simplification, which is a trade-off for the sake of 
obtaining a comprehensive picture of policies that fit into the category of 
transitional justice and their mutual relationships.51
Third, I assume rationality of the main agent. In this research, rationality 
is understood as a quality of an agent that is essentially subjective: this ratio-
nality is defined by the function of utility of action as assessed by the agent. 
Of course, utility may be defined differently by different agents, depending 
 50 Byrne, Callaghan, Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, pp. 26–29.
 51 Of course, it would be interesting to conduct a different research that will trace 
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on their values, information possessed, and even the ability to process infor-
mation. For example, a study of the motivation of German soldiers who 
fought in the Second World War proved that values and beliefs can perfectly 
play the role of force that drives an essentially rational behavior.52
Thus, the empirical research presented in the following chapters clearly 
fits into the mentioned category of narrowly focused case studies in the 
application of transitional justice policies. At the same time, this research 
is quite original. The peculiarity of the Donbas conflict will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 2; however, there is one feature of it that should be 
mentioned here. Taking into account the unresolved nature of the Donbas 
conflict – along with the lack of a clear perspective of its resolution at the 
time I write this book – the final model of transitional justice designed to 
deal with its legacy remains unknown. Therefore, the analysis presents what 
can be called transitional justice in statu nascendi or “transitional justice 
in-the-making.” In other words, I focus on adaptive reactions of a social 
agent aimed at stabilizing a complex social system stamped out from the 
state of equilibrium. The evolution of the system as a whole remains largely 
outside of the scope of my analysis; that is, I will not scrutinize the political 
development of Ukraine.
To obtain the comprehensive picture, I focus on tracing the evolution of 
policies designed by the Ukrainian government, which directly or indirectly 
aim at achieving the specific normative goals prescribed to transitional 
justice aimed at dealing with the consequences of an armed conflict. The 
empirical analysis begins with the dissection of context for the applica-
tion of transitional justice addressed at the effects of the Donbas conflict 
(Chapter 2). In other words, I look here at relatively constant circumstances, 
which to a certain extent determine the behavior of the social agent under 
scrutiny. The analysis of the evolution of relevant policies starts with truth-
seeking (Chapter 3), which is supposed to play a fundamental role in cre-
ating narratives that may constitute frameworks for providing retributive 
and restorative aspects of justice, respectively discussed in Chapters 4 and 
 52 Sönke Neitzel et  al., Żołnierze:  protokoły walk, zabijania i umierania 
(Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2014).
 
 
Summary and analytical framework 45
5. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 begin with brief theoretical remarks that provide 
additional insight into the peculiarities of discussed normative goals.
All in all, the research is inspired by the explain-outcome variant of pro-
cess tracing: my ambition here is to build a minimally sufficient explanation 
of the observed outcome. In other words, the research seeks to understand 
basic principles that explain the “pathways” of development of relevant 
policies up to a certain moment in time. Mutual relationships between 
three “policy lineages” – truth-seeking, retributive justice, and restorative 
justice – are explained in conclusions. At the same time, theory-building can 
be regarded as a secondary goal.53 In particular, I hope that the research will 
produce some conclusions which will be applicable for testing in further 
comparative studies, and therefore become the basis for more generaliz-
able regularities regarding how the creation process of transitional justice 
policies determines the eventual modality. Having in mind the mentioned 
limitations dictated by the complexity-informed research regarding the pos-
sibility of prediction, determinism is understood in the following way: the 
past determines the present and the future in the sense that it limits their 
possibilities.54
 53 Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations 
and Guidelines (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), pp. 60–62.






Chapter 2.  Ukrainian politics and the 
context for transitional justice 
addressed at the legacies of the 
Donbas conflict
2.1.  Specificity of the political system
Political system of any state sets up the most fundamental “rules of the 
game” for the policymaking process. The topic of Ukraine’s political system 
is in itself very wide and, for an obvious reason, I will not discuss it in detail. 
In this section, I pay attention to its most significant feature, which can be 
called a dualism between formal and informal institutions. This feature 
appears to last throughout the numerous developments in the history of 
independent Ukraine; there are sufficient grounds to regard the institutional 
dualism as able to exert influence on the shape of extraordinary policies at 
the center of this analysis.
Let us start with what can be called the “formal side” of Ukraine’s polit-
ical system. On July 16, 1990, the Verkhovna Rada of the Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Ukraine (the parliament) adopted the “Declaration of state 
sovereignty.”55 The document provides formal grounds for the legal and ter-
ritorial continuity of the Ukrainian state, as well as the basis for adoption of 
a new constitution. Ukraine’s independence was eventually declared by the 
parliament on August 24, 1991.56 As soon as on September 12, 1991, the 
law on the legal succession of Ukraine was adopted57 to regulate the basic 
principles of the transitional period from one of the former soviet republics 
to an independent state. According to the document, Ukraine announced 
itself a legal successor of the rights and obligations under international 
 55 Verkhovna Rada of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine, “Declaration on 
state sovereignty of Ukraine,” Pub. L. No. 55-XII (1990), https://zakon.rada.
gov.ua/go/55-12.
 56 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On declaration of independence of Ukraine,” 
Pub. L. No. 1427-XII (1991), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1427-12.
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treaties of the USSR, which do not contradict the Constitution of Ukraine 
and its interests. What is even more important from the perspective of this 
work is that the law confirmed the institutional continuity of the state: the 
constitution of the Ukrainian SSR remained in force until the adoption 
of the new constitution. The Verkhovna Rada of the USSR was renamed 
into the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – leaving the deputy composition 
unchanged – and proclaimed to be the supreme organ of Ukrainian state 
power. Moreover, state authorities and agencies, public prosecutor’s office, 
courts, and arbitration courts formed on the basis of the Ukrainian SSR 
constitution remained in force until the establishment of state authorities 
and agencies, public prosecutor’s office, courts, and arbitration courts on 
the basis of the new constitution.
The new constitution of Ukraine was adopted in 1996,58 reaffirming 
democracy, the rule of law, the separation of powers, along with polit-
ical, economic, and ideological diversity, as fundamental principles upon 
which the state is based. Ukraine is a unitary state, it acknowledges and 
guarantees local self-government, but also the autonomy of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea that nevertheless remains an integral part of Ukraine. 
Furthermore, the constitution proclaims human rights and freedoms as 
inalienable and inviolable.
According to the 1996 constitution, Ukraine can be characterized as a 
semi-presidential republic. The one-chamber parliament – the Verkhovna 
Rada – is the only legislative organ of the state. The executive is divided 
between the popularly elected president and the government: the Cabinet 
of Ministers. The president obtains the power to nominate the prime min-
ister and dismiss members of government. The judiciary power is carried 
out exclusively by the courts. Finally, the constitution established the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine, responsible for decisions on the com-
pliance of laws and other legal acts with the constitution, but also for the 
official interpretation of the constitution.
Since that time, the constitution underwent several changes, all of which 
essentially referred to the issue of relations between the legislature and the 
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executive. In December 2004, the parliament amended the constitution by 
weakening the presidential power.59 The task of nominating the prime min-
ister was transferred to the parliament; the president also lost the power 
to dismiss the government. However, (s)he has gained the right to dissolve 
the parliament and call new parliamentary elections if the latter fails to 
appoint the prime minister. In other words, in 2004 Ukraine essentially 
became a parliamentary republic. This amendment was closely connected 
to the developments known as the Orange Revolution.60
In 2010, the 2004 amendment was overturned by the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine, who considered them unconstitutional.61 This change of 
the constitution should be regarded as a part of the process of power consol-
idation by Ukraine’s fourth president, Viktor Yanukovych, and later became 
the basis for his indictment for the usurpation of power. Yanukovych’s 
presidency ended early in the aftermath of probably the most remarkable 
event in the country’s contemporary history: the mass protests known as 
Euromaidan.62 Facing the unprecedented situation that followed the culmi-
nation of Euromaidan, the parliament delegitimized the 2010 verdict of the 
Constitutional Court, thus restoring the version of the constitution intro-
duced in December 2004 and bringing back the parliamentary republic.63
 59 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On amendments to the constitution of Ukraine,” 
Pub. L. No. 2222-IV (2004), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/2222-15.
 60 More on this topic, see Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul, eds., 
Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). Andrew 
Wilson, Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
 61 Constitutional Court of Ukraine, “The decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine in the case of the constitutional petition of 252 deputies of Ukraine on 
the compliance with the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of the Law 
of Ukraine “On Amendments to the constitution of Ukraine” of December 8, 
2004, No. 2222-IV,” Pub. L. No. 20-рп/2010 (2010), https://zakon.rada.gov.
ua/go/v020p710-10.
 62 I discuss this issue in more details elsewhere:  Igor Lyubashenko, 
“Euromaidan: From the Students” Protest to Mass Uprising,” in The Maidan 
Uprising, Separatism and Foreign Intervention: Ukraine’s Complex Transition, 
ed. Klaus Bachmann and Igor Lyubashenko, Studies in Political Transition, vol. 
4 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014).
 63 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On the text of the Constitution of Ukraine in 
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The above paragraphs briefly present the evolution of the Ukrainian 
political system as seen from the formal perspective.64 The institutional 
structure remained relatively stable and the state proclaimed commitment 
to broadly understood Western standards of liberal democracy. At the same 
time, Ukraine’s political system faced several attempts to “fine-tune” it for 
the sake of ongoing political game; these attempts could be regarded as 
manifestations of the system’s “informal side.”
In order to understand the “informal side” of Ukraine’s political system, 
we should consider the specificity of the economic policy of the state in the 
early stages of its development. The perestroika policy initiated at the end 
stage of USSR’s existence allowed, among other things, more freedom to 
managers of state-owned enterprizes.65 Thus, this group of people obtained 
some experience of acting in a relatively competitive environment; they also 
had relatively high positions in the social hierarchy. As a result, they pre-
dominantly managed to take control over significant parts of the economy, 
when the already independent Ukraine started the process of privatization. 
This group gave rise to a specific class of large capitalists who eventually 
became new powerful stakeholders in the political game, able of forming 
alliances with the opposition and eventually leading to changes in the ruling 
elite.66 This class is widely referred to as oligarchs.67
Ukraine of December 8, 2004 No. 2222-IV, February 1, 2011 No. 2952-VI, 
September 19, 2013 No. 586-VII,” Pub. L. No. 750-VII (2014), https://zakon.
rada.gov.ua/go/750-18.
 64 For more about the specificity of Ukraine’s political system, see Andrew Wilson, 
The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, 2. ed. with new material (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2002); Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy 
in the Post-Soviet World, 1st ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); 
Kataryna Wolczuk, The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of 
State Formation (Budapest; New York: Central European University Press, 2001).
 65 Paweł Kowal, “Oligarchy, Tyranny and Revolutions in Ukraine 1991–2014,” in 
The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign Intervention: Ukraine’s Complex 
Transition, ed. Klaus Bachmann and Igor Lyubashenko, Studies in Political 
Transition, vol. 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014), p. 120.
 66 Scott Radnitz, “The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and 
the Post-Soviet “Revolutions,” Comparative Politics 42, no. 2 (2010), p. 127.
 67 It should be clearly noted here that this briefly explained process is by no means 
a specifically Ukrainian phenomenon. Similar developments could be observed 
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Understanding the role of oligarchs in the political system of Ukraine 
is crucial. To make the long story short, oligarchs should be regarded as 
important political actors. They usually do not hold formal positions but 
use the existing formal institutional structure of the state as a “playground” 
that provides more or less equal and predictable conditions for all “players” 
participating in the “game.” According to Matuszak:
Big business not only controls entire sectors of the Ukrainian economy and the 
electronic mass media—it also has a vast influence within political parties. It 
is often the case that the overriding goal of a given grouping’s existence is to 
represent the oligarchs who sponsor it. […] One may risk stating that it is the 
interplay of the interests of the oligarchs that is the real mechanism which shapes 
Ukrainian politics. When giving their support for a given political grouping, rep-
resentatives of big business are guided by nothing more than their own interests, 
and they do not identify themselves with the views of the political parties and 
politicians they are offering financial support to. If the political configuration 
changes, the oligarchs usually have no problems finding common ground with 
the new government.68
In other words, during the period of independence Ukrainian politics 
turned primarily into a tool of conducting business: it allowed either pref-
erential access to public resources or the possibility to create favorable 
regulations.
Such a system is not without positive features. First and foremost, the 
plurality of existing oligarch clans appeared to be contributing to the 
pluralism in political life and the media.69 Moreover, pre-2014 oligarchy 
is argued to strengthen Ukraine’s position vis-à-vis Russia, because none 
of the richest Ukrainians was interested in doing business on Russian 
terms.70
Among the most obvious weaknesses of the system one can mention the 
monopolization of Ukrainian economy, which is in turn one of the causes 
of the country’s unfavorable investment climate. The mentioned plurality of 
political actors also (somehow counterintuitively) led to the politicization 
 68 Sławomir Matuszak, The Oligarchic Democracy: The Influence of Business 
Groups on Ukrainian Politics (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2012), p. 5.
 69 Matuszak, The Oligarchic Democracy.
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of the judiciary; unsure about how long will they manage to stay in politics, 
incumbents had more incentives to manage the current policy control also 
by pressuring courts.71
The oligarchic system proved to be very resilient to changes. It survived 
several significant extraordinary moments. The already mentioned Orange 
Revolution of 2004–2005 led to a reshuffle among the oligarchs without the 
alteration of the system itself. Viktor Yanukovych’s attempts to concentrate 
power by reversing the 2004 constitutional amendment are interpreted as 
yet another try to alter the Ukrainian oligarchic system and institute its 
“Russian variant;” thus, a situation when the government finds a way 
to dominate the oligarchy and turns it into one of the tools of support. 
Yanukovych’s attempt eventually ended in his removal from the office.72 The 
Euromaidan protest was to a great extent driven by the popular demand to 
at least weaken the “informal side” of Ukraine’s political system, defined 
by the oligarchy. Nevertheless, the described oligarchic system remains a 
key mechanism that shaped Ukrainian politics and economy in the post-
Euromaidan period,73 which is covered by this study.
Let me summarize the above considerations and explain their relevance 
for the analysis of transitional justice policies designed to address the 
legacy of the Donbas conflict. First of all, the institutional structure of the 
Ukrainian state is formally based on normative acts that clearly define its 
liberal democratic nature, but also its commitment to the rule of law prin-
ciple and human rights. However, this structure remains immature due to 
the existence of its very strong “informal side;” this statement remains true 
also in the period covered by this book.
The discussed duality of the political system suggests that authorities in 
reality have a greater scope of freedom when designing different sorts of 
policies, than it can be deduced from the analysis of the formal “rules of the 
 71 Maria Popova, Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A Study of Courts 
in Russia and Ukraine, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 169.
 72 Kowal, “Oligarchy, Tyranny and Revolutions in Ukraine 1991–2014,” 
pp. 132–34.
 73 Wojciech Konończuk, Fundament systemu:  starzy i nowi oligarchowie na 
Ukrainie, Punkt Widzenia, no. 59 (Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich 
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game” like constitutions or specific laws. In other words, one may say that 
Ukrainian authorities have a significant experience in operating beyond the 
existing formal rules, which is also an essential feature of extraordinary pol-
itics. However, this sort of traditional greater freedom from legalism does 
not necessarily lead to a conclusion that it can automatically be used in a 
constructive way to deal with the previously unknown problem of armed 
conflict. In particular, a significant part of Ukrainian society has expressed 
its dissatisfaction with the discussed duality of the political system; which 
manifested itself in the form of the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. 
Therefore, there is an uncertainty about how the society as a whole – and 
some elements of it in particular – may react to an extraordinary decision.
Finally, the “informal side” of political system should be taken into 
account when analyzing any political process in Ukraine. This causes an 
obvious problem, because the informality of the rules can only be traced 
through their manifestations in political reality, rather than simply read 
from normative acts. Taking into account that this research project pri-
marily focuses on the evolution of transitional justice policies as available 
in official documents issued by Ukrainian authorities, the exact explanation 
of the processes that led to a certain outcome remains outside the scope 
of this research.74 In other words, I focus on the visible outcomes of both 
formal and informal political processes. In this book, I regard two things 
as certain: (1) the outcome of decision-making processes in the form of 
official documents may reflect the influence of political actors who formally 
reside outside of that process; (2) the continuous functioning and develop-
ment of the specific connections between business and politics led to what 
may be called the socialization of political class to functioning in such a 
system. In other words, personal profitability of a given policy or solution 
should be taken into account as one of the main criteria of its utility in the 
rational decision-making process (see Chapter 1). In yet other words, the 
 74 This problem is worthwhile but requires a separate research that would base 
on a different research design. In particular, it would be interesting to trace the 
actual interplay of formal and informal connections between political actors in 
the process of creation of specific elements of transitional justice. The results of 
such research would inevitably show an even narrower picture but would be 
helpful in the better understanding of mechanisms that led to certain decisions.
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past “normal” behavior of political actors who treated politics in business 
terms may play a role of a filter that limits possible variants of action in 
new circumstances.
2.2.  The specificity of the Donbas conflict: susceptibility 
to multiple interpretations
The armed conflict in the east of Ukraine started to evolve in the after-
math of the mentioned Euromaidan protests that took place at the end of 
2013 and the beginning of 2014. The protests ended with the escape of 
President Yanukovych to Russia on February 22, 2014. Almost immedi-
ately, on March 1, the event incited rallies in the cities of Kharkiv, Odesa, 
Donetsk, Kherson, and Mykolaiv – all situated in the south and east of 
Ukraine – whose participants openly expressed their disagreement with 
the change of authorities in Kyiv. It is important to note that the support 
for Euromaidan was concentrated in the western and central regions of the 
country. However, this statement should not be regarded as a proof that 
the ideas and values of Euromaidan were not supported in other regions of 
Ukraine; although, the support was limited to an extent.75 Therefore, it was 
no surprise that the narrative presenting the protests and their outcome as 
an illegal coup d’etat gained fertile ground in the east and in the south of 
the country. I discuss the problem of narratives used to describe the essence 
of the conflict in more detail in Chapter 3.
Rallies against the post-Euromaidan change of authorities also happened 
in Crimea. The latter were used by local pro-Russian groups openly 
supported by the Russian military to organize a referendum on the inde-
pendence of Crimea on March 16, 2014. Two days later, on March 18, 
2014, an agreement was signed in Moscow on the joining of Crimea to the 
Russian Federation. There is sufficient evidence to regard these events as 
an act of aggression against Ukraine.76
 75 Democratic Initiatives Foundation, “Dva misiatsi protestiv v 
Ukraїni:  shcho dali?”, January 21, 2014, https://dif.org.ua/article/
dva-misyatsi-protestiv-v-ukraini-shcho-dali.
 76 Thomas D. Grant, Aggression against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, and 
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The events in Donbas generally fit the same pattern. Anti-government 
meetings were soon complemented with separatist rallies. There were 
instances of occupation of official buildings throughout the region, accom-
panied by the proclamation of “people’s authorities.” On May 11, 2014, 
the “authorities” conducted unconstitutional referendums. According 
to Ukraine’s constitution, issues of altering the territory of Ukraine are 
resolved exclusively by an all-Ukrainian referendum. Thus, the referenda 
provided a dubious basis for the so-called independence of the self-pro-
claimed “people’s republic” of Donetsk (DNR) and Luhansk (LNR). 
Although Russia clearly supported the emergence of both putative states, 
there was no attempts to annex the secessionist territories as it happened 
in the case of Crimea.
Unlike in the case of Crimea, Ukrainian government decided to use force 
against the secessionists in Donbas. On April 13, 2014, a counter-terrorist 
operation (ATO) was authorized to oppose growing centrifugal tendencies. 
By summer 2014, the conflict escalated to a full-fledged war. Russian forces 
were documented to be directly engaged in the conflict, although Russian 
authorities never acknowledged their participation, consequently refusing 
being regarded as a side in the conflict, instead positioning themselves in 
the role of a mediator. A more nuanced analysis of preconditions and the 
evolution of the conflict is available in works by Wilson77 and Kuzio.78
Peace talks regarding the situation in Ukraine began already at the early 
stages of the conflict’s escalation. On April 17, 2014, representatives of the 
Ukrainian government, the European Union, the United States of America, 
and the Russian Federation concluded an agreement in Geneva with the 
main aim to deescalate growing tensions and providing security. In June 
2014, the so-called Normandy Format was created – an informal group 
of leaders from France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine – which became 
the main political platform for consulting the possibilities of finding a res-
olution of the Donbas conflict. On a more technical level, the Normandy 
Format is supplemented by the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), which 
 77 Andrew Wilson, Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2014).
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consists of representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The group drafted the first 
ceasefire agreement signed on September 5, 2014, in Minsk by the repre-
sentatives of the OSCE, Ukraine, Russia, and leaders of the self-proclaimed 
“republics” of DNR and LNR. The second ceasefire agreement was signed 
on February 12, 2015, following a new wave in the escalation of violence 
at the beginning of 2015. Below, I will refer to them respectively as Minsk-1 
and Minsk-2 protocols. Both documents have a status of political declara-
tion and cannot be regarded as legally binding; neither of them was ratified 
into the legal system of Ukraine. The texts of both protocols can be found 
in Annex 3.
The Minsk-2 protocol achieved a relative calm, although not a complete 
end of violence. Annex 1 presents a schematic timeline of the conflict since 
its beginning until the end of 2018, including the information about the 
number of conflict-related casualties and the most important decisions that 
can be regarded as milestones in the evolution of the conflict.
The whole period of time covered by this book is characterized by 
constant negotiations and consultations taking place within the framework 
of both the TCG and the Normandy Format. However, these led to no 
legally binding agreement that would put an end to the conflict.
Along with the significant number of victims of direct violence, the con-
flict generated additional problems, whose solution may be interpreted in 
terms of the provision of or restoration of justice. First, international or-
ganizations and NGOs report violations of human rights as a direct or indi-
rect result of warfare, not only by combatants of the “people’s republics,” 
but also by the Ukrainian government forces.79 Second, for the first time 
since independence, Ukraine has faced the problem of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), whose number is estimated around 1.4 million people.80 
 79 International Federation for Human Rights, “Eastern Ukraine. Civilians Caught 
in the Crossfire,” October 2015, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/eastern_
ukraine-ld.pdf.
 80 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report 
on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 May to 15  August  2015,” 
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IDPs are reported to face problems in the protection of their social rights.81 
Third, the conflict provided a new context to the process of necessary state 
reforms, in particular its decentralization, pretty much obvious even before 
the outbreak of the war. The emergence of separatism further politicized 
the issue, creating a field of new problems: how to conduct reforms neces-
sary for better socio-economic development – thus providing the basis for 
socio-economic rights – and simultaneously avoid accusations of unjustified 
concessions given to the government’s adversaries who question the legiti-
macy of central authorities?
This briefly presented combination of external aggression and separatism 
constitutes the most significant feature of the conflict that inevitably has 
an impact on any policy aimed at dealing with the consequences of such 
conflict. Justice-related policies are not an exception here. In the Ukrainian 
public sphere, the notion of hybridity was widely used to grasp the essence 
of the conflict. For example, one of the most well-known Ukrainian political 
scientist devoted a monograph to this problem, defining hybrid war as a
totality of previously prepared and promptly implemented measures of military, 
diplomatic, economic, and informational nature, aimed at achieving strategic 
goals. The main objective of [the hybrid war] is the subordination of interests of 
one state to the interests of another under conditions of formal preservation of a 
political order of the victim-state. Following components can be regarded as the 
basic elements of hybrid warfare: traditional and non-standard threats, terrorism, 
subversion, and new or nonconventional technologies used to confront the mili-
tary power of the enemy.82
Without any doubt, the Donbas conflict is not the first one to be labelled 
as hybrid; it would not be an exaggeration to state that any war witnessed 
by history contained some elements of hybridity, as defined by Mahda. 
It is not the goal of this study to argue for or against the correctness of 
the use of the term of hybridity to explain the essence of the Donbas con-
flict. Nevertheless, I mention it because the notion draws attention to the 
important ambiguities that accompany the conflict since the moment of its 
 81 Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, “Zahubleni v papirtsiakh: dotrymannia 
sotsialnykh prav vnutrishn’o peremishchenykh osib,” 2017, https://helsinki.org.
ua/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/zagubleni_ukr.pdf.






Ukrainian politics and context for transitional justice58
emergence, and thus constitute a significant element of scope conditions, in 
which occurs the process of designing and implementation of transitional 
justice policies by Ukrainian authorities.
In particular, one should pay attention to the existence of local pro-
Russian groups in Ukraine, which organized a series of “referenda” on 
the independence of a certain territory and, finally, openly supported the 
Russian military when it entered into combat. The “referenda” became the 
main argument supporting the emergence of the putative states, later either 
incorporated into the Russian Federation – as in the case of Crimea – or 
supported by it, as in the case of the DNR and the LNR. In other words, 
although there is no serious doubt that Russia’s de facto aggression against 
Ukraine became a necessary condition for the emergence of “people’s re-
publics” in the Ukrainian Donbas, and the following outbreak of violence, 
the existence of some local popular support for the “republics” cannot be 
denied.
As a consequence, it is possible to provide evidence supporting both 
claims that the conflict is essentially an interstate armed conflict and claims 
that it is essentially a non-international armed conflict. Furthermore, 
favoring any of these claims can be regarded as a political declaration of 
support for one of the sides of the conflict.
I do not aim to provide a definite solution of this problem. At the mo-
ment of writing, some of its aspects are under consideration of international 
courts (see Chapter 3) and – for the sake of objectivity – it would be wise 
to rely on their eventual verdicts. What is important from the perspective 
of this book is that this ambiguity – whether legitimate or not – cannot be 
ignored in the process of creating a comprehensive model of transitional 
justice addressing the legacy of the Donbas conflict, which requires us to 
answer several fundamental questions, such as: What actually happened 
(truth)? who should bear primary responsibility (justice)? who should rec-
oncile with whom (peace/reconciliation)?
International law seems to have only a limited potential to find satis-
factory answers to these and similar questions. For example, Ukraine and 
Russia are parties to Geneva conventions and therefore are obliged to apply 
international humanitarian law. From the perspective of the convention, 
the existence of an armed conflict does not depend on the fact of recogni-
tion of its existence by the states but emerges from the very fact of armed 
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confrontation. Thus, the very existence of an armed conflict in Donbas can 
be regarded as a legal fact. However, while the international humanitarian 
law sets up the standards of behavior during an armed conflict, it does not 
provide any reference point to establish, who is a party of the conflict. On 
the other hand, international criminal law provides the basis for inves-
tigating the chains of command, and thus to bring to accountability the 
ones who hold the effective control over the combatants, and through their 
actions may be responsible for committing serious atrocities.83 Still, taking 
into account the problem of potential peace vs. justice and truth vs. justice 
dilemmas (see Chapter 1), addressing the violent legacy of an armed con-
flict by legal means does not constitute any guarantee of reconciliation. To 
put it differently, numerous mentioned uncertainties inevitably require the 
engagement of essentially political means to solve them.
Summing up, from the perspective of this study’s goal, it impossible to 
ignore the existing uncertainties referring to the legal status of the conflict 
and its combatants. On the one hand, such uncertainty is unfavorable. On 
the other hand, it creates space for what can be called political maneuvering 
when trying to create policies aimed at achieving the normative goals of 
transitional justice. Of course, such maneuvering in the field devoid of 
more or less clear legal framework is associated with the risk of criticism 
for breaking the principle of the rule of law; keeping in mind that – from 
the normative perspective – transitional justice is expected to reinforce the 
latter.
2.3.  Economic constraints
Along with the unprecedented crisis of military nature, 2014 also marks 
the beginning of a period of significant economic turbulence in Ukraine. 
This circumstance cannot be omitted in this analysis due to the simple fact 
that justice costs.
Costs are generated by actions that are aimed at provision of both retrib-
utive and restorative functions of justice. The former is probably less evident 
 83 Greg R. Vetter, “Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in the 
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from the perspective of an average citizen, but the main instruments of 
retributive justice (investigations and trials) are generally quite expensive. 
The latter is more obvious, taking into account that material compensations 
are one of the most obvious tools to restore the situation affected by an 
extraordinary event. In both cases, there is a need to spend the relevant 
amount of public money.
Figure 2.1 presents the value of Ukraine’s GDP between 2012 and 2017. 
As a result of economic slowdown, Ukrainian economy shrank by about 
fifty percent over the first two years of the conflict. In other words, the size 
of the “cake,” which is the source of resources that could be somehow dis-
tributed by the state to address injustices generated by the conflict became 
much smaller.
One can hardly realistically assess the costs needed for investigations 
and trials, so attempts to calculate the costs needed for restorative needs 








2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Figure 2.1. GDP of Ukraine (current USD, billion USD)
Source: World Bank.
 84 For example:  The World Bank, “Ukraine. Recovery and Peacebuilding 
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that – along with some constraints of legal and political nature mentioned 
in other sections of this  chapter – Ukrainian authorities willing to design 
and implement transitional justice policies can hardly avoid calculations of 
economic and financial costs and benefits of possible policies. For example, 
retributive efforts may lead to quick benefits of moral and emotional nature. 
On the other hand, policies fitting into the category of restorative justice, 
despite their more obvious costliness may also be regarded as a sort of 
investment, which can support development.85
2.4.  Public perception of the Donbas conflict
The Donbas conflict permanently redefined the public perception of most 
significant problems faced by the Ukrainian state. Basing on available 
research, we may name its two important features.86
First, the majority of Ukrainians tend to believe that things generally 
go wrong in their country (Figure 2.2). Since the beginning of 2014, the 
Donbas conflict is clearly considered to be the most important problem that 
prevents Ukraine from moving “in the right direction” (Table 2.1). These 
data can be interpreted as follows: Ukrainians predominantly expect steps 
to be taken towards the resolution of the conflict; this expectation did not 
weaken as the conflict transformed from the most violent phase in 2014 
to the phase of low intensity from the beginning of 2015. Noteworthy, 
the outbreak of the conflict is regarded as an additional problem, which 
overshadows what can be called the pre-conflict priority issues such as com-
bating corruption and widely understood steps toward the improvement of 
economic conditions; still, the conflict did not remove these elements from 
the view of the public.
 85 Pablo De Greiff and Roger Duthie, eds., Transitional Justice and Development. 
Making Connections (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009).
 86 All data cited in this part and in the whole book refer to public opinion in 
Ukraine’s mainland, unless indicated otherwise. The notion of mainland refers 
to Ukraine’s territories under control of the Ukrainian government, thus they 
exclude Crimea and territories occupied by the “people’s republics” of DNR 
and LNR. Our knowledge about the public opinion of inhabitants of the latter 
is very limited due to physical danger associated with conducting research on 
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Second, a series of surveys exclusively devoted to the problem of Donbas 
conflict reveals some stable preferences of Ukrainians regarding how the 
goal of normalization should be achieved, which does not change signif-
icantly along with the development of the conflict. According to the data 
presented in Figure 2.3, the predominant majority of Ukrainians believe 
that the conflict should eventually be solved without the use of force and 
would accept all compromises. Regular public opinion surveys further 
confirm that only a small minority (around sixteen percent) believes that 
peace can be achieved only as a result of military victory. Moreover, there 
is an obvious regional disproportion in the level of acceptance of possible 
compromises: the farther respondents live from the conflict area the more 
uncompromising position they tend to have; for those living in the direct 
vicinity of the self-proclaimed “republics” – and thus those who most likely 
witnessed or experienced the war in person – the undisputable priority is 










Dec. 2013 Dec. 2014 Dec. 2015 Dec. 2016 Dec. 2017 Dec. 2018
Generally speaking, do you think that the developments in 
Ukraine are moving in a wright or wrong direction?
In the right direction In the wrong direction Hard to answer
Figure 2.2. Ukrainians’ perception of the state of affairs in the country.
Source: Democratic Initiatives Foundation.
 87 Democratic Initiatives Foundation, “Poshuky shliakhiv vidnovlennia 
suverenitetu Ukraїny nad okupovanym Donbasom: stan hromadskoї dumky 
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From the perspective of the objective of this book, these data show 
the virtual impossibility of Ukrainian decision-makers to avoid engaging 
in steps towards the resolution of the Donbas conflict; however banal it 
may sound. At the same time, hawkish solutions are clearly not a prefer-
able option, as the clear majority of constituents opts for following the 
path of political concessions. This clearly provides decision-makers with a 
large field for manoeuvring when trying to meet the public expectation of 
achieving peace by primarily political means. At the same time, this casts a 
shadow on the goal of justice, whose achievement may be delayed in time 
and – as a result – lead to some tensions in the Ukrainian society.
***
Summing up, any steps by Ukrainian authorities addressed to deal with 
injustices generated by the Donbas conflict are expected to be constrained 
by the number of relatively constant conditions: the strong mutual penetra-












Sep.14 Oct.15 May.16 Jun.17 Dec. 2018
Do you think it is necessary to accept compromises with Russia and the 
leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics for the sake of 
peace?
Soft (peace at all cost) Middle (some compromises can be accepted)
Hard (real peace can be achieved only by force) Hard to say
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the very nature of the conflict; limited resources caused by the economic 
crisis, and the general public expectation to end the conflict by peaceful 
means. In the following chapters of the book, I will focus on the evolution 
of policies that fit into the category of transitional justice, as defined above. 
One of questions that guided the analysis is to what extent did the above-
discussed constraints actually impact these policies.
Chapter 3.  Truth-seeking
3.1.  The significance of truth-seeking for 
conflict-affected societies
As mentioned in Chapter 1, truth-seeking should be regarded as an “aux-
iliary” goal of transitional justice in the sense that it may help achieve the 
ultimate goal of reconciliation. From this perspective, the primary function 
of truth-seeking is to set a reference point for assessment, which should be 
regarded as wrongdoing worth punishing or, on the other hand, a harm 
worth a reparative action. Sometimes, these issues are obvious; in complex 
social reality and especially in extraordinary situations things may look 
different.
As a starting point of the analysis I propose to focus on the concept of 
four different categories of truth proposed by Albie Sachs, former South 
African Constitutional Court justice: (1) microscopic truth (e.g. positivist 
truth in science or legal truth in the court of law); (2) logical truth (implicit 
in a proposition or statement); (3) experiential truth (which is essentially 
about storytelling); and (4) dialogical truth (“the whole mix of evidential 
testimonial, experiential, the truths of many people being interpreted in 
many ways; and it’s never ending”).89 What we should clearly state is that 
such approach to understanding truth has nothing to do with relativism. 
The value of the idea presented by Sachs, an experienced legal practitioner, 
is that it reflects the extreme complexity close to practical impossibility to 
grasp the absolute objective truth about a certain event.
How Sachs’s concept of truth can be useful for this analysis? To cor-
rect a situation created by some instance of injustice, we should possess a 
knowledge about what actually happened. Thus, the provision of justice 
depends on establishing facts. This statement can be regarded as a conven-
tional wisdom that raises no significant doubts in what I call here ordinary 
circumstances. To deal with inevitable minor conflicts and wrongdoings 
that occur on everyday basis, contemporary societies tend to trust the 









combination of Sachs’s microscopic and logical types of truth, as estab-
lished by proper state institutions, primarily courts, and based on existing 
institutionalized norms obliging in a given society.
Things may look different under extraordinary circumstances, when the 
existing institutionalized reality breaks down and societies must deal with 
the legacy of mass-scale violence. In such situations, additional problems 
usually arise.
First, there is no consensus among legal theorists regarding the possi-
bility of a universally infallible knowledge.90 This argument may refer to 
any judicial or non-judicial process that rests upon searching for evidence. 
However, the argument may appear to be especially relevant when trying 
to establish truth understood as knowledge that perfectly reflects the full 
picture of causes, course, and outcome of an extremely complex phenom-
enon or process, such as an armed conflict and participation of individuals.
Second, even if one assumes that establishing truth – understood as 
knowledge – about a certain event or process is within reach, there is no 
guarantee that beliefs and attitudes to this event will necessarily change.91 
In other words, political divisions that underlie the escalation of violence 
obviously do not vanish along with the ceasefire; in fact, they may even 
deepen. As a result, we may deal with different frameworks of interpreting 
the meaning of events, even when there is certainty about facts.92
Therefore, in the context of transitional justice, the understanding of 
truth should be expanded toward what can be called acknowledgement. 
Indeed, this way of understanding truth is clearly prescribed to the spe-
cific element of “transitional justice toolkit:” truth commissions. Truth 
commissions are expected to “provide a public platform for victims to 
address the nation directly with their personal stories and can facilitate 
 90 Donald Nicolson, “Taking Epistemology Seriously: “Truth, Reason and Justice” 
Revisited,” The International Journal of Evidence & Proof 17, no. 1 (2013), 
pp. 1–46.
 91 Erin Daly, “Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times 
of Transition,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 1 (2008), 
pp. 23–41.
 92 Janine Natalya Clark, “Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation:  An 
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public debate about how to come to terms with the past,”93 and can “assist 
in investigating current and past human rights violations or abuses, thus 
contributing to public recognition of these violations and of the suffering 
of victims.”94
Thus, acknowledgement is close to Sachs’s concept of experiential truth, 
which is about “analyzing one’s experience of a phenomenon, in which 
one’s participated.”95 Acknowledgement is usually understood as a victim-
oriented practice. However, in complex situations, when the dividing line 
between perpetrators/wrongdoers and victims is not always obvious, this 
way of understanding acknowledgement suggests the need of at least con-
sidering a wide range of stories from those engaged in conflict.
Summing up, we may say that the relation between justice and truth 
when addressing a wrongdoing strongly depends on broader political 
circumstances. In what I call here ordinary circumstances, justice “produces” 
truth – primarily understood as knowledge – by establishing facts and 
assessing them from the perspective of existing institutionalized reality. In 
extraordinary circumstances, truth extended towards the acknowledge-
ment of actual experience of those engaged in violence may appear to be 
the necessary condition for creating an adequate framework that allows 
for the assessment of facts in a way that contributes to the (re)creation of 
institutions constituting the backbone of political order. Moreover, mindful 
of the victims’ perspective, acknowledgement as such may serve the function 
of restorative justice.96
In other words, while judiciary and non-judiciary investigations inev-
itably “produce” microscopic and logical truths like data or facts, such 
“production” under extraordinary circumstances should be to some extent 
sensitive to experiential truths of those engaged in and affected by large-scale 
 93 United Nations, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies. Report of the Secretary-General,” September 23, 2004.
 94 European Union, “The EU’s Policy Framework on Support to Transitional 
Justice,” 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/the_eus_
policy_framework_on_support_to_transitional_justice.pdf.
 95 Sachs, “Archives, Truth, and Reconciliation,” p. 8.
 96 Margaret Urban Walker, “How Can Truth Telling Count as Reparations?”, 
in Historical Justice and Memory, ed. Klaus Neumann and Janna Thompson, 










violence. Ultimately, if we understand reconciliation not as a static ideal 
situation but an open-ended agonistic process that creates space for the 
peaceful coexistence of “multiple truths, multiple histories,”97 a bridge is 
established with Sachs’s idea of dialogical truth.
Basing on the above considerations, under the term of truth-seeking 
I will understand a process of establishing claims and narratives that are 
“sufficiently responsive to the experiences of relevant individuals and com-
munities to be counted as truth.”98 Noteworthy, the term “truth-seeking” 
is used here deliberately instead of “truth-telling,” a term more commonly 
used in transitional justice literature and which refers to specific policies 
primarily aimed at revealing facts about violent events.
3.2.  The establishment and evolution of Ukrainian 
authorities’ “official truth” about the Donbas conflict
During the period covered by this book, Ukrainian authorities have not 
established any sort of formal mechanism that could be categorized as 
truth-telling understood in transitional justice literature; such as fact-finding 
missions or truth commissions. Therefore, I focus here on what was defined 
above as truth-seeking, which is essentially about attempts to frame the 
potential dialogue between adversaries and aims at making the task of 
finding a common ground easier.99 This leads me to begin the analysis 
with what can be called “official truth.” Under this term I mean the meta-
narratives used by Ukrainian authorities as a comprehensive framework for 
the interpretation of different aspects of the Donbas conflict in general, and 
relevant individual experiences in particular. It can be partly understood 
 97 Sarah Maddison, Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation:  Multi-Level 
Challenges in Deeply Divided Societies (London, New York: Routledge, 2017), 
p. 208.
 98 Cindy Holder, “Truthfulness in Transition:  The Value of Insisting on 
Experiential Adequacy,” in Jus Post Bellum and Transitional Justice, ed. Larry 
May and Elizabeth Edenberg, ASIL Studies in International Legal Theory 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 246.
 99 Lee Ross, “Perspectives on Disagreement and Dispute Resolution: Lessons from 
the Lab and the Real World,” in The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, 
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as similar to Sachs’s concept of experiential truth, a “story” of the con-
flict, however told not by a certain individual but by a collective entity. 
Obviously, it will present only one “side of equation,” simply due to the 
fact that there has been no genuine dialogue between the adversaries aimed 
at establishing a common narrative of the conflict.
In order to identify these narratives, I  looked at Ukrainian legislation 
adopted since the beginning of the conflict aimed at addressing the problems 
it generated. Tracing the emergence of these narratives requires us to move 
back in time to the period that preceded the outbreak of the Donbas con-
flict itself, and which follows the dramatic culmination of the Euromaidan 
protest.
On February 22, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a 
series of important resolutions. In particular, the Verkhovna Rada declared 
President Yanukovych’s de facto self-removal from office;100 it restored the 
parliamentarian political regime by annulling the 2010 change of the con-
stitution introduced to reinforce Yanukovych’s presidential power;101 and 
it accepted political responsibility for the situation in the country,102 thus 
opening the way for the formation of an interim government.
These documents are crucial because of their extraordinary char-
acter: without any doubt, Ukrainian legislation did not foresee procedures 
for removing the president from the office, changing the constitution, or 
forming the interim government. These decisions were dictated by the polit-
ical necessity to stabilize the situation.
However, the mentioned documents also provided arguments for the 
opponents of the interim government arguing that these events could be 
 100 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On self-abolition of the President of Ukraine 
from the exercise of his constitutional powers and the appointment of early 
elections of the President of Ukraine,” Pub. L. No. 757– VII (2014), https://
zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/757-18.
 101 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, On the text of the Constitution of Ukraine in 
the wording of June 28, 1996, as amended and supplemented by the Laws of 
Ukraine of December 8, 2004 No. 2222-IV, February 1, 2011 No. 2952-VI, 
September 19, 2013 No. 586-VII.
 102 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On taking political responsibility for the sit-









interpreted as an illegal coup d’etat. So, in Yanukovych’s statement of March 
1, 2014, in which he asks President Putin to use Russian armed forces to 
“restore law, peace, stability and protect the population of Ukraine,” the 
mentioned events were characterized as “the illegal capture of power,” 
which led the country on the “verge of civil war.”103 The notion of civil war 
unleashed by “fascists” who came to power as a result of a coup d’etat later 
became a cornerstone of identity policies of the self-proclaimed “people’s 
republics.”104 These were also fundamental for the Russian narrative about 
the discussed events.105
The considerations of Ukrainian government about how to respond to 
the developing crisis are well reflected in the minutes of the meeting of 
the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC),106 which 
happened on February 28, 2014. The document presents the discussion 
of events by Ukrainian decision-makers as Russian preparation to war, 
which could take the form of a full-scale invasion. It also reflects the aware-
ness of decision-makers of the growing threat to the territorial integrity of 
Ukraine – although the crisis at that moment centered around Crimea – but 
also the awareness of the weakness of the Ukrainian state. From the per-
spective of this analysis, the most important idea contained in the document 
is the need to avoid any steps that could be used by Russia as an argument 
for invasion and the need to construct policies addressing the threat for 
 103 Censor.NET, “Yanukovych`s Letter to Putin with Request to Send Troops to 




 104 Yulia Abibok, “Identity Policy in the Self-Proclaimed Republics in 
East Ukraine,” OSW, June 6, 2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-06-06/identity-policy-self-proclaimed- 
republics-east-ukraine-0.
 105 A prominent example of using this argument can be seen in 2015 documen-
tary by Andrey Kondrashov “Krym. Put’ na Rodinu” (Crimea. A way back 
to Motherland). The movie is published on the official YouTube channel of 
“Rossiya 24” TV channel: https://youtu.be/t42-71RpRgI.
 106 NSDC is the institution headed by the president of Ukraine, which aims to 
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territorial integrity in such a way that would ensure the support of inter-
national community.107
The manifestation of such deliberate cautiousness could be observed 
soon. On March 1, 2014, the Russian State Duma allowed for the use of 
force on Ukrainian territory, to what the Verkhovna Rada responded with 
an appeal to President Putin to not use this right,108 along with an appeal 
to the parliaments of states-guarantors of Ukraine’s security and interna-
tional organizations.109 The latter document referred to ongoing events as 
“military actions against Ukraine,” thus avoiding the use of more specific 
terms such as “war” or “aggression.”
To a significant extent, this cautious approach explains the virtually non-
violent process of Crimea’s annexation, where Russian forces faced virtually 
no resistance from the Ukrainian side. Another profound manifestation is 
the reluctance of Ukrainian authorities to introduce martial law. The latter 
could be interpreted as formal confirmation that Ukraine was in the state 
of war, thus could once again indirectly trigger Russia’s intervention on a 
much larger scale.
All in all, the initial phase of the conflict is characterized by the indeci-
siveness of the Ukrainian authorities on how to frame the emerging conflict. 
Ukraine’s interim government sought a narrative framework in a responsive 
way, looking for cautious claims that could not be read as an incentive for 
further escalation and at the same time not discourage international part-
ners from providing political support.
Along with the development of events, Ukrainian authorities managed 
to crystallize several narratives that were used to tell a more or less com-
prehensive story about the Donbass conflict. Let me now discuss them in 
the chronology of their appearance.
 107 National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, “Transcript of the Meeting 
of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine,” February 28, 2014, 
http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2016/stenogr.pdf.
 108 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine,” Pub. L. No. 844-VII (2014), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/844-18.
 109 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine to the parliaments of the states – guarantors of security of Ukraine 










The notion of separatism appeared very early in the discourse that 
accompanies the analyzed conflict. Along with the mentioned extraordinary 
decrees that referred to the basic issues of the organization of political life 
after the culmination of the Euromaidan protest on February 22, 2014, the 
Verkhovna Rada adopted another decree condemning the manifestations of 
separatism and other forms of attacks on the national security of Ukraine.110 
Obviously, at that particular moment the document referred first and fore-
most to developments in Crimea. Moreover, the transcript of the NSDC 
meeting on February 28, 2014, several times mentions separatism as the 
fundamental threat to Ukrainian statehood.
However, the notion of separatism never later appeared in any legal act 
formulating principles of state policy toward the discussed problems. For 
example, the law establishing the special status of the “people’s republics” 
adopted on September 16, 2014, after signing the Minsk-1 protocol, refers 
to these entities as the “certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts;” the 
conflict as such was referred to as “events” and government’s adversaries, 
the de facto separatists, as “participants of the events.”111 In other words, 
the law establishing main principles of state policy toward separatist entities 
used notions devoid of unambiguous political meaning.
On the other hand, the notion of separatism appeared to be very pop-
ular in general public discourse. Although this issue is not covered by this 
research, it would be not an exaggeration to state that the notion of sepa-
ratism was and continues to be one of the most popular terms used by the 
Ukrainian media to address the problem of the self-proclaimed “republics” 
and the parts of Ukrainian society that became adversaries of the govern-
ment. The notion was also present in the rhetoric of key political figures 
and parties, which I will consider later.
 110 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On preventing the manifestations of separatism 
and other attacks on the foundations of the national security of Ukraine,” Pub. 
L. No. 756-VII (2014), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/756-18.
 111 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Law on special regime of local self-government 
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The reason of such split between the use range of the notion of sepa-
ratism in legal and political domain can be explained as follows. The notion 
of separatism is too vague and unclear to be used in the process of creating 
legal foundations for provision of justice. Neither international law nor 
Ukrainian legislation provide hard ground for treating separatism per se 
as a wrongdoing. This problem was reflected in the practice of punishing 
those who are referred to as “separatists:” Ukrainian law enforcement 
agencies and the judiciary had to develop relevant criminal cases basing on 
a section of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (CCU) devoted to crimes against 
state security (see Chapter 4).
When observed from the political perspective, the notion of separatism 
appears to be quite a convenient tool. It allows for the creation of a simple 
category containing different problems and thus simplify political com-
munications; suffice to use the term “separatism” or “separatist” to make 
it clear which set of issues, problems, and persons we refer to. Thus, the 
notion of separatism became an important element of the “story” of the 
conflict as told by the Ukrainian government, although it did not strike 
roots in relevant legislation.
Terrorism
After the annexation of Crimea, the spark of the conflict moved to the 
eastern region of Donbas. Although protests against the change of author-
ities in Kyiv occurred in numerous cities of eastern and southern Ukraine 
as early as on March 1, 2014, events started to develop more quickly at 
the beginning of April, when separatists declared the sovereignty of the 
“Donetsk People’s Republic” and the city of Slovyansk was seized by a 
group of combatants under the command of Russian citizen Igor Girkin 
(aka Strelkov).
In a response to these events, acting president Oleksandr Turchynov is-
sued a decision to initiate a counter-terrorist operation (ATO) on April 14, 
2014,112 basing on the recommendation of the NSDC issued a day earlier. 
 112 President of Ukraine, “Decree on the Decision of the Council of National 
Security and Defense of Ukraine of April 13, 2014 “On Urgent Measures to 
Overcome the Terrorist Threat and Preserve Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” 






On the one hand, this decision was dictated by the obvious need to intro-
duce countermeasures to avoid the repetition of the “Crimean scenario” 
of Ukrainian state’s de facto withdrawal from secessionist regions. On the 
other hand, it was dictated by the mentioned considerations regarding the 
need to avoid any steps that could be used by Russia as a justification for 
undisguised military intervention. Using force within the legal framework 
of a counter-terrorist operation was thus decided to be the most optimal 
way to act.
As a result of this decision, the notion of terrorism was introduced for 
good into the Ukrainian public debate for the issues of Donbas conflict. 
More specifically, the government started to call its adversaries terrorists.
Along with positive effects like the possibility to use force without 
announcing martial law and the rhetorical “joining” of international efforts 
aimed at fighting international terrorism, the introduction of the terrorism 
narrative had several important pitfalls. In particular, it introduced serious 
legal ambiguities regarding the status of fighters and prisoners on both 
sides of the conflict; it added uncertainty regarding the responsibility to pay 
compensations to persons affected by warfare; which is a subject I briefly 
develop in Chapters 4 and 5. Last but not least, the notion of terrorism 
can hardly become a basis for reconciliation or even a starting point for 
dialogue between adversaries.
At the beginning of 2018, Ukrainian authorities undertook an attempt 
to establish as a single legal act the different elements of state policy toward 
secessionist territories in Donbas, which were often created in an ad hoc 
manner, which is popularly referred to as the “reintegration law.”113 Among 
other changes, the document created a possibility to end the ATO, even-
tually reorganized as the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) in April 2018. The 
notion of terrorism was thus officially removed from relevant legislation.
 113 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Law on the Peculiarities of the State Policy 
Aimed at Protecting the State Sovereignty of Ukraine in Temporarily Occupied 
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Aggression
The fate of the notion of aggression can be regarded as a mirror reflection 
of the fate of the notion of separatism. As mentioned above, in the initial 
phase of the conflict Ukrainian authorities were reluctant to use any notion 
that could be associated with war.
This approach started to change after the annexation of Crimea. As the 
first step, notions of occupation and occupied territories were introduced in 
the law “On ensuring the rights and freedoms of citizens and legal regime in 
the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine,” adopted on April 15, 2014. 
However, it was only in January 2015 when the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 
issued a statement, in which it explicitly states that “Ukraine remains the 
object of military aggression on the part of the Russian Federation, which 
is conducted, among other things, through the support and provision of 
supplies necessary for large-scale terrorist attacks.”114
The narrative of aggression was later used in a number of legal acts aimed 
primarily at introducing sanctions against Russia. Finally, the narrative was 
reinforced by the adoption of the mentioned “reintegration law,” which 
explicitly defines the conflict under scrutiny as the result of a crime of ag-
gression committed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine. The rein-
tegration law defines both Crimea and the “people’s republics” in Donbas 
as temporarily occupied territories under effective control of the Russian 
Federation.
The notion of aggression differs from the previously discussed notions of 
separatism and terrorism, primarily because it provides a much more consis-
tent “story” about the conflict. First and foremost, it puts responsibility for 
violence and injustices primarily on an external enemy; the cause of the con-
flict is definitely removed outside of the Ukrainian state; whereas separatism 
could have been interpreted as a response to injustices committed by the 
 114 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine 
to the United Nations, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, the GUAM Parliamentary Assembly, the national 
parliaments of the countries of the world on the recognition of the Russian 







central government. Furthermore, the notion of aggression is well-grounded 
in legal terms.115
Narratives in the authorities’ public rhetoric
As the second step of analysis, I looked at how these key narratives appeared 
in the public rhetoric of key politicians aspiring for or holding important 
official positions. In this book, I do not conduct a comprehensive analysis 
of public discourse referring to the problem of Donbas conflict. Instead, 
I focus on several sources that can be regarded as important channels of 
communication between the political elites and citizens: (a) programs of 
political parties and candidates for presidency and (b) the most significant 
regular speeches of the president. Obviously, political programs are by no 
means sources of accurate information about politicians’ real beliefs or 
preferences. Especially in Ukrainian context, political programs usually 
assume the shape of brief broad sketchy slogans, a list of general mottos 
a politician would like to be associated with, rather than a detailed pro-
posal of actions planned for implementation in an upcoming electoral 
term. This is exactly the feature of these documents that is useful for my 
analysis: I regard political programs as sets of simple narratives, which 
are used by politicians to communicate with constituents at the moments 
when “authorities” are being shaped: elections. These narratives reflect 
the attempts to adjust political “supply” (proposals by candidates willing 
to be elected to the office) to political “demand” (expectations of the 
electorate).
However, political programs present only a static picture, clearly visible 
at moments of elections. To add some dynamism, I added speeches of the 
president to the analysis. In the Ukrainian political system, the president 
has a special position: he has significant power in forming the Cabinet of 
Ministers, thus the government in a narrow sense. President Poroshenko in 
particular appeared to have an especially strong position due to support in 
the parliament. These statements should not be understood as arguments 
 115 Thomas D. Grant, Aggression against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, and 
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that in the period of time covered by the analysis Ukraine faced the rule of 
one man. Nevertheless, the position of the president was strong enough to 
regard him as one of the key decision-makers able of having a significant 
impact on the general political course of an entity that I call here “Ukrainian 
authorities.”
Having in mind the goal of my research, I  analyzed the mentioned 
documents through the prism of the following questions:
 1. Are Donbas conflict-related issues underlined as priorities?
 2. How is the essence of the conflict presented?
 3. Who are the wrongdoers/adversaries of Ukrainian state?
 4. Who are the victims of the conflict?
 5. Are there any proposals regarding post-conflict justice?
On May 25, 2014, early presidential elections in Ukraine took place, won 
in the first round by Petro Poroshenko who obtained 54.7 per cent of all 
votes. Table 3.1 presents the analysis of programs of main candidates for 
presidency in 2014.116 The campaign happened after the annexation of 
Crimea but simultaneously to the escalating warfare in Donbas. The data 
presented in the table show general consistency of narratives proposed by 
main presidential candidates. The conflict is characterized as a result of 
Russian aggression, which contrasts with the cautious approach of interim 
government to use such narratives in legal acts at that time. There are no 
references to victims of the conflict; although we should remember that the 
most violent phase of the conflict was still ahead. As for the “visions of 
justice,” they remain either absent or very vague and general.
The interim period that followed the Euromaidan protests was defi-
nitely ended on 26 October 2014, when early parliamentary elections took 
place. This time, elections were held soon after the most violent phase of 
the conflict, and after signing the Minsk-1 protocol. Table 3.2 presents the 
analysis of programs of six parties that managed to get to the Verkhovna 
 116 It should be noted that 21 candidates for presidency were registered in 2014. 
The overwhelming majority of have failed to receive more than 2 % of votes. 
Therefore, we concentrate attention on four leaders of the race, whose com-
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Rada and form parliamentary fractions. Furthermore, all of these parties 
(with the exception of the Opposition Block, the party that was formed out 
of remnants of Yanukovych’s Party of Regions) have joined into a ruling 
coalition, thus forming the government.117
As we can see, the narrative of aggression was once again used by all 
ruling parties. At the same time, there are several differences that can be 
observed when comparing parliamentary electoral campaign with the previ-
ously discussed presidential one. First, the notion of terrorism appeared 
on agenda, used in the program of one of two major parties (Aresniy 
Yatseniuk’s National Front). Second, notions that could be understood 
as calls for restorative justice were introduced: the need to restore regions 
affected by warfare; the need of decentralization of the state, and providing 
more power to local authorities (though, such proposals should not be 
understood as concessions to authorities of self-proclaimed “republics,” 
but as a proposal to restore common political order on new principles that 
would be more sensitive to specific needs and preferences of local popu-
lation). Third, an “alternative story” of the conflict was introduced in the 
campaign of the Opposition Block. The party claimed the conflict to be 
a civil war and underlined the responsibility of Ukrainian authorities for 
its outbreak. The fact of the party has managed to get to the parliament 
clearly suggests that such interpretation of events was at least to some extent 
supported by part of Ukrainians.
Table 3.3 presents the evolution of the narrative referring to the Donbas 
conflict in the period without electoral campaigns, as seen from the per-
spective of the most important speeches of President Poroshenko. Here, 
I focus on the following speeches: inauguration speech held on June 7, 2014; 
public speeches traditionally delivered on the Independence Day (August 
24); and yearly messages delivered by the president to the parliament. I call 
the latter “States of the Union,” referring to the similarity to speeches held 
 117 It should be noted that Ukrainian parliamentary elections in 2014 were held 
in accordance with mixed electoral system. As a result, significant amount 
of candidates who entered the parliament from single-member constituen-
cies, often created their own political programs. Nevertheless, the majority of 
them usually joins fractions formed by parties. The latter are thus the main 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































by the US president to the joint session of the US Congress. These speeches 
are broadly transmitted and widely discussed in the media, thus having a 
significant reach among citizens.
A tendency present in the data is the following: along with the passage 
of time, the president narrowed down the abundancy of notions used to tell 
the story of the conflict. Closer to the end of President Poroshenko’s term 
in office, as the conflict went on with no clear perspective of resolution, 
notions suggesting the international nature of the conflict (“aggression,” 
“war”) became the main elements of the discussed narrative.
Table 3.4 presents narratives used in the 2019 presidential campaign.118 
These data do not introduce any significant novelty. What should be 
noted is that more candidates decided not to underline the priority of 
the conflict, understood as a problem detached from other challenges 
faced by the country. This is not to say that the Donbas conflict lost its 
“political appeal;” rather that it is presented as one of equally impor-
tant problems, such as poor economic situation, poverty, or corruption, 
whose solution should be comprehensive and depend primarily on eco-
nomic and political development of the state. Like in the case of the 2014 
parliamentary campaign, there is an “outsider,” a candidate representing 
the mentioned Opposition Block (Yuriy Boyko) who consequently 
underlined that the conflict’s fundamental causes are not exclusively 
external.
We should pay special attention to the fact that victims are virtually 
absent in all discussed sources. In other words, Ukrainian decision-makers 
avoided expressing claims about who actually suffered from the conflict. 
Only in some cases and mainly at the beginning of the conflict some general 
statements appeared in presidential speeches that referred to all peaceful 
Ukrainians as those suffering the consequences of the conflict or to the ones 
who directly experienced captivity by the representatives of the “people’s 
republics.” I  interpret this phenomenon as compatible with the overall 
 118 In 2019, 39 candidates registered to run in the presidential elections. Eventually, 
the elections were won by Volodymyr Zelenskyi. Here, I focus on the leaders of 
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tendency to narrow down the government’s meta-narrative about the con-
flict to the notion of aggression. In such a case, it is indeed logical not to 
identify any specific group as having a special status of victims, because 
it is the whole nation that is the object of aggression. Such interpretation 
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provides an answer to one of the uncertainties related to hybridity. The goal 
of reconciliation primarily refers to Ukrainian citizens, who appeared to be 
separated from the mainland as a result of the warfare. In turn, reconcili-
ation with the aggressor is removed to unspecified future.
***
At this point, I wish to briefly summarize both the analysis of official 
documents and political rhetoric. Generally, Ukrainian authorities tend to 
simplify their “official truth” about the conflict. Interim government that 
took power immediately after the Euromaidan and faced the first phase 
of the emerging conflict tried to avoid confrontational notions. One of 
the effects was the introduction of the notion of terrorism. It provided 
Ukrainian authorities with the possibility to use the force against the 
“people’s republics.” On the other hand, it could hardly be regarded as 
the basis for the coexistence of “multiple stories” supported by different 
parts of the divided society. As time passed and the situation on the front 
stagnated – although the violence never stopped definitely – a turn was 
made toward what can be called a unification of narrative: the conflict was 
now called the result of external aggression.119 A schematic timeline of this 
process is presented in Annex 1.
3.3.  The consistency of Ukrainian authorities’ 
“official truth” about the Donbas conflict
As mentioned, I understand truth-seeking primarily as attempts to con-
struct a meta-narrative, which could create space for the coexistence of 
individual interpretations of facts about the conflict, a common ground 
for reconciliation in the form of an agonistic but peaceful coexistence of 
different detailed stories of the conflict as seen from the perspectives of dif-
ferent parts of Ukraine’s divided society. Such a view of the conflict would 
also be a reference point for the provision of justice. Taking into account 
the specificity of circumstances – the ongoing conflict – steps discussed in 
the previous part are essentially efforts taken by one side of the conflict. 
 119 Noteworthy, this statement does not mean that the notions of separatism and 
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They are not an outcome of any sort of agreement and therefore lack what 
can be called a “joint ownership.” The question that arises here is to what 
extent can the identified narratives become the basis for reconciliation? The 
rest of this chapter will attempt to answer this question.
Let me start by looking at the consistency of “stories about the conflict” 
identified in the previous part. The following considerations are based on 
the assumption that the lack of serious controversies and inconsistencies in 
narratives designed to frame the potential dialogue between hostile parts of 
society constitutes a necessary condition for achieving the normative goals 
prescribed to truth-seeking. Potentially, a situation when different entities 
constituting broadly understood state authorities disagree with each other 
is the most obvious source of such inconsistencies. Therefore, it is worth-
while to confront the “official truth” formulated at the political level with 
the microscopic and logical truths “produced” as a result of investigations, 
when actual individual acts and experiences of those engaged in the con-
flict are taken under scrutiny. In other words, I assume that any significant 
inconsistency in this field can become one of the obstacles in the process of 
reconciliation and a source of further tensions and conflicts; which is the 
essence of the truth vs. justice dilemma.
Ukrainian law enforcement agencies and courts were engaged to address 
instances of conflict-related wrongdoings. As a result, Ukrainian courts 
issued a number of verdicts basing on provisions of the criminal code that 
were virtually not used before the outbreak of the conflict. In the framework 
of this research, I created a database of court decisions in conflict-related 
cases available in Annex 2. In particular, the database contains information 
about the following categories of crimes:
 a) crimes against foundations of the national security of Ukraine, in par-
ticular: actions seeking to violently change or overthrow the constitu-
tional order or the seizure of state power (art. 109 of the CCU); attack 
on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (art. 110, 110-2 
of the CCU); treason (art. 111 of the CCU);
 b) terrorism-related crimes, in particular:  terrorist act (art.  258 of the 
CCU), involvement in committing a terrorist act (art.  258-1 of the 
CCU), public appeals to commit a terrorist act (art. 258-2 of the CCU), 
creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization (art. 258-3 of the 
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CCU), facilitating the commission of a terrorist act (art. 258-4 of the 
CCU), financing terrorism (art. 258-5 of the CCU);
 c) creation of illegal paramilitary or armed units (art. 260 of the CCU);
 d) planning, preparing, starting, and conducting an aggressive war 
(art. 437 of the CCU).
Clearly, these categories significantly correspond with the mentioned 
narratives that frame the Donbas conflict. Two issues should be underlined. 
First, taking into account that the criminal code of Ukraine does not con-
tain a crime defined as separatism, acts widely referred to as de facto sepa-
ratism – e.g. public support, agitation for ideas of some form of secession 
of a part of the country – were addressed as crimes against foundations of 
the national security of Ukraine. Second, there is a category of crimes that 
does not refer directly to any of the abovementioned narratives: the creation 
of illegal paramilitary or armed units.
Along with the mentioned database of court decisions, I use data regu-
larly published by the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine that presents 
the amount of crimes registered by law enforcement agencies at the partic-
ular period of time. Having both sources of information, I can compare the 
number of instances when the state through its law enforcement agencies 
accuses someone of committing a crime with the number of instances when 
the accusation is confirmed by the court. In other words, a ratio of issued 
convictions to the number of registered crimes can be treated as an indicator 
of the level of consistency between what the authorities call the “official 
truth” and the microscopic and logical truths established by courts.
Of course, the result of such analysis should be treated with caution. First, 
the data originate from different sources; there is no technical possibility to 
trace the fate of each act registered as a crime; some may not end in court 
at all, investigation of other cases may last longer and be finally resolved by 
the court in the period of time that is not reflected in the analysis. Second, 
one should bear in mind that Ukrainian judiciary cannot be regarded as per-
fectly independent (see Chapter 2). Therefore, we cannot exclude that – at 
least to a certain degree – verdicts issued by Ukrainian courts are dictated 
by political motivations rather than by a willingness to investigate the case 
accurately. This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
On the other hand, we may deduce from the database that the average time 
that passes between the moment of committing a crime and issuing a decision 
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is fifteen months; in other words, the average path of a case from committing 
an act to the issuance of court decision is relatively short. The overwhelming 
majority of cases covered by the database conveys no “big fishes” in whose sit-
uation we would logically expect politicized decisions. Finally, I operate with 
a relatively large number of cases, which allows for the possibility to identify 
some regularities and patterns. Basing on these arguments, I assume that the 
proposed indicator can contribute some value added to this sort of analysis.
The results of comparison are reflected in Figures 3.1–3.4. Basing on the 
above considerations, we may conclude that the narratives of separatism 
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Figure 3.1. The number of registered crimes vs. issued convictions: crimes against 
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Figure 3.3. The number of registered crimes vs. issued convictions: illegal armed 
groups.
Source: http://reyestr.court.gov.ua, https://www.gp.gov.ua.
have the weakest support in the form of relevant court decisions. In the case 
of crimes against foundations of the national security of Ukraine – which 
I treat here as equivalents of separatism – the ratio under scrutiny grew reg-
ularly. It suggests that Ukrainian authorities have learned how to approach 
this type of wrongdoings in a way that does not create contradictions. In the 
case of terrorism-related crimes, the gap between the number of registered 













2014 2015 2016 2017
Registered crimes Convictions Ratio





The consistency of truth about the Donbas conflict 91
The gap between the number of registered crimes and issued convictions 
confirming that the crime was actually committed appears to be the 
narrowest in the cases of illegal paramilitary or armed units creation 
(Figure 3.3). This category can be called a “neutral” one: it does not directly 
support any of the identified “stories” of the conflict. On the other hand, 
it also does not contradict any of the mentioned narratives, and therefore 
can be “channeled” into any of them; participants of illegal armed groups 
can be framed as “separatists,” “terrorists,” or “aggressor’s collaborators” 
with equal ease.
The data referring to acts qualified as aggressive warfare (Figure 3.4) 
should be interpreted with special caution. The ratio under scrutiny in this 
case is higher, however the number of cases – which refers to both registered 
crimes and court decisions – is much smaller; in fact, these figures would 
hardly be visible if placed on the same scale as other types of wrongdoings. 
To an extent, this is not a surprise: alleged principal authors of aggression 
remain outside of the reach of the Ukrainian judiciary.
Summarizing, the proposed indicator does not tell us much about the 
fate of individual cases when the Ukrainian state addresses acts interpreted 
as conflict-related wrongdoings. Therefore, we cannot use this indicator to 
assess the accuracy of the work of Ukrainian law enforcements, authorities, 
or courts. We should interpret it only from the perspective of what can be 
called the “practical effectiveness” of main narratives used by Ukrainian 
authorities to “tell the story” of the conflict. On the one hand, we have the 
language of political rhetoric. The number of registered crimes is likely to 
be sensitive to it: law enforcement agencies and the prosecution are part of 
the executive branch of power. Registering a particular act as a certain type 
of crime can be used by the government as proof of their effective work to 
deal with the problem.
On the other hand, there are the courts whose task is to establish what 
was called above a microscopic and logical truth about a certain case. 
Indeed, the general number of committed conflict-related crimes confirmed 
by the courts is impressive. However, the existing gap between both num-
bers can be used as evidence that the authorities are “overzealous” in label-
ling certain types of deeds. In turn, this opens the way for regarding these 
labels (narratives) as unfounded. The narratives of separatism and terrorism 
appear especially prone to this kind of criticism.
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International courts provide another potential point of reference for 
assessing the consistency of narratives used by Ukrainian authorities to 
“tell the story” of the conflict. On January 27, 2017, Ukraine submitted a 
lawsuit against Russia at the International Court of Justice (ICJ), alleging 
that the latter violates the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) and the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).120
On February 14, 2015, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a declaration about 
a self-referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC), with the inten-
tion to cover the annexation of Crimea and warfare in Donbas.121 The 
declaration alleges that Ukraine has been the subject of aggression by the 
Russian Federation, as a result of which “the highest officials of the Russian 
Federation and the leaders of terrorist organizations of DNR and LNR” 
committed crimes against humanity and war crimes on the territory of 
Ukraine.
Finally, Ukraine lodged several inter-state applications against Russia at 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), whose common denomi-
nator is the allegation that Russia holds effective control over the occupied 
territories, which obviously suggests the fact of aggression.122
At the time of writing, none of these cases ended with a court decision, 
which may be used as an argument in support or against the narratives 
of aggression and terrorism that the mentioned lawsuits obviously recall.
 120 International Court of Justice, “Application of the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine 
v.  Russian Federation),” April 19, 2017, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/166/19410.pdf.
 121 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On the statement of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine “On the recognition by Ukraine of the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court over the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by 
senior officials of the Russian Federation and the leaders of the terrorist organ-
izations “DNR” and “LNR,” which led to particularly grave consequences and 
the massacre of Ukrainian citizens,”“ Pub. L. No. 145– VIII (2015), https://
zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/145-19.
 122 European Court of Human Rights, “New Inter-State Application Brought by 
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3.4.  Effects and challenges
Finally, I focus on indicators reflecting to what extent does the presented ap-
proach to truth-seeking actually contribute to the ultimate goal of reconcili-
ation. Clearly, the most significant issue in this regard is the extent to which 
the mentioned narratives are actually accepted by constituents. Let us note 
that despite relative abundance of surveys conducted in Ukraine devoted 
to the problems of the Donbas conflict, not all of them are conducted sys-
tematically; different research centers formulate questions differently and 
the majority of surveys are not repeated, so there is a limited possibility to 
trace relevant changes of public opinion. Thus, our understanding of the 
evolution of public perception of the conflict is far from perfect.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 respectively reflect the public opinion of Ukrainians 
regarding the role of Russia in the conflict and opinion about self-pro-
claimed “people’s republics;” unfortunately, there are no similar data going 
beyond the beginning of 2016. Both figures confirm that the narratives of 
Russian aggression and terrorism are accepted by the majority of citizens 
who reside in Ukraine’s mainland. At the same time, it reflects the existence 
of a minority that does not accept Ukrainian authorities’ “official truths.” 
This phenomenon also explains the existence of “alternative stories” of the 
conflict that could be found in political programs of some political parties 
and candidates for presidency.
What is much more important from the perspective of this research, is 
to what extent the authorities’ narratives speak to the part of Ukrainian 
citizens who live on the territories of self-proclaimed “republics.” However, 
in this case the problem of imperfect knowledge is much more severe: ac-
cording to our best knowledge, only one publicly available survey was 
conducted on the territories of the DNR/LNR during the conflict.123 Despite 
its undoubtful informative value, the survey does not provide grounds for 
direct comparison of public moods with the Ukrainian mainland: it was 
 123 Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Donbas – Two Parts, or Still One? The Experience 








based on different questions. Therefore, we are condemned to some general 
observations only.
Figure 3.7 presents one of the result of the mentioned survey conducted 
in Donbas; both in parts under the control of Ukraine and under the con-
trol of the DNR/LNR. The assessment of the conflict by inhabitants of the 
“republics” is radically incompatible with narratives proposed by Ukrainian 
authorities. In particular, the belief that the conflict was caused by Russia – 
that would correspond with the dominating narrative of aggression  – 
appears to be the less popular. A qualitative research based on the method 
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the DNR/LNR are characterized by a lack of trust in Ukrainian authorities. 
Furthermore, they tend to regard the conflict primarily as an internal one.124
However, on the optimistic side, different available studies lead to a 
common conclusion that for the majority of Ukrainians living both in the 
mainland and in the DNR/LNR, a preferable future for these territories is 
within the Ukrainian state. This fact suggests that there is some common 
ground for a unifying narrative framework that can potentially lead to rec-
onciliation. The problem is that the narratives proposed by the Ukrainian 
authorities to “tell the story” of the conflict indeed appear to be appealing 
to the majority of Ukrainians living in the mainland. At the same time, they 
are far from reflecting the perception of Ukrainians who remain in the ter-
ritories controlled by the DNR/LNR. In other words, these narratives serve 
the function of consolidating the public opinion of Ukraine’s mainland rather 
than the function of “building a bridge” between divided parts of the society.
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0%
Result of Western intervention
Caused by Russia
Caused by Ukraine
Local reaction against nationalist government
Which statement about the conflict in Donbas is closest to your opinion?
DNR/LNR Donbas
Figure 3.7. The essence of the Donbas conflict in the perception of its inhabitants 
(2017). 
Source: Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Donbas – Two Parts, or Still One? The Experience 
of War through the Eyes of the Regional Population,” ZOiS Report, May 
2017, https://www.zois-berlin.de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/ZOiS_Reports/ZOiS_
Report_2_2017.pdf.
 124 Petro Burkovs’kyi, Ruslan Kermach, and Andrii Hirnyk, “Chym zhyvut’ 
tymchasovo nekontrol’ovani terytoriї Donbasu? Osoblyvosti horyzontal’noї 






Therefore, truth-seeking efforts conducted in the context of the Donbas 
conflict face one crucial challenge, which arises from the problem of the 
so-called reactive devaluation. In the negotiations process, the evaluation 
of specific deals and compromises may change if they were offered by the 
adversary.125
Indeed, having in mind the proclaimed goals of reintegration of the 
occupied territories, Ukrainian authorities have no other choice but to start 
“building their part of the bridge,” which is expected to reunite the divided 
society. Much has been done to achieve it. In particular, Ukrainian authori-
ties took steps to consolidate the “official truth” about the conflict around 
one notion: aggression. It is much less exclusive in comparison to other 
notions that were also used to frame the conflict (separatism and terrorism). 
If the responsibility for violence lies on the side of forces that come from 
outside of our community, it is easier to argue that all representatives of 
our community are in fact victims of the situation and not our adversaries. 
At the same time, there is evidence that this narrative does not correspond 
with beliefs of the part of the society that appears to be separated from the 
mainland, who predominantly do not trust Ukraine’s central government. 
Thus, the process of “building a bridge” continued with no coordination 
with persons standing on “the opposite side.” As a result, truth-seeking 
initiatives initiated by the Ukrainian government conducted in the period 
covered by this research were sentenced to a certain level of ineffectiveness.
 125 Ross, “Perspectives on Disagreement and Dispute Resolution: Lessons from 
the Lab and the Real World,” p. 117.
 
 
Chapter 4.  Retributive justice
4.1.  Retributive justice in conflict-affected 
societies: specificity and significance
The concept of retributive justice refers to the most intuitive and straight-
forward understanding of what “justice” may mean in the face of a wrong-
doing: punishment. In other words, retributive justice focuses on the problem 
of how to treat those who somehow break the obliging rules and norms; they 
may be called offenders, perpetrators, or wrongdoers.
The idea of retributive justice can be traced to the oldest known legal 
documents. It is based on what can be called codified revenge for a harm 
done: “If a man destroy the eye of another man, they shall destroy his eye.”126 
Indeed, punishment can be regarded as a measure motivated by a scope of 
so-called retributive emotions: anger, indignation, contempt, hatred, and pity 
for the victims.127
Contemporary understanding of the function of retribution is more sophis-
ticated than mere revenge. First and foremost, retributive justice focuses not 
on a certain act but on guilt. In other words, retributive justice does not boil 
down to an algorithm: if A commits X, the punishment is Y; which is the kind 
of logic present in the Hammurabi code. Punishment requires assessment to 
what extent the culprit can be regarded responsible for committing a certain 
act; for example, killing a person in self-defense assumes less guilt than killing 
a person with the intent to rob her.
Contemporary understanding of retributive justice regards the culprit 
to be a part of society. Criminal codes – the main tools of retributive jus-
tice – assume that committing a crime reflects one’s conscious contestation 
 126 “The Code of Hammurabi,” Internet Sacred Text Archive, accessed April 3, 
2019, http://www.sacred-texts.com/ane/ham/ham06.htm.
 127 Jon Elster, “Retribution,” in Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to 











of rules established by the will of the whole.128 Retribution also affirms 
individual autonomy and the responsibility of a perpetrator as an agent 
of the common good.129 Therefore, providing retributive justice is to a sig-
nificant extent a relational matter: imposing a sanction on an individual is 
expected to contribute to the improvement of relations in an affected com-
munity, among others by means of deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabil-
itation of wrongdoers.130 A detailed review of retribution theories exceeds 
the scope of this analysis. What should be underlined is that despite different 
justifications for punishment and expectations of specific effects of punish-
ment, there is a common ground in terms of an idea that a wrongdoer is 
subject to accountability for committed crimes, which in turn is expected 
to lead to a change in the behavior of the wrongdoer; hopefully in a con-
structive direction.
Extraordinary circumstances (see Chapter 1) create specific constraints 
for retributive justice. In particular, there may appear the problem of the 
growing gap between legal codes and community sentiments. People gener-
ally tend to perceive how strongly the offenders deserve punishment basing 
on their beliefs about how wrongfully the offenders behave.131 When the 
community faces new, previously unexperienced types of wrongdoings, 
perceptions of wrongfulness of such deeds and deservingness of punishment 
are likely to arise; at the same time, the adequacy of relevant legal codes is 
not guaranteed. Some wrongdoings can be codified but remain “asleep.” 
For example, as we will see below, criminal code can contain a provision on 
aggressive warfare, which is nevertheless unused in practice simply due to 
the lack of such kind of wrongdoings. As a result, the judiciary has no expe-
rience in the assessment of guilt if such a problem emerges. Alternatively, 
 128 Michel Foucault, Zło czynić, mówić prawdę:  funkcja wyznania w 
sprawiedliwości:  wykłady z Louvain, 1981 (Kraków:  Społeczny Instytut 
Wydawniczy Znak, 2018), p. 251.
 129 Charles Villa-Vicencio, “The Reek of Cruelty and the Quest for Healing: Where 
Retributive and Restorative Justice Meet,” Journal of Law and Religion 14, 
no. 1 (1999), p. 175.
 130 Elster, “Retribution.”
 131 John M.  Darley and Adam L.  Alter, “Behavioral Issues of Punishment, 
Retribution and Deterrence,” in The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, 
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one can imagine a situation when a wrongdoing is not codified at all. The 
problem may appear to be even more complicated, if we take into consid-
eration that those labelled as wrongdoers by the interested state may raise 
the argument that it is their cause that is actually just; therefore, it is not 
they who break the laws established by the community.132 All in all, these 
examples illustrate a certain level of the inevitability of retribution’s polit-
icization in extraordinary circumstances. From the perspective of the goal 
of reconciliation, the conclusion is that the matter of guilt may become a 
matter of bargain between interested sides. As a result of such a bargain, 
specific retributive measures can be introduced, such as retroactive justice133 
or amnesty, understood as measures aimed at removing the prospect of 
criminal liability for designated persons or classes of persons.134
Below, I will focus on measures taken by the Ukrainian authorities that 
directly or indirectly aim to meet the retributive goal of transitional justice 
in the context of the Donbas conflict.
4.2.  The evolution of Ukrainian authorities’ approach 
to punishment for conflict-related crimes
The approach of Ukrainian authorities to accountability for conflict-related 
wrongdoings has evolved over time. One can identify several stages of 
development in this approach, which I discuss in this section. The schematic 
timeline is presented in Annex 1.
Retribution as a tool to deter separatism
The outline of this initial approach of Ukraine’s authorities to account-
ability for anti-governmental actions, have not yet transformed into a vio-
lent armed conflict, can be deduced from the minutes from the meeting 
of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC), which 
 132 David Armitage, Civil Wars: A History in Ideas (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2017), p. 132.
 133 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 
pp. 33–34.
 134 Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils:  Amnesties and the Search for Justice 












occurred on February 28, 2014.135 One should remember that at that par-
ticular moment Crimea was the main center of events of separatist nature, 
and that the conflict had not turned into a direct armed confrontation. 
Ukrainian authorities decided to avoid any engagement of the military 
against spreading anti-governmental rallies, which was believed to may 
serve the Russian authorities as a pretext to use their armed forces openly on 
a much larger scale than they were actually used. Clearly, this assumption 
was not without grounds, taking into account the decision of the Russian 
authorities to allow the use of armed forces on the territory of Ukraine. 
At the same time, an instruction was given to law enforcement agencies to 
“develop steps to detain and bring to Kyiv the traitors who captured power 
in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.”
As I already mentioned in Chapter 3, separatism as such is not a crime ac-
cording to Ukrainian legislation; that is, Ukraine’s penal system is based on 
the nullum crimen sine lege principle. Therefore, the notion of separatism 
here has no obvious legal definition. The presented approach is based on 
the assumption that to underline the prospect of criminal accountability 
may at least to some extent deter further actions that can be called a de 
facto separatism; actions which undermine the sovereignty of the state yet 
fall short of direct violence, such as participation in meetings devoted to the 
idea of capturing power in a particular region or city or actions of spreading 
ideas that undermine territorial integrity of the state.
The presented approach remained dominant in the following several 
weeks, when the wave of separatism spread across the eastern and southern 
regions of Ukraine. Basing on its logic, the criminal code of Ukraine was 
amended on April 8, 2014,136 increasing the punishment for encroachment 
against territorial integrity and treason.
 135 National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, “Transcript of the Meeting 
of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine.”
 136 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On amendments to the Criminal Code of 
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Retribution as deterrence from the engagement 
in anti-governmental warfare
The Ukrainian authorities eventually failed to achieve the goal of bringing 
leaders of Crimean separatists to accountability; with minor exceptions, the 
annexation of Crimea was finalized without much violence. It was different 
in the eastern regions of Ukraine’s mainland, where the conflict escalated, 
and the problem of direct violence emerged.
The decision to initiate the ATO on April 14, 2014137 had a profound 
impact on the approach to retribution in the discussed context. This decision 
reflected the attempt to spread the logic of using the prospect of criminal 
accountability as a tool of deterrence, this time addressing the ones who 
engage in acts of direct violence against the Ukrainian law enforcement 
forces, the military, and the pro-governmental volunteer battalions.
The rationale behind the use of the counter-terrorist operation format 
was the one already mentioned: it was an intermediate solution between a 
complete lack of engagement and the introduction of martial law, which 
once again might have provoked Russia to a more intense military opera-
tion under the guise of supporting the emerging “people’s republics.” The 
ATO allowed to frame anti-governmental fighters as terrorists, which in 
turn opened the possibility to engage the existing but to mostly unused 
counter-terrorist provisions of the criminal code. These provisions have 
been additionally tightened in the following months: on August 26, 2014, 
the Prosecutor General issued an order to allow easier detention of per-
sons suspected of widely understood terrorism;138 on October 7, 2014, the 
authorities amended criminal code once again, this time to introduce a 
 137 President of Ukraine, Decree on the decision of the Council of National 
Security and Defense of Ukraine of April 13, 2014 “On urgent measures to 
overcome the terrorist threat and preserve territorial integrity of Ukraine.”
 138 Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, “On approval of the Instruction on the pro-
cedure for preventive detention in the area of the counter-terrorist operation 
of persons involved in terrorist activities and the special regime of pre-trial 
investigation in conditions of martial law, state of emergency or in the area of 









more severe punishment for terrorism and to introduce the institution of 
investigation in absentia.139
Retribution becomes an object of negotiations
As the conflict continued escalation towards a full-fledged war, which cul-
minated in August 2014, the Ukrainian authorities agreed to turn the issue 
of accountability into an object of political negotiations. The Minsk-1 pro-
tocol of September 5, 2014, serves as the main marker of this decision: the 
agreement provided an immediate release of all hostages and illegally detained 
persons, along with amnesty for DNR/LNR combatants (see Annex 3 for 
more details). As mentioned above, the Minsk-1 protocol was never ratified 
in Ukraine’s legal system; nevertheless, it is possible to trace its political effects. 
On September 16, 2014, Ukrainian government adopted the law “On special 
regime of local self-government in certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk 
oblasts”140 – a term used to refer to the territories controlled by the self-pro-
claimed “people’s republics” – which, among others, contained a provision 
on de facto amnesty for anti-governmental combatants. However, this provi-
sion remained ineffective due to the fact that it was conditioned by the prior 
conduct of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation, which 
was not fulfilled.
We should note that, along with the mentioned law, President Poroshenko 
proposed a bill on amnesty for persons involved in anti-governmental 
armed formations and taking part in activities of organs of self-proclaimed 
“republics,” which was not conditioned by any political concessions from 
their side.141 However, this proposal was not supported by the parliament 
and eventually withdrawn in December 2014.
 139 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On amendments to the Criminal and Criminal 
Procedural Codes of Ukraine regarding the inevitability of punishment for 
certain crimes against foundations of national security, public security and 
corruption crimes,” Pub. L. No. 1689– VII (2014), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
go/1689-18.
 140 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On special regime of local self-government in 
certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts,” Pub. L. No. 1680– VII 
(2014), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1680-18.
 141 President of Ukraine, “Draft Law “On prevention of the persecution and 
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Generally, the Minsk-1 protocol can be regarded a milestone that marks 
the opening of Ukrainian authorities’ thinking about accountability for 
conflict-related wrongdoings on the acceptability of an essentially political 
solution; that is, they accepted that there will be no punishment if certain 
criteria are fulfilled.
Increasing bids in political negotiations over accountability
The Minsk-1 protocol resulted in only temporary decrease in the intensity 
of warfare and – as a result of the new wave of escalation – the second 
Minsk protocol was signed on February 12, 2015. Minsk-2 protocol did 
not altered the essence of the agreement (see Annex 3 for more details). 
Moreover, it did not result in the adoption of any new legislation that would 
be treated as a step toward its implementation. Nevertheless, the signing 
of the agreement marks the beginning of a period of relative calm on the 
frontline, although not a definite ceasefire. In this situation, the Ukrainian 
authorities decided to refer to the institution of international criminal jus-
tice. On February 4, 2015, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a decla-
ration on the acceptance of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) over alleged war crimes on Ukrainian territory starting February 20, 
2014.142
In the period between the parliament’s agreement to accept the ICC 
jurisdiction over what can be generally called a situation in Donbas and 
its official lodging to the ICC – which happened in September 2015 – the 
Ukrainian authorities made several steps that could be interpreted as 
attempts to prepare themselves for potential investigation; in particular, 
to limit grounds for arguments that Ukrainian law enforcement agencies 
and the judiciary focus exclusively on cases of anti-governmental action. 
oblasts,” Pub. L.  No. 5082 (2014), http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/
webproc4_1?pf3511=52183.
 142 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On the statement of the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine “On the recognition by Ukraine of the jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court over the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed 
by senior officials of the Russian Federation and the leaders of the terrorist or-
ganizations “DNR” and “LNR,” which led to particularly grave consequences 






Thus, in April 2015 a new law was adopted that increases responsibility for 
committing war crimes.143 According to the April law, the term of impris-
onment was increased as a punishment for abuse of power by military 
officials. Furthermore, in March 2015, the Ukrainian government initi-
ated first investigations of crimes committed by representatives of pro-
governmental forces, widely covered by the media. The most prominent 
of the investigations is the process against members of the “Tornado” 
battalion.144
At the moment of writing, the ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor continues 
preliminary investigation of the situation in Ukraine, and it remains unclear 
whether the case eventually becomes an object of a more thorough inves-
tigation. From the perspective of this book, the decision to engage the 
institution of international criminal justice may be interpreted as an addi-
tional argument in an essentially political negotiation over the shape of 
retributive policies aimed at addressing wrongdoings committed during the 
Donbas conflict:  in addition to prospect of accountability in accordance 
with Ukrainian legislation, a prospect (however vague) of being tried before 
the ICC was presented primarily to the decision-makers of the “people’s 
republics.”
Another specificity of the discussed stage is the revived debate about 
the possibility to apply amnesty. In March 2015, a bill was proposed to 
the Verkhovna Rada by a group of opposition MPs, once again proposing 
“the prevention of criminal prosecution, punishment, and administrative 
accountability of participants in the events in Donetsk, Luhansk oblasts;”145 
 143 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On amendments to the Criminal Code of 
Ukraine on the abuse of power by the military officials,” Pub. L. No. 290-
VIII (2015), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/290-19.
 144 For more information about the “Tornado” case, see:  “What You Need 
to Know about the Case of Former Tornado Battalion Servicemen,” 
Ukraine Crisis Media Center, April 11, 2017, http://uacrisis.
org/55087-need-know-case-former-tornado-battalion-servicemen.
 145 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Draft Law “On prevention of criminal 
persecution, bringing to criminal, administrative responsibility and pun-
ishment of participants of events in the territory of Donetsk, Luhansk 
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in other words, a wide-ranging amnesty for those who can be called 
separatists. On the other hand, in April 2016 others presented a proposal 
of amnesty for participants of ATO; in other words, broadly understood 
pro-governmental combatants.146 Both proposals remained on paper only. 
The former was criticized primarily for being a too far-going concession 
to the government’s adversaries. The latter was criticized for being incom-
patible with the principle of the inadmissibility of amnesty for persons 
who committed serious crimes, which is present in Ukrainian legislation. 
In other words, Ukrainian authorities clearly became aware of the need of 
some sort of going beyond an ordinary approach to retribution, however 
displayed the lack of readiness to design and implement relevant policies.
Reset
As a result of lowering the intensity of warfare after signing the Minsk-2 
protocol, there were no new incentives for the Ukrainian authorities to 
alter the approach to accountability for conflict-related crimes. On the 
other hand, the conflict remained unresolved, and its public perception as 
an urgent problem remained unchanged (see Chapter 2).
At the beginning of 2018, a new framework law was adopted aimed at 
ordering the policy of Ukrainian state toward territories occupied by the 
“people’s republics” (the already mentioned “reintegration law”).147 Among 
other things, the law created a ground for reformatting the ATO that lasted 
since April 2014 into the Joint Forces Operation – which happened on April 
30, 2018 – and therefore opened the way for eliminating inconsistencies 
caused by the fact of applying counter-terrorist legislation to regulate crim-
inal accountability in the context of a de facto armed conflict. However, 
the law generally omitted issues of retributive justice; unlike measures that 
 146 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Draft Law “On amnesty for the persons 
who at the time of committing a crime participated in the Counter-Terrorist 
Operation,”“ Pub. L. No. 4519 (2016), http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/
webproc4_2?pf3516=4519&skl=9.
 147 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Law on the peculiarities of the state policy aimed 
at protecting the state sovereignty of Ukraine in temporarily occupied territo-








can be interpreted as elements of restorative justice, discussed in details in 
the following chapter.
At the same time, at the beginning of 2018, influential representatives of 
the Ukrainian authorities started signaling the need for the elaboration of 
a new comprehensive strategy of reintegration of the “people’s republics” 
with Ukraine, containing elements of DDR, justice, and reconciliation. The 
most important proposal of this type was presented in June 2018 by the 
interior minister Arsen Avakov.148 This proposal directly refers to the idea 
of the need to operate outside of existing retributive provisions, and there-
fore suggests introducing two extraordinary mechanisms. The first one is 
the adoption of the law on amnesty for the majority of people living in the 
“republics” – except from those with “blood on their hands” – and thus 
having something to do with the conflict. The second one is the adoption 
of the law on collaborators that would define the basic principles of their 
punishment. Taking into account the informal status of this proposal, we 
cannot treat it as a position shared by the broadly understood authorities. 
Nevertheless, this law may be interpreted as a signal that, after the end of 
ATO and the change of authorities as a result of presidential elections in 
2019, Ukrainian decision-makers started thinking about a “reset” in the ap-
proach to the accountability of separatists. More specifically, it corresponds 
with the dominant interpretation of events by the Ukrainian authorities in 
terms of an outcome of external aggression (see Chapter 3). Introduction 
of the category of “collaborators” suggests that the primary responsibility 
for committed wrongdoings rests on an external agent; obviously, this agent 
is Russia. The logical consequence of this approach is the introduction of 
relatively harsh sanctions against the group of “traitors” who decided to 
collaborate with the external enemy and thus contributed to the scale of 
injustices generated by the conflict. On the other hand, this approach leaves 
an open door for those whose engagement in warfare was somehow forced 
by circumstances, or who simply continued doing their jobs providing basic 
public goods to the population. From this perspective, the proposal takes 
 148 Arsen Avakov, “Strategy of Restoration of the Integrity of Ukraine and 
De-Occupation of the Donbass. “SMALL STEPS MECHANISM,” accessed 
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into account the lessons learned from the discussed evolution of approach 
to retributive justice: it underlines the need to provide both a stick and a 
carrot, creates space for both deterrence and a rehabilitation of those who 
contributed to the emergence and escalation of the conflict. To what extent 
will actual policies move in this direction and what final shape will they 
assume should become the subject of future studies.
Thus, we can trace a clear evolution in the approach of Ukrainian author-
ities to the problem of accountability of those responsible for the rise of 
separatism since the beginning of 2014. The initial “legalist” approach 
was gradually opened toward accepting “political” solutions. While basing 
on tools of ordinary justice (existing provisions of the criminal code), a 
way was given for extraordinary tools; in particular, opening a field for 
negotiations over possible amnesty, which nevertheless did not materialize 
itself during the period covered by the analysis.
4.3.  The practice of punishment for conflict-related crimes
Having at my disposal the database of court decisions in conflict-related 
criminal cases (see Annex 2), as a next step of the analysis I take a closer 
look at this source of information with the aim to analyze the mentioned 
practice of engagement of the Ukrainian judiciary in relevant retributive 
practices. Is the above-presented evolution in the approach of Ukrainian 
authorities to accountability for conflict-related crimes observable only at 
the political level? That is, in decisions issued by the legislature and the 
executive, which are by definition sensitive to political “demand” in the 
shape of public opinion and accordingly provide political “supply” in the 
shape of design of relevant policies. Or, can similar changes be traced also 
in decisions issued by the judiciary? That is, a segment of state authori-
ties responsible primarily for the interpretation and application of law. In 
other words, did the evolution of approach to retributive justice happen 
only in the field of political thought, or was it also reflected in decisions 
that directly affect persons engaged in the conflict? This section is devoted 
to answering these questions.
Each court trial is unique by definition. Ideally, a court is expected to 
assess the guilt of the accused by taking into account all the circumstances 




a political motivation impacted the issuing of any particular verdict149 
requires conducting a thorough audit of the course of a case from its begin-
ning to the end. Such a task was beyond the reach of this research project 
(and so, it constitutes a potentially interesting subject for further research). 
My approach here is based on the assumption that – due to the relatively 
large number of analyzed documents (ca. 1900) – any significant changes 
in the approach of the judiciary in punishing conflict-related wrongdoings 
can be deduced from the dynamics of the most fundamental information 
about the outcome of relevant court cases: the dynamics of the number of 
issued verdicts – including the proportion of convictions and acquittals – 
but also the dynamics of the average severity of punishment expressed in 
months of imprisonment.
Another assumption is that Ukrainian courts are characterized by “tra-
ditional sensitivity” to the will of the executive (see Chapter 2). This as-
sumption is reinforced by the following argument. Before the outbreak of 
the Donbas conflict, Ukrainian judiciary had virtually no experience in 
dealing with the types of crimes covered by the database. During the four-
years period preceding the beginning of the conflict – a timespan similar 
to the one covered by the database – we find only seventeen similar court 
decisions. There is no formal role of precedence in Ukrainian criminal law. 
At the same time, court practice in general is regarded as the source of law. 
However, it is not created by individual court decisions but established 
in the case of repeatability of problems faced by the court.150 Therefore, 
Ukrainian judiciary did not have any sort of established practice in dealing 
with these sorts of wrongdoings. Taking into account that the discussed 
cases appeared on agenda in circumstances that are essentially extraordi-
nary, the lack of established practice in dealing with them makes courts’ 
sensitivity to the approach proposed by the executive even more plausible. 
In other words, looking at the mentioned fundamental information about 
conflict-related court decision, I expect to observe the effect of hypothetical 
 149 As mentioned in Chapter  1, the provision of justice in extraordinary 
circumstances inevitably contains a significant element of political motivations, 
which from a normative perspective should contribute to reconciliation.
 150 O. Dashkovs’ka, “Sudovyi pretsedent i sudova praktyka iak dzherela prava,” 
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informal decisions to change the practice of bringing to accountability for 
some sort of wrongdoing. Data should reveal proper tendencies if there is 
a decision to stop prosecutions for an act interpreted as a manifestation 
separatism or, on the contrary, if there is a decision to provide more severe 
punishments for an engagement in anti-governmental activities.
Figures 4.1–4.4 present the visualization of mentioned data. Each figure 
reflects court decisions addressing different types of wrongdoings. Such divi-
sion is dictated by two reasons. First, it allows formulating some conclusions 
regarding the establishment of court practice, taking into account the men-
tioned principle of repeatability. Second, it creates ground for the search 
for mutual connections with the practices of truth-seeking discussed in 
Chapter 3. As a reminder, these are the following types of wrongdoings:
 1) crimes against foundations of the national security of Ukraine (they 
cover the activities that can be popularly referred to as separatism), in 
particular actions aimed at violent change or overthrow of the constitu-
tional order or the seizure of state power (art. 109 of the CCU); attack 
on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine (art. 110, 110-2 
of the CCU); treason (art. 111 of the CCU);
 2) terrorism-related crimes, in particular a terrorist act (art. 258 of the 
CCU), involvement in committing a terrorist act (art.  258-1 of the 
CCU), public appeals to commit a terrorist act (art. 258-2 of the CCU), 
creation of a terrorist group or terrorist organization (art. 258-3 of the 
CCU), facilitating the commission of a terrorist act (art. 258-4 of the 
CCU), financing terrorism (art. 258-5 of the CCU);
 3) the creation of illegal paramilitary or armed units (art. 260 of the CCU);
 4) planning, preparing, starting, and conducting aggressive war (art. 437 
of the CCU).
Figures reflecting the practice of punishing crimes against foundations 
of the national security of Ukraine (4.1) have an irregular yet symmetric 
shape. There is no clear increasing or decreasing tendency. This suggests 
the non-existence of any sort of informal decisions taken by the Ukrainian 
authorities aimed at either treating this kind of essentially political acts in 
a more indulgent way or, on the contrary, increasing the deterring poten-
tial of these punishments. Furthermore, the figures provide no ground for 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































judicial practice visible at this level of analysis. Indeed, a deeper insight 
into randomly selected documents from this category reveals that similar 
provisions are applied to different types of actions; from support in orga-
nization of illegal referendums to spreading anti-governmental agitation in 
social media. As a result, the figures lack a clear pattern in terms of average 
punishment. What can be stated is that acts that could be interpreted as 
manifestations of or support to separatist ideas remained under constant 
scrutiny of Ukrainian authorities.
Figures reflecting the practice of punishing terrorism-related crimes 
(4.2) show a different picture. The figure reveals no sudden increases or 
decreases in the number of issued decisions, however there is a general 
growing tendency, which starts to be clearly visible since the middle 
of 2015. In other words, unlike in the case of other types of crimes, in 
which courts started issuing verdicts relatively quickly, terrorist-related 
cases were initially treated with reluctance. Furthermore, if we take 
into account the large number of terrorism-related crimes registered by 
the prosecution (see Chapter 3), one of the possible interpretations of 
this picture is the following. By taking a decision to operate within the 
framework of the ATO, Ukrainian authorities created a pressure that 
eventually “forced” courts to confirm that incumbents are indeed guilty 
of terrorism. In other words, in terrorism-related cases we deal with 
the process of establishing a court practice “inspired” by the executive 
branch of power. At the same time, the average punishment remained 
relatively stable, which does not suggest that there were any further 
informal decisions to mitigate or exacerbate punishments for this sort 
of acts beyond the very decision to frame the use of force against the 
government in terms of terrorism.
When it comes to participation in illegal armed groups, the figure (4.3) 
reflecting the number of issued decisions reveals a decreasing tendency. 
This figure shows some similarity with the figure reflecting the number of 
conflict-related casualties (see Annex 1). This suggests that peaks reflecting 
the increased number of issued verdicts can be explained as an outcome 
of increased intensity of warfare in summer 2014 and at the beginning 
of 2015. Moreover, the figure reflecting average punishment remained 
here stable. Generally, neither tendency suggests the existence of informal 
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decisions regarding changes in approach to the practice of punishment in 
this category of wrongdoers. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this category of 
cases is neutral from the perspective of narratives used by the Ukrainian 
authorities to “tell the story” of the conflict. Therefore, it would be also 
correct to state that retributive practices in these cases are also the less sus-
ceptible to incorrect or unjust interpretations. Indeed, the almost flat figure 
reflecting the average punishment suggests the existence of a unanimity in 
courts’ assessment of such actions.
Figures reflecting the practice of punishing crimes related to aggressive 
warfare (4.4) appear to be less informative. In fact, the much smaller amount 
of cases here disallows any inference basing on tendencies, as there are only 
sixteen relevant cases in the database. Therefore, the scale of the axis reflecting 
the number of verdicts is smaller than in previous figures and the figures them-
selves only reflect individual verdicts issued during the period covered by the 
book, so I provide them for illustrative purposes only.
All figures have an obvious common feature: acquittals constitute a small 
minority of all issued decisions. In other words, having in mind the dis-
proportion between the number of crimes registered by the prosecutor and 
the number of verdicts (see Chapter 3), it would be correct to state that 
the Ukrainian judiciary appears to be severe toward wrongdoers, whose 
cases eventually end up in courts. Unfortunately, available data disallow 
any general conclusions regarding the fate of the accused whose cases are 
not finalized in courts.
There are some additional observations from the database, which do 
not arise from the presented figures, but which are nevertheless important 
from the perspective of this book. First, none of the documents covered 
by the database contain any sort of reference to notions of justice, truth, 
or peace in parts justifying the issued decisions. In other words, there is 
no formal trace of courts taking into account the logic of extraordinary 
situation, which is theoretically possible due to the existence of room for 
judiciary discretion. Second, none of the documents covered by the data-
base refers to the “big fish” cases; that is, persons belonging to the small 
group of high-level leaders of the self-proclaimed “republics.” Third, there 
are no cases referring to pro-governmental combatants, although there are 
cases of investigations against persons serving in spontaneously created 
Retributive justice116
volunteer battalions, which theoretically can be treated as illegal armed 
groups.151
The latter two observations should not be interpreted as a sufficient 
proof that Ukrainian judiciary practices a selective approach to punishment. 
These lacks result from the fact that numerous cases were pending at the 
moment of conducting the analysis, and some types of conflict-related cases 
remained beyond the scope of the database due to technical problems with 
their extraction (see the discussion about the limitations of the database 
in Annex 2).
All in all, we find no ground to state that there is a strong evidence 
supporting the claim that Ukrainian authorities somehow attempt to 
influence the practice of courts in their dealings with conflict-related 
wrongdoings with the aim to “fine-tune” this practice with the evolving 
political thought on how to use available retributive instruments in the 
context of the ongoing armed conflict. The only exception here is a sort of 
“suggestion” to engage counter-terrorist provisions of the criminal code 
in the shape of decisions to use force within the framework of ATO. As a 
result, since the beginning of the conflict till the end of 2017, approximately 
400 persons were found guilty of committing terrorism-related crimes.
The above-presented findings are relevant first and foremost from the 
perspective of an “average wrongdoer:” a Ukrainian citizen152 who for some 
reason engaged in anti-governmental activity. It is exactly this category of 
persons that is primarily affected by the discussed retributive measures. 
From this viewpoint, the judiciary acted in a rather “ordinary” way: if you 
commit an act regarded by the Ukrainian authorities as a conflict-related 
wrongdoing – and if you get into the gears of the judiciary – you will most 
likely be punished; there is not much possibility to alter your fate by refer-
ring to the circumstances of the armed conflict.
Still, there are potential spaces in which retributive practice could be 
modified to take into account the extraordinary circumstances of the armed 
conflict. The first is the timespan between the registration of a given crime 
and the court’s verdict. Indeed, Ukrainian authorities initiated a program 
 151 My interview with a representative of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights 
Union, Kyiv, September 2017.
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entitled “They wait for you at home,” which allows DNR/LNR combatants 
to return to peaceful life in the mainland in exchange for cooperation with 
law enforcement agencies. The program does not provide any formal 
guarantee of avoidance of criminal responsibility but obviously aims at a 
tradeoff between the state and an individual wrongdoer. There is no details 
about the program’s implementation, as they are classified.153 However, its 
very existence suggests the possibility of informal decisions affecting the 
severity of punishment of individual wrongdoers before the case is lodged 
to the court. The second are the “big fish” cases along cases of punishing 
pro-governmental combatants. However, a systematic research of these 
issues requires conducting separate research designed in a different way.
4.4.  Effects and challenges
As the final step of analysis of retributive measures elaborated and 
implemented by the Ukrainian authorities to address the wrongdoings 
related to the Donbas conflict, I focus on the question: to what extent did 
they contribute to achieving normative goals prescribed to transitional jus-
tice? Taking into account the theoretical considerations mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter, this question can be reformulated as follows: to 
what extent is the society-dominating perception of deservingness of pun-
ishment met, and to what extent does it contribute to settling down the 
existing retributive emotions, thus supporting reconciliation?
As discussed in Chapter 2, Ukrainians predominantly do not support 
a hawkish approach to policies aimed at putting an end to the conflict. 
Among other things, this refers to retributive measures. According to the 
research conducted with the aim to assess the degree of acceptability for 
“forgiveness” to inhabitants of the DNR/LNR, the overwhelming majority 
of Ukrainians (around 75 percent) agree that persons working in the areas 
of health, utilities, education, and social protection should be allowed to 
save their jobs in the event that the Ukrainian government returns control 
over these territories; in other words, they should not be punished in any 
 153 Tetiana Katrychenko, “Na tebe chekaiut’ vdoma, abo kolyshni terorysty na 







way. On the contrary, a similar majority rejects the idea of amnesty provi-
sion to anti-governmental combatants.154 However, when compared with 
other possible concession that could be provided by Ukrainian authorities, 
amnesty proves to be no priority issue (see Table 5.1 in Chapter 5).
When seen in this context, the discussed development of Ukrainian 
authorities’ thinking about approach to punishments, but also practice 
of punishment are all conducted within the space designated by what can 
be called a “political demand.” The application of existing retributive 
provisions to address relevant wrongdoers does not allow to claim that 
separatists and anti-governmental combatants generally enjoy impunity. 
At the same time, the presence of the idea of withdrawal from a strictly 
legalist approach to punishment and opening a possibility to conditionally 
remove punishment by some political concessions can also be argued to go 
in line with overall popular expectations. The same can be said about ideas 
that did not took the shape of legal acts: more or less concrete draft laws 
on amnesty, but also the idea to introduce the notion of collaborators into 
the legislation. All these initiatives can be regarded as “testing” different 
approaches to find possible solutions the peace vs. justice dilemma within 
the scope accepted by majority of Ukrainians.
However, there are at least several arguments that do not allow stating 
that the entirety of policies discussed in this chapter indeed bring the goal 
of reconciliation closer.
First, the discussed decision to start ATO and utilize counter-terrorist 
legislation greatly contributed to the abovementioned susceptibility of the 
conflict to multiple interpretations, as it introduced additional serious ambi-
guities regarding the status of combatants and prisoners on both sides.155 
Such circumstances allowed using the “retributive machine” not only to 
 154 “Chto ukraintsy dumaiut ob amnistii na Donbasse?,” Kalmius Group, 
September 10, 2018, https://www.kalmiusgroup.org/2018/09/blog-post_33.
html.
 155 Media Initiative for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, 
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achieve its direct goals but for the sake of “taking hostages” – persons who 
could be exchanged for prisoners held by the “authorities” of the DNR/
LNR.156 The legality of such practices is doubtful. While in principle it 
can be regarded as going in line with the logic of acting in extraordinary 
situations, the lack of transparency in this regard may become a ground 
for further resentments. In other words, the practice of using the retributive 
apparatus by the Ukrainian state to address the problem of engagement of 
part of the population into anti-governmental warfare has created ground 
for claims about injustices that emerged as its result.
Second, the discussed judicial practice remained predominantly beyond 
attention of the public opinion. Effects of retributive apparatus in action 
were experienced by those directly affected by relevant investigations and 
trials. While this is not a small group, the results of these investigations and 
trials were not communicated in a systematic way to the rest of the citizens, 
whose opinions define the space for authorities to act, as it was mentioned 
above.157 In other words, one can hardly find evidence that the discussed 
practice of punishment for conflict-related wrongdoings has a socialization 
effect. As a result, the questions remain unanswered whether dominating 
expectations regarding the deservingness of punishment are actually met 
and whether retributive emotions in the society are satisfied.
Last but not least, the presented data reflecting social expectations 
of retributive policies refer only to the Ukrainian mainland. Available 
data allow assuming, that inhabitants of the DNR/LNR are afraid of 
consequences of the contact with Ukrainian law enforcement agencies in 
the case these territories return under the control of Ukrainian central gov-
ernment.158 Taking into account that the cited research was focused on 
“ordinary people” who do not participate in warfare, there is an obvious 
gap between the retributive expectations of mainland inhabitants and the 
 156 My interview with a representative of the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights 
Union, Kyiv, February 2019.
 157 My interview with the representative of Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group, Kyiv, 
February 2019.
 158 Petro Burkovs’kyi, Ruslan Kermach, and Andrii Hirnyk, “Chym zhyvut’ 
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fears of inhabitants of the “people’s republics.” This is probably the most 
serious argument in support of the statement that the proper modality of 
retributive justice that may serve the goal of reconciliation has not yet been 
elaborated.
Chapter 5.  Restorative justice
5.1.  Restorative justice in conflict-affected 
societies: specificity and significance
The concept of restorative justice refers to measures aimed at healing 
and rehabilitation those affected by instances of injustice.159 Repairing 
the consequences of previous law violations is an immanent principle of 
any legal system, including international law.160 Unsurprisingly, this prin-
ciple gained significant weight also in the process of provision of justice in 
extraordinary circumstances.
The concept of restorative justice requires some clarification, first and 
foremost because of the existence of alternative terms widely used in the 
literature: “reparations” and “reparative justice.” With no goal to enter the 
theoretical debate about the specificities of both these concepts, I regard 
them as more or less equivalent, therefore synonymous. As a result, we deal 
here with quite a capacious concept, as it refers to a multitude of specific 
measures such as restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, 
guarantees of nonrecurrence, and specific programs for providing benefits 
directly to the victims of certain types of crimes.161 It is also extended 
onto the fields of dealing with historical injustices162 and unintentional or 
incidental damages.163 Generally, the abundancy of issues covered by the 
 159 Charles Villa-Vicencio, “The Reek of Cruelty and the Quest for Healing: Where 
Retributive and Restorative Justice Meet,” Journal of Law and Religion 14, 
no. 1 (1999), p. 175.
 160 Tomasz Lachowski, Perspektywa praw ofiar w prawie 
międzynarodowym: sprawiedliwość okresu przejściowego (transitional jus-
tice) (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2018), p. 125.
 161 Pablo De Greiff, “Justice and Reparations,” in The Handbook of Reparations, 
ed. Pablo De Greiff (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 452–53.
 162 Janna Thompson, “Reparative Claims and Theories of Justice,” in Historical 
Justice and Memory, ed. Klaus Neumann and Janna Thompson, Critical 
Human Rights (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2015).
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discussed concept can be regarded the consequence of the fact that relevant 
theoretical reflection refers primarily to questions that arise in the context 
of dealing with mass-scale violence; e.g. what can be regarded as a measure 
sufficient to provide healing and rehabilitation? what should be the extent 
of such measures?
To summarize, measures that can be categorized as belonging to the set of 
restorative justice complement those belonging to the set of retributive jus-
tice (see Chapter 4). They draw attention to “the other side of wrongdoing,” 
namely the victims. Restorative justice is aimed at achieving relational goals. 
In particular, the mentioned measures are expected to contribute to recog-
nition of all individuals of a conflicted community as citizens with equal 
rights, the promotion of trust among citizens and solidarity understood as 
the disposition and willingness of people to put themselves in the place of 
others.164
Like other extraordinary measures, the practice of restorative justice 
application generates challenges. The latter originate from the specificity 
of measures under scrutiny which, despite focus on relational aims, are 
strongly dependent on the redistribution of material resources at the dis-
posal of a society. Simply put, reparations generate costs, both as specific 
programs aimed at paying individual or collective compensations and as 
policies providing certain public goods. These costs inevitably constitute 
burden for some parts of the society. Whenever the issue of distribution 
of wealth is introduced into the political agenda, one can expect disputes 
regarding the fairness of specific solutions.165 If restorative justice measures 
address the consequences of large-scale violence, the problem of proper 
calculation of the value to be provided to victims in one way or another 
becomes even more obvious.166
Furthermore, while in principle the responsibility of the offender 
to somehow compensate the harm done  – and thus to contribute to 
 164 De Greiff, “Justice and Reparations,” pp. 460–66.
 165 This problem is discussed in more detail in Harry Brighouse, Sprawiedliwość 
(Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sic!, 2007).
 166 Tyler Cowen, “How Far Back Should We Go? Why Restitution Should Be 
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reparation – raises no objection, in the situation of uncertainties and ambi-
guities regarding the division between offenders and victims, a focus on 
the latter is usually associated with the risk that it will revictimize and 
stigmatize both victims and offenders.167 This leads to underlining once 
again the sensitivity of restorative justice to truth-seeking (see Chapter 3). 
Who is actually a victim? Who actually bears the responsibility for victims’ 
suffering? The answers to these and other similar questions may signifi-
cantly determine relevant policies of an interested state, and thus determine 
whether they lead to more social solidarity or revictimization of certain 
social groups.
Below, I will focus on measures that fit into the category of restorative 
justice, applied by Ukrainian authorities to address the consequences of 
wrongdoings associated with the Donbas conflict.
5.2.  The evolution of Ukrainian authorities’ approach to 
restorative justice in the context of the Donbas conflict
Similar to other policies fitting into the category of transitional justice 
discussed in previous chapters, the approach of the Ukrainian authorities 
to restorative measures aimed at dealing with the legacy of the Donbas 
conflict has evolved over time. In this case, the specificity is in the fact 
that – along with the passage of time – new initiatives did not replace 
the previous ones but rather supplemented them, constituting an attempt 
to adjust the approach to changing needs. The schematic timeline of the 
approach’s development is presented in Annex 1. Let us now turn to the 
analysis of the main stages of development of relevant policies.
Setting up foundations of policy toward IDPs 
and citizens in non-controlled territories
The most evident problem that required the Ukrainian authorities to intro-
duce measures fitting into the category of restorative justice manifested itself 
 167 Jemima Garcia-Godos and Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Introduction,” 
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at the very early stages of the Donbas conflict. As a result of sovereignty 
loss over a part of its territory, the Ukrainian state de facto lost its ability 
to provide rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution to a signif-
icant part of its citizens. Some of them decided (and some were forced) to 
leave their places of residence and move to the mainland (territory under 
control of the government), which resulted in the emergence of the problem 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The very existence of IDPs, who by 
definition suffer a certain form of injustice, can be regarded as the most 
visible symptom of the discussed conflict and its impact on the Ukrainian 
society. Meanwhile, the citizens who remained in their places of residence 
constitute exactly that part of the society, which is to be “reintegrated,” 
and which is to become a party of the process of reconciliation in the first 
place. Thus, it is no surprise that the first steps that fit into the category 
of restorative justice were taken to address this particular problem and to 
outline the most fundamental principles of the state’s policy toward citi-
zens whose “contract” with the state – in terms of guaranteed rights and 
freedoms – appeared to be violated as a result of the conflict: those who 
for different reasons remained in the occupied territories and those who 
moved to the mainland.
Unsurprisingly, foundations were laid during what was already called 
the Crimean phase of the conflict. Almost immediately after the finalization 
of the annexation of Crimea, on March 19, 2014, there was initiated the 
preparation of the law on ensuring civil rights and freedoms, along with 
the legal regime on the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine. The law 
was adopted on April 15, 2014.168 In the case of this document, the notion 
of temporarily occupied territory referred exclusively to Crimea. The goal 
of the law was to confirm the Ukrainian state’s obligation to guarantee 
the rights of its citizens; both those who decided to stay in Crimea and 
those who moved to Ukraine’s mainland. In particular, the law explicitly 
mentioned political (electoral) rights, the right of free movement, property 
rights, the right to inheritance, the right to justice; although, it did not set 
up any concrete mechanism to guarantee these rights. In August 2014, 
 168 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On ensuring civil rights and freedoms, and the 
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the discussed document was supplemented by the law that provided the 
basis for the creation of the “Crimea” free economic area and established 
rules for the economic activity of Ukrainian citizens and companies origi-
nating from the occupied Crimean Peninsula. This document was declared 
to be aimed at maintaining the profitability of legal entities evacuated from 
Crimea and maintaining the living standards of citizens voluntarily or forc-
ibly evacuated from this area.169
Obviously, the problem of IDPs gained additional significance along with 
the spread of the conflict to Donbas and the escalation of violence associ-
ated with it. On October 20, 2014, the law on IDPs was adopted with the 
aim of creating a comprehensive state policy to guarantee the rights of the 
latter.170 The most significant innovation of the law was the formal creation 
of the special status of an IDP, which is confirmed by the special certifi-
cate – thus “indicating” those entitled to become beneficiaries of policies 
aimed at providing some form of compensation – and the creation of the 
specialized register of IDPs. Both elements were aimed at facilitating the 
management of relevant policies targeted at this most widespread category 
of persons affected by the conflict.
The law also established a connection to retributive measures (see 
Chapter 4). In particular, one basis to deprive a person of the IDP status is 
when he or she commits one of the crimes that became the basis for judging 
the government’s adversaries; then widely referred to as separatists. That is, 
crimes against foundations of the national security of Ukraine, terrorism-
related crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. In other 
words, active engagement in anti-governmental actions was defined as a 
criterion for distinguishing perpetrators from victims among the inhabitants 
of the conflict-affected territories. The fundamental principles laid down in 
 169 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On creation of a free economic zone “Crimea” 
and the peculiarities of economic activity in the temporarily occupied terri-
tory of Ukraine,” Pub. L. No. 1636-VII (2014), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
go/1636-18.
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these documents remained in force over the whole period of time covered 
by this research.
Restoration of infrastructure in the uncontrolled 
territories: bargaining and conditionality
Along with the escalation of the conflict, it became clear that restorative 
measures cannot be limited to mere legislation confirming the validity of 
the mentioned “contract” between the Ukrainian state and all its citizens 
in the extraordinary situation.
The destruction of infrastructure and deterioration of socio-economic 
situation of people directly or indirectly affected by the conflict – regardless 
of the side of the conflict they represent – obviously required further steps 
which were inevitably connected with the need of redistribution of public 
resources, such as compensations and programs of restoration of the infra-
structure. As discussed above, the peak of violence in August 2014 led to the 
engagement of Ukrainian authorities in the process of political negotiations 
with their adversaries; however vague this category was due to the hybridity 
of the Donbas conflict. The combination of these circumstances was used by 
the Ukrainian authorities to apply a certain kind of conditionality targeted 
at the decisionmakers of the self-proclaimed “republics.” More specifically, 
the issue of provision of material resources necessary both for normal func-
tioning and restoration of damages in the occupied territories was turned 
into a matter of bargain.
Two decisions illustrate this logic. The law on the special status of occu-
pied territories adopted on September 16, 2014,171 among other issues 
contained the provision for the creation of a special mechanism enabling 
the financial support of local authorities – having in mind the territories 
under control of the self-proclaimed “republics” – to ensure social, eco-
nomic, and cultural development of these territories. However, this was 
conditioned by the prior conduct of local elections in accordance with 
 171 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Law on special regime of local self-government 
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Ukrainian legislation. This condition was never fulfilled and, as a result, 
the mentioned proposal remains on paper.
On the other hand, Ukrainian authorities took several steps that can be 
interpreted as an attempt to exert economic pressure on the “authorities of 
republics.” First, in November 2014, the Ukrainian government decided to 
stop budgetary payments to local institutions under the control of separatists. 
In practice, this decision closed the possibility for the “authorities” to provide 
public goods and deploy social payments at the cost of Ukrainian budget; 
which was additionally used by the “authorities” as a means to legitimize 
themselves. Noteworthy, this decision was taken almost half a year after the 
beginning of the violent phase of the conflict. As a result, citizens remaining 
in the “republics” had to visit the mainland regularly to obtain due social 
payments (such as pensions). On June 9, 2015, the Ukrainian government 
informed the Council of Europe about its derogation from the European 
Convention on Human Rights under Article 15 of the Convention,172 thus 
additionally underlining its readiness and ability to guarantee all sorts of civil 
rights only on the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. Finally, 
in March 2017, economic restrictions against the “republics” were tightened 
when the economic blockade was enacted, significantly limiting the possibility 
of trade with the occupied territories.173
This what can be called “restorative proposal” formulated by the 
Ukrainian authorities in the aftermath of signing the Minsk-1 protocol 
did not result in any break-through in terms of evolution of the conflict. 
Nevertheless, it remained in force in the following years. The special status 
was initially planned to last for three years, but in October 2018 it was 
eventually prolonged till the end of 2019.174 Another signal that Ukrainian 
authorities are potentially ready to bargain in this field was sent in March 
 172 “Ukraine Derogation from European Convention on Human Rights,” 
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2015, after signing the Minsk-2 protocol. At that moment, the process 
of constitutional amendment on state decentralization was initiated. The 
reform was aimed primarily at meeting the generally understood European 
standards in terms of self-government, in particular the principles of sub-
sidiarity, universality, and financial sustainability of local government. 
Nevertheless, its implementation would undoubtedly provide local author-
ities throughout the country with broader competences, which could be 
combined with obtaining additional resources on the basis of the law on 
special status. Once again, the process was suspended due to the lack of 
progress in peace talks.175
Development of controlled territories: attempt to build soft power
Along with the above measures, Ukrainian authorities started the imple-
mentation of projects aimed at the restoration of parts of Donbas remaining 
under the control of central government.
In order to manage the area, a state agency for the restoration of Donbas 
was created on September 10, 2014.176 In April 2016, together with the State 
Service of Ukraine for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of 
Sevastopol, the agency was transformed into the Ministry of Temporarily 
Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons (MTOT), whose 
primary task is to manage relevant state policies.
After signing the Minsk-1 protocol, a number of plans and programs 
aimed at the restoration of the destroyed infrastructure were adopted:
 • action plan for recovery of objects of social and transport infrastruc-
ture, housing, and life support systems (October 16, 2014);177
of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts,”“ Pub. L. No. 2588-VIII (2018), https://
zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/2588-19.
 175 I discuss this issue in more details elsewhere: Igor Lyubashenko, Transitional 
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Transition, vol. 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2017), pp. 135–39.
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go/442-2014-%D0%BF.
 177 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, “On approval of the plan of measures for 
the organization of restoration of damaged (destroyed) objects of social and 









Approach to restorative justice in the Donbas conflict 129
 • decision of the Cabinet of Ministers regulating the procedure of 
obtaining subventions for the recovery of the destroyed infrastructure 
(April 29, 2015);178
 • amendment to the Budgetary Code of Ukraine, according to which all 
unused resources in local budgets throughout the country are trans-
ferred to special funds in the local budgets of Donetsk and Luhansk 
oblasts, aimed at the restoration of damaged infrastructure (June 2, 
2016);179
 • action plan for the realization of some principles of state policy toward 
territories under the control of the “people’s republics” (January 11, 
2017);180
 • state program of the recovery of and peacebuilding in eastern regions of 
Ukraine (December 13, 2017).181
As a result, measures constituting the core of approach to restorative justice 
can be regarded as based on the principle of focusing on the restoration 
of public property situated in Ukraine’s mainland. Noteworthy, neither of 
the mentioned documents provides basis for individual compensations for 
and Luhansk oblasts,” Pub. L. No. 1002-р (2014), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
go/1002-2014-%D1%80.
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those who suffered as a result of warfare in Donbas. This can be explained 
in the following way.
Having in mind Ukraine’s hard economic situation (see Chapter 2), 
the proper allocation of available – rather modest – material resources 
constitutes a challenge. Already in mid-2014 the Ukrainian government 
requested technical assistance and financial support from the international 
community to assess and plan priority recovery and peacebuilding efforts in 
the conflict-affected regions of eastern Ukraine. In response to this request, 
the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment was prepared by a consortium 
of the EU, the UN, and the World Bank.182 The document indicated the 
most significant needs of the region affected by warfare, whose majority can 
be interpreted as measures fitting into the category of restorative justice. 
Moreover, it clearly indicated main governance problems, which consti-
tute major obstacles for achieving identified goals (first and foremost, the 
problem of corruption). It also contains a suggestion that foreign support 
should be supplementary to Ukraine’s own efforts.
In August 2015, the mentioned document was accepted by the Cabinet 
of Ministers of Ukraine as official “guidelines” for the further development 
of policies toward Donbas.183 As a result, the mentioned state program of 
recovery and peacebuilding in the eastern regions of Ukraine adopted in 
December 2017 is based exactly on the proposals of the international con-
sortium. In particular, the program assumes that the conflict is an important 
factor of deterioration in social and economic rights, however this problem 
is rooted deeper and has origins in the period that preceded the conflict. 
Therefore, reconstruction should be future-oriented. In other words, the 
goal is not to just “restore” social and economic situation from before the 
outbreak of the conflict but to create conditions for modernization.
 182 The World Bank, “Ukraine. Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment. Analysis 
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Furthermore, the discussed aspect of Ukraine’s policy reflects the domi-
nating popular expectations that the conflict should be resolved primarily 
by peaceful means. More specifically, it is based on the assumption that 
what can be called the normalization of life in territories controlled by 
Ukraine’s central government – and their anticipated development in the 
future – can serve as the most effective tool to reintegrate the occupied ter-
ritories. Hence, the idea of soft power.184
Relegation of responsibility to Russia
By adopting the already mentioned “reintegration law” at the beginning of 
2018,185 the Ukrainian authorities marked their will to consolidate and – at 
least to some extent – eliminate controversies in conflict-related policies 
(I will return to this issue in the following section). This had a significant 
impact on restorative measures.
The law confirmed that the protection of rights, freedoms, and lawful 
interests of physical and legal persons constitutes one of the goals of 
Ukraine’s policy towards the occupied territories; along with the freeing of 
the occupied territories and the restoration of constitutional order there, 
ensuring the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. 
At the same time, the law established the principle according to which 
Ukraine does not bear responsibility for “unlawful actions of the Russian 
Federation or its occupation administration in the temporarily occupied 
territories in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts or for unlawful decisions taken 
by them” (art. 6). Consequently, the “responsibility for material or non-
material damages caused to Ukraine as a result of the armed aggression 
of the Russian Federation, relies on the Russian Federation in accordance 
with principles and norms of international law” (art. 2).
In other words, the law indirectly confirmed principles of restorative 
measures undertaken in the context of the Donbas conflict, established 
in the previously discussed stages: (1) the focus on guaranteeing rights of 
 184 Joseph S Nye, Soft Power:  The Means to Success In World Politics. 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2009).
 185 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Law on the peculiarities of the state policy 
aimed at protecting the state sovereignty of Ukraine in temporarily occupied 








citizens directly affected by the conflict and provision of necessary assistance 
to IDPs; (2) the provision of investments to recover “normal life” in parts 
of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts under control of the central government. 
These were supplemented by the principle of the relegation of responsi-
bility for all conflict-related damages to Russia as the aggressor. This step 
obviously goes in line with developments in other “lineages” of transitional 
justice policies discussed in previous chapters; in particular, in the field of 
truth-seeking.
5.3.  Effects and challenges
Turning to the issue of effectiveness, I will deliberately omit the question of 
achieving the direct goals prescribed to above measures. Besides, progress in 
the process of restoration of destroyed infrastructure is a complex problem 
in itself, which should be studied separately according to principles of eval-
uation of public policies. Taking into account the goal of this study, I will 
focus on effects and challenges in achieving relational goals prescribed to 
restorative justice.
The most fundamental strength of presented measures is that they agree 
with dominating popular expectations regarding the necessary steps to 
establish peace. According to data presented in Table 5.1, conviction about 
the necessity of restorative measures – that is, the conviction about the 
potential effectiveness of the “soft power” approach – as a step toward 
peace is the most popular one, set aside the necessity to increase interna-
tional pressure on Russia. At the same time, support declines to a position 
that can be regarded as opposite (stop financing the occupied territories).
On the other hand, the presented measures generated a number of 
problems. Some can be regarded as shortcomings in the process of policy 
implementation. In turn, some constitute what can be called unintended 
consequences of policies.
In terms of shortcomings, one should first and foremost underline 
problems in the field of execution of policy towards IDPs. The latter are re-
ported to experience difficulties that question the actual ability of the state to 
fully implement proclaimed goals of protection of their social rights. In par-
ticular, IDPs experience arrears in payments (pensions, targeted assistance), 
problems with assistance in solving housing issues (providing housing, con-
cluding a rental contract), problems with confirming the actual place of 
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residence, problems with obtaining subsidies, problems with housing and 
communal services payments, along with instances of unfounded annulment 
of the IDP certificate.186 Furthermore, IDPs were de facto deprived of their 
rights to vote in 2015 local elections.
Table 5.1.  Preferable ways to solve the Donbas conflict, as seen by Ukrainians.
What decisions, in your opinion, should be taken in  
order to establish peace in Donbass? (respondents cold  










Separation of territories occupied by the DNR and LNR 
from Ukraine
8.2 12 8.8 9.8
Providing the DNR and LNR with a special status within 
the borders of Ukraine
13.5 12.8 11.8 12.9
Introduction of federalism in Ukraine 8.1 7.5 4.6 8.7
The successful restoration of normal life in the territories of 
Donbas under the control of Ukraine
29.2 27.6 28 30.6
Legal elections in the territories controlled by the DNR and 
LNR 
12.9 12.6 11.7 13
Providing Russian language with an official status 8.2 11.4 4.9 6.5
Provision of amnesty to everyone who participated in 
warfare in Donbas
2.7 5.7 3.8 7.2
Forcing Russia to stop interference in the Donbas conflict
(strengthening international sanctions, having international 
institutions pressure Russia)
35.2 40.6 38.1 32
Stop financing the territories occupied by the DNR and 
LNR (pensions, salaries etc.)
13.2 19.6 11 7.1
Resignation from the perspective of NATO membership, 
guaranteeing neutral status of Ukraine in the constitution
5.9 7.5 6.3 6.6
Peace can be established only by force - Ukraine should 
regain control over territories of DNR and LNR by military 
means
13.6 14.8 13.5 14.2
Other 0.8 1.8 3.3 2.1
Hard to say 17.5 13.1 14.1 15.8
Source: Democratic Initiatives Foundation.
 186 Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, “Zahubleni v papirtsiakh: 






On the other hand, policies targeted at IDPs do not prevent the emer-
gence of tensions between the latter and the local population. According 
to data presented in Table 5.2, along with the prolongation of the con-
flict, one can observe the tendency of growing distrust toward IDPs in the 
Ukrainian society. The reason for that is primarily due to the conviction 
about the “privileged status” of IDPs.187 Another research revealed that 
IDPs themselves declare an increased interest in politics, which makes them 
a “politicized social group.” Both tendencies suggest that there is a potential 
for new tensions/conflicts between those who can be called victims of the 
conflict and “neutral citizens.”188
 187 Democratic Initiatives Foundation, “Stavlennia naselennia Ukraїny do 
vnutrishn’o peremishchenykh osib,” January 30, 2019, https://dif.org.ua/
article/stavlennya-naselennya-ukraini-do-vnutrishno-peremishchenikh-osib.
 188 Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Displaced Ukrainians. Who Are They, and What 
Do They Think?” (Centre for East European and International Studies, 
March 2017), https://www.zois-berlin.de/publikationen/zois-report/
zois-report-12017/.
Table 5.2.  The level of trust toward IDPs among Ukrainians.
I am ready to accept IDPs from Donbas as… 2015 2017 2018
Members of my family 22.1 26.4 22.9
Close friends 31.6 40.5 34.1
Neighbours 51.1 65 58.3
Persons I manage: hired workers, subordinates, etc. 21.3 23.4 20.8
Colleagues at work, who work as my peers at different  
positions
36.8 42 34
Persons who manage me: employers, bosses, etc. 12.5 18.1 13
Persons who head the administration of a town/village  
I currently live in
9.8 15.1 10
Persons, who head ministries or state services of Ukraine 9.2 15.1 9.6
The President of Ukraine 7.7 13.8 8
Citizens who vote in elections for the President, the  
Verkhovna Rada, or local self-government
27 41.5 31.1
Persons who obtain tax, credit, or other financial privileges 15.2 24.3 15.1
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In terms of what was called above the unintended consequences of 
discussed policies, we should pay attention to the mentioned principle of 
focus on the restoration of public property. The logic behind such an ap-
proach is clear. In conditions of limited resources, it is better to focus on 
measures that can serve, among other things, the function of investment. 
However, as a result of the specificity of Ukraine’s political system (see 
Chapter 2), virtually all measures/initiatives proposed by the authorities 
bear the burden of “the lack of trust by default.” Restorative measures are 
no exception here.
More specifically, Ukrainians who reside in parts of Donbas under 
the control of central government regard state policies as not aimed at 
the protection of citizen interests, but rather as instruments of personal 
enrichment of the authorities, both central and local.189 Such views are 
not groundless. The economic blockade of the “republics” resulted in the 
emergence of the problem of contraband, which involves both Ukrainian 
officials and the DNR/LNR “authorities.”190 Furthermore, there are sig-
nals in public debate about instances of fraud of resources allocated to 
restoration programs.191 Obviously, verifying such information requires 
an audit of these policies. Importantly, such reports do not reinforce the 
trust of all Donbas inhabitants in Ukrainian authorities. Figure 5.1 presents 
the relevant data; due to the scarcity of information originating from the 
occupied territories, there are unfortunately no available data to reflect a 
more nuanced picture.
The second unintended consequence of the presented approach to restor-
ative justice originates from the fact that – at least to some extent – it 
appears to be at odds with other aspects of policies addressed at dealing 
 189 Petro Burkovs’kyi, Ruslan Kermach, and Andrii Hirnyk, “Chym zhyvut’ 
tymchasovo nekontrol’ovani terytoriї Donbasu? Osoblyvosti horyzontal’noї 
komunikatsiї meshkantsiv rozdilenoho rehionu” (Kyiv: Democratic Initiatives 
Foundation, 2018).
 190 “Peretynaiuchy mezhu:  nelehal’na torhivlia z okupovanym Donbasom, 
shcho pidryvaie oboronu” (Kyiv: The Independent Defence Anti-Corruption 
Committee, 2017).









with the consequences of the Donbas conflict. According to the law on the 
fight against terrorism,192 citizens are eligible for compensation for any 
damage caused during counter-terrorist operations. Therefore, the decision 
to regulate actions against self-proclaimed “republics” in the framework 
of ATO opened a legal possibility for citizens to demand corresponding 
individual compensations.
Of course, such summons were connected with risks of political nature, 
as it could be interpreted as a proof that Ukrainian authorities are respon-
sible for instances of violence that resulted in the physical destruction of 
property, and financial nature, as there are no clear estimations of the 
potential value of private property destroyed or damaged as a result of the 
Donetsk warfare. Due to the lack of a clear state policy referring to this 
 192 Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “On fight against terrorism,” Pub. L. No. 638– 
IV (2003), https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/638-15.
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Figure 5.1. The level of trust in Ukrainian authorities among Donbas 
inhabitants.
Source: Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Donbas - Two Parts, or Still One? The 
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particular problem, affected persons interested in obtaining compensations 
have to do it through courts.193
Several draft laws were proposed by MPs aimed at establishing 
mechanisms to solve the problem, but none of them was ever voted.194 
Furthermore, there are signals that the state is unwilling to pay individual 
compensations even when there is a positive court decision: state budget 
lacks appropriate provisions that would allow such payments.195
The decision to adopt the law containing a provision on the relegation 
of responsibility for conflict-related damages to Russia should be regarded, 
among other things, as a way to address this particular problem. However, 
it does not change the fact that the described inconsistency may serve as an 
additional variable that increases the distrust of interested citizens toward 
Ukrainian authorities’ declarations referring to their will to protect the 
rights of all Ukrainians affected by the Donbas conflict.
Summing up, restorative measures constitute the most challenging aspect 
of transitional justice policies designed to address the legacy of the Donbas 
conflict. They have the potential to be experienced directly by the largest 
number of interested persons (direct and indirect victims of the conflict). 
On the other hand, these measures have to take into account the potential 
risks of both political and economic nature. The former are related to the 
possibility that the addressees of restorative redistribution may be regarded 
by some parts of the society as wrongdoers (or their collaborators) or that 
actual victims appear to be omitted by relevant programs. The latter stem 
from the simple fact that resources to be devoted to such restorative redis-
tribution are always limited.
 193 My interview with the representative of Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group, Kyiv, 
February 2019.
 194 Oleh Shynkarenko, “Chy mozhlyvo otrymaty kompensatsiiu za 
zruinovane na Donbasi zhytlo?,” Precedent_UA, August 8, 2016, https://
precedent.in.ua/2016/08/08/chy-mozhlyvo-otrymaty-kompensatsiyu- 
za-zrujnovane-na-donbasi-zhytlo/.
 195 Oleh Shynkarenko, “Kaznacheistvo vidmovliaiet’sia vyplachuvaty dva miliony 










In search of a solution to these dilemmas, Ukrainian authorities primarily 
relied on instruments that can be regarded as future-oriented; the restora-
tion of damaged infrastructure can be regarded such an investment. Similar 
proposal was presented to the “authorities” of DNR/LNR in exchange for 
the return of the self-proclaimed “republics” under Ukraine’s sovereignty, 
which nevertheless remained unanswered.
Proposed restorative measures generated a number of problems. 
However, all of them have a negative impact on the trust of persons inter-
ested in Ukrainian authorities. Solving these problems will constitute one 
of the main tasks in the process of further elaboration of a comprehensive 
transitional justice model.
Conclusion
The book explored policies elaborated by the Ukrainian authorities in the 
context of the ongoing armed conflict in Donbas, which fits into the cate-
gory of transitional justice.
Taking up this topic was in itself associated with considerable risk, which 
inevitably emerges whenever analysis focuses on ongoing processes:  it is 
hard to draw unambiguous conclusions when the phenomenon under scru-
tiny is not concluded yet.
On the other hand, such an approach has an obvious advantage, as 
it allows us to follow the events as they unfold and thus make sense of 
gathered data, taking into account the much better understanding of the 
context when compared to an exclusively retrospective view.
Noteworthy, the period covered by the research appeared to be a certain 
“chapter” in the Ukrainian history. This “chapter” will be associated with 
the presidency of Petro Poroshenko. The Donbas conflict emerged after the 
“abdication” of Viktor Yanukovych from presidency. Escalating violence in 
spring 2014 appeared to be one of conditions of Poroshenko’s electoral suc-
cess. In October 2014, Ukrainians reelected the parliament, also giving the 
majority of votes to pro-presidential political forces. As a result, the pres-
ident gained significant possibilities to shape policies in different domains, 
including the one to which this book is devoted. Thus, there is every reason 
to speak about a “Poroshenko’s chapter” in the history of modern Ukraine. 
This “chapter” was closed on May 20, 2019, when president Volodymyr 
Zelenskyi was sworn into office and simultaneously announced early par-
liamentary elections. Thus, the book presents the development of a specific 
category of policies in a certain more or less closed historical period. In 
other words, the book contains an analysis of the part of a pathway, whose 
end defines the starting point for the new authorities’ attempts to develop 
their own policies. The existence of the pathway limits the possible options 
for further development but simultaneously does not force new authorities 
to continue the journey of their predecessors.
Taking all these reservations into account, I prefer to speak about lessons 




definitive conclusions. These lessons can be divided into two groups: (1) 
those directly referring to the case under scrutiny, and (2) those referring 
more generally to the role of transitional justice mechanisms in managing 
ongoing armed conflicts.
Let us start with lessons from the first group. The questions typical for 
transitional justice appeared on the agenda of Ukrainian authorities almost 
immediately when first signals emerged that suggested the appearance of a 
threat to the territorial integrity of the state. What happens? Who is respon-
sible? How to bring those responsible to accountability? As soon as the 
conflict generated a significant number of people whose lives were directly 
or indirectly affected by the warfare, these questions were supplemented by 
new ones. Who should be regarded a victim? How to restore the situation 
of victims? In attempts to answer these questions, the Ukrainian authorities 
took a number of steps that eventually became the foundations of what 
I call in this book transitional justice measures.
Without any doubt, the Donbas conflict brought the Ukrainian state off 
the tracks of its established order. The warfare generated problems that 
required measures of both retributive and restorative nature. The existing 
normative framework appeared to be insufficient to guide relevant policies. 
In other words, the provision of justice required to essentially operate in an 
extraordinary way: adjusting the existing norms “on-the-go” not only to 
create future-oriented “rules of the game” but also to provide an adequate 
framework for addressing the already committed deeds (and thus, at least 
to certain extent, acting retrospectively).
The policies analyzed in the book allow us to identify several regularities, 
all of which are interrelated. First and foremost, the elaboration of policies 
fitting into the category of transitional justice resulted not from a deliberate 
plan. They were created and later adjusted in a reactive manner: whenever 
a specific problem occurred the authorities proposed a solution. However, 
as the multitude of such small solutions lacked a clear overarching strategy, 
they started to intervene each other, which in turn generated unexpected 
consequences. The decision to start the counter-terrorist operation is prob-
ably the most brilliant and the most symptomatic example of this phenom-
enon. It could be indeed regarded a creative way to answer the problem 
of the conflict’s hybridity. It created a convenient narrative about the con-
flict that appeared to be convincing for the majority of Ukrainians, but it 
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also allowed the state to use existing counter-terrorist provisions as the 
basis for retributive measures. However, it also created the foundation for 
unexpected financial claims from some victims of the conflict and even-
tually appeared to be counterproductive in terms of “building bridges” 
between parts of the divided society. Eventually, the law aimed at providing 
a comprehensive regulatory framework for different aspects of state policies 
towards the occupied territories was adopted four years after the beginning 
of the conflict and had to address, among other things, the “mess” caused 
by previous policies. Undoubtedly, such an approach cannot be called irra-
tional. The rationality in this case was focused primarily on limiting the 
chaos rather than making a new order.
Second, if we look at the policies under scrutiny from the perspective of 
their relationship with the goal of peace/reconciliation, we notice a change 
of focus. In the initial phases of the conflict, characterized by the threat 
of escalation and the outbreak of mass violence, Ukrainian authorities 
designed relevant steps that ensured minimally sufficient steps to satisfy 
relevant interests. First and foremost, these were aimed at avoiding any 
decision that could provoke Russia into a more active engagement.
This started to change after two waves of intensive warfare in summer 
2014 and at the beginning of 2015, when the situation of low-intensity 
stalemate crystallized and the risk associated with escalation of Russia’s 
engagement diminished. Then, justice-related initiatives started being more 
future-oriented. In other words, Ukrainian authorities started regarding 
these initiatives as potential tools to “steer” the development of the conflict 
toward a preferable outcome. This approach manifested itself especially 
in what was referred to as the consolidation of the “story of the conflict” 
around the narrative of external aggression – avoided in the initial stages – 
and in the corresponding adjustment of approaches to the retributive and 
restorative functions of justice.
Third, the mentioned consolidation of approaches happened primarily 
in the domain of political thought rather than in the implementation of 
concrete elements of a “transitional justice toolkit.” One can observe the 
following regularity. In pursuing the goal of truth-seeking, Ukrainian 
authorities did not elaborate any policy mechanism aimed at producing a 
concrete result in the shape of either revealing unknown facts about the con-
flict or creating a consensual framework for the interpretation of facts both 
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known and unknown (truth commission could hypothetically become such 
a mechanism). At the same time, it is exactly in this field that the evolution 
of the authorities’ approach to the conflict is the most visible; although it 
took the shape of a unilateral top-down framing of conflict-related issues.
In pursuing the goal of restorative justice, Ukrainian authorities obvi-
ously also evolved toward accepting the need of an extraordinary approach 
to punishments of those responsible for the outbreak of the conflict and 
engaged in the warfare. Furthermore, the approach to retributive measures 
was not limited to the domain of ideas, the corresponding practice appeared 
to be quite intensive. However, retributive measures were based on the 
adaptation of existing regulations to the needs of extraordinary times. The 
mentioned example of the initiation of the ATO and the consequent rise in 
the number of punishments for terrorism-related crimes constitutes a good 
example here. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian authorities remained reluctant 
to develop any retributive mechanism designed specifically to address the 
needs of the extraordinary situation such as amnesty or a special trial.
Actions in the field of restorative justice appeared to be the most practice 
oriented. It is here that the authorities elaborated and implemented a number 
of new regulations aimed at creating the rules of providing compensations 
for widely understood victims of the conflict. However, it is hard to avoid an 
impression that these rules were aimed at limiting the financial burden for 
the state rather than the provision of just compensations to those affected 
by the conflict. At the same time, the underlying conceptual thoughts did 
not go through significant evolution; instead, they created new layers, set-
tling on the previous ones but not altering them.
All in all, this observation suggests the significant impact of calculations 
of economic nature on the final shape of policies under scrutiny. More 
attention was paid to the elaboration of new regulations that referred to 
the potentially most cost-absorbing aspect of transitional justice, whereas 
policies operating in the “symbolic domain” remained on the margin.
Moreover, let me underline that this book presents the phenomenon 
under scrutiny as an evolving process, not as an instantaneous outcome of 
interplay of some variables that could serve as the basis for formulating law-
like claims. Hence, one of the most valuable insights proposed by the book 
is the one that allows “looking under the hood” of this evolving process in 
the approach to justice, from treating it in accordance with the principles 
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of “firefighting management” to first shy attempts in treating it as a tool 
that would allow – at least to some extent – to steer the whole complex 
situation of the ongoing armed conflict into a desirable direction. Whether 
the ultimate goal of reconciliation between the parts of divided society will 
be eventually reached? And, to what extent it will be the outcome of tran-
sitional justice policies? For obvious reasons, we will not find answers to 
these questions in this book. Will the indicated tendencies continue under 
President Zelenskyi? Or, will we observe a “new beginning?” Answers to 
these questions should be provided by future research.
The last of the above statements constitutes a bridge to the second cate-
gory of lessons that could be learned from the analysis in this book: the cate-
gory that refers more generally to the role of transitional justice mechanisms 
in managing ongoing armed conflicts. Of course, it would be wrong to 
generalize on the analysis of a single case. Therefore, I propose to treat 
the following considerations as hypothetical claims that can be verified in 
further comparative research.
First, I wish to underline the “spontaneous” nature of the modality of 
transitional justice that emerges in situations when the status of the con-
flict is unclear, when a divided society remains in a “gray zone” between 
war and peace. This observation confirms the assumption that transitional 
justice should always be regarded as an essentially complex phenomenon, 
highly dependent on specific circumstances. However, what should be taken 
into account is not only the combination of circumstances that create an 
opportunity for a given modality of transitional justice. Understanding why 
in a given case transitional justice policies look like this and not differently 
requires one to analyze the pathway of its emergence, along with the legacy 
of trials and errors that led to a given situation.
The second lesson is quite simple. Transitional justice can hardly be 
regarded a tool of effective management of the conflict, especially in the 
violent phase of the latter. However, as soon as the intensity of the conflict 
decreases, the ambition of decision-makers to use justice-related issues to 
steer the conflict increases. Nevertheless, it is correct to regard more general 
peacebuilding process as a space in which possibilities for the elaboration 
of transitional justice policies unfold.
The third lesson refers to the thesis on the significance of the quality of 
peace negotiations between the belligerents, mentioned in the theoretical 
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chapter of the book. The conducted analysis allows us to develop this thesis 
further. Whenever we talk about situations similar to the Ukrainian one – a 
conflict around a secessionist part of the country that leads to deep divisions 
in the society – communication between the adversaries constitutes a nec-
essary condition to set up any transitional justice policy which could have 
chances to be regarded as equally just by citizens who support different 
sides of the conflict. However, this statement should be regarded a source 
of additional pessimism. If hybridity constitutes an immanent feature of 
modern conflicts, establishing effective channels of communication may be 
a hard task. If on the one side of the conflict there is no entity that could 
officially take responsibility for formulating a negotiation position and, 
consequently, implement the negotiated solution of the conflict, finding a 
working solution for the peace vs. justice dilemma can be virtually impos-
sible. This is not to state that transitional justice as such loses its sense 
altogether, but the problem is that it will be devoid of the added value of 
“joint ownership” of the policies shared by representatives of both sides 
of the conflict.
Finally, I would like to underline that the book obviously does not pro-
vide answers to all possible questions. As I mentioned at the very begin-
ning, among other things, I regard this book to be an invitation to join the 
research of this significant problem. Along with the simple continuation of 
analysis in the development of conflict-related transitional justice policies 
in the new “chapter” of Ukraine’s history, there are at least two problems 
that deserve special attention but require further research. The first one is 
deeper analysis of conflict-related criminal cases, which may shed more light 
on the extent to which the undertaken retributive measures are dictated by 
political calculations of managing the conflict. The second is a more thor-
ough and more systematic research of public opinion – ideally representing 
both parts of the divided society – but also a more systematic engagement 
of methods typical for the humanities in order to obtain a better under-
standing of emotions of constituents, which in turn could provide a way to 
more effective approaches to manage such conflicts in the future.
Bibliography
Abibok, Yulia. “Identity Policy in the Self-Proclaimed Republics 
in East Ukraine.” OSW, June 6, 2018. https://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-06-06/
identity-policy-self-proclaimed-republics-east-ukraine-0.
Albin, Cecilia, and Daniel Druckman. “Equality Matters: Negotiating an 
End to Civil Wars.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 2 (2012), 
pp. 155–82. doi:10.1177/0022002711431798.
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil. Penguin Classics. New York: Penguin Books, 2006.
Armitage, David. Civil Wars: A History in Ideas. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2017.
Åslund, Anders, and Michael McFaul, eds. Revolution in Orange: The 
Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough. Washington: Carnegie 
endowment for international peace, 2006.
Avakov, Arsen. “Strategy of Restoration of the Integrity of Ukraine and 
De-Occupation of the Donbass. “SMALL STEPS MECHANISM.” 
Accessed May 23, 2019. https://avakov.com/strategy-of-restoration-of-
the-integrity-of-ukraine-and-de-occupation-of-the-donbass-small-steps-
mechanism.html.
Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. Process-Tracing 
Methods: Foundations and Guidelines. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 2013.
Binningsbø, Helga Malmin, Cyanne E Loyle, Scott Gates, and Jon 
Elster. “Armed Conflict and Post-Conflict Justice, 1946–2006.” 
Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 5 (2012): pp. 731–40. 
doi:10.1177/0022343312450886.
Blum, Gabriella, and Natalie J. Lockwood. “Earthquakes and Wars: The 
Logic of International Reparations.” In Jus Post Bellum and 
Transitional Justice, edited by Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg. 
ASIL Studies in International Legal Theory. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013.
Brems, Eva. “Transitional Justice in the Case Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights.” International Journal of Transitional Justice 5, 




Brighouse, Harry. Sprawiedliwość. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sic!, 2007.
Bukrovs’kyi, Petro, Ruslan Kermach, and Andrii Hirnyk. “Chym 
zhyvut’ tymchasovo nekontrol’ovani terytoriї Donbasu? Osoblyvosti 
horyzontal’noї komunikatsiї meshkantsiv rozdilenoho rehionu.” 
Kyiv: Democratic Initiatives Foundation, 2018.
Byrne, David, and Gill Callaghan. Complexity Theory and 
the Social Sciences: The State of the Art. First Edition. 
New York: Routledge, 2014.
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. On approval of a plan of measures 
aimed at implementation of certain principles of the state policy 
towards certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, where the 
state authorities temporarily do not exercise their powers, Pub. L. No. 
8-р (2017). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/8-2017-%D1%80.
———. On approval of the plan of measures for the organization of 
restoration of damaged (destroyed) objects of social and transport 
infrastructure, housing stock and life support systems in Donetsk and 
Luhansk oblasts, Pub. L. No. 1002-р (2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.
ua/go/1002-2014-%D1%80.
———. On approval of the procedure and conditions of providing 
subventions from the state budget to local budgets for the restoration 
(construction, overhaul, reconstruction) of infrastructure in Donetsk 
and Luhansk oblasts, Pub. L. No. 250 (2015). https://www.kmu.gov.
ua/ua/npas/248135239.
———. On approval of the report of the joint mission of the European 
Union, the United Nations and the World Bank “Recovery and 
Peacebuilding Assessment in Ukraine,” Pub. L. No. 797-р (2015). 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/797-2015-%D1%80.
———. On approval of the state target program for the restoration and 
peacebuilding in the eastern regions of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 1071 
(2017). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1071-2017-%D0%BF.
———. On optimization of the system of central executive organs, Pub. 
L. No. 442 (2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/442-2014-%D0%BF.
Censor.NET. “Yanukovych`s Letter to Putin with Request to Send 
Troops to Ukraine: Censor.NET Publishes Historical Document.” 




“Chto ukraintsy dumaiut ob amnistii na Donbasse?” Kalmius Group, 
September 10, 2018. https://www.kalmiusgroup.org/2018/09/blog-
post_33.html.
Clark, Janine Natalya. “Transitional Justice, Truth and 
Reconciliation: An Under-Explored Relationship.” International 
Criminal Law Review 11 (2011), pp. 241–61. doi:10.1163/1571812
11X551390.
Constitutional Court of Ukraine. The decision of the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine in the case of the constitutional petition of 252 
deputies of Ukraine on the compliance with the Constitution of 
Ukraine (constitutionality) of the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to 
the constitution of Ukraine” of December 8, 2004, No. 2222-IV, Pub. 
L. No. 20-рп/2010 (2010). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/v020p710-10.
Corliss, Cody. “Truth Commissions and the Limits of Restorative 
Justice: Lessons Learned in South Africa’s Cradock Four Case.” 
Michigan State International Law Review 21, no. 2 (2013), 
p. 273–298.
Cowen, Tyler. “How Far Back Should We Go? Why Restitution Should 
Be Small.” In Retribution and Reparation in the Transition to 
Democracy, edited by Jon Elster, pp. 17–32. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511584343.004.
Daly, Erin. “Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in 
Times of Transition.” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, 
no. 1 (2008), pp. 23–41. doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijn004.
Darley, John M., and Adam L. Alter. “Behavioral Issues of Punishment, 
Retribution and Deterrence.” In The Behavioral Foundations of 
Public Policy, edited by Eldar Shafir. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2013.
Dashkovs’ka, O. “Sudovyi pretsedent i sudova praktyka iak dzherela 
prava.” Visnyk Akademiї Pravovykh Nauk Ukraїny, no. 1 (64) 
(2011).
De Greiff, Pablo. “Justice and Reparations.” In The Handbook of 
Reparations, edited by Pablo De Greiff. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006.
De Greiff, Pablo, and Roger Duthie, eds. Transitional Justice and 
Development. Making Connections. New York: Social Science 
Research Council, 2009.
Bibliography148
Democratic Initiatives Foundation. “Dva misiatsi protestiv v 
Ukraїni: shcho dali?”, January 21, 2014. https://dif.org.ua/article/
dva-misyatsi-protestiv-v-ukraini-shcho-dali.
———. “Poshuky shliakhiv vidnovlennia suverenitetu Ukraїny nad 
okupovanym Donbasom: stan hromadskoї dumky naperedodni 




———. “Stavlennia naselennia Ukraїny do vnutrishn’o 
peremishchenykh osib,” January 30, 2019. https://dif.org.ua/article/
stavlennya-naselennya-ukraini-do-vnutrishno-peremishchenikh-osib.
Elster, Jon. Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical 
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
doi:10.1017/CBO9780511607011.
———. “Retribution.” In Retribution and Reparation in the Transition 
to Democracy, edited by Jon Elster, pp. 33–56. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511584343.005.
European Court of Human Rights. “New Inter-State Application Brought 
by Ukraine against Russia. Press Release,” August 27, 2018.
European Union. “The EU’s Policy Framework on Support to 
Transitional Justice,” 2015. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_
stories/pdf/the_eus_policy_framework_on_support_to_transitional_
justice.pdf.
Fischer, Martina. “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and 
Practice.” In Advancing Conflict Transformation, edited by Beatrix 
Austin, Martina Fischer and Hans-Joachim Giessmann. The Berghof 
Handbook 2. Michigan: Barbara Bdrich Publishers, 2011.
Forsythe, David P. “Human Rights and Mass Atrocities: Revisiting 
Transitional Justice.” International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (2011), 
pp. 85–95. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01000.x.
Foucault, Michel. Zło czynić, mówić prawdę: funkcja wyznania w 
sprawiedliwości: wykłady z Louvain, 1981. Kraków: Społeczny 
Instytut Wydawniczy Znak, 2018.
Freeman, Mark. Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. doi:10.1017/
CBO9780511691850.
Bibliography 149
Galtung, Johan. “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” 
Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969), pp. 167–91. 
doi:10.1177/002234336900600301.
Garcia-Godos, Jemima, and Chandra Lekha Sriram. “Introduction.” 
In Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground Victims 
and Ex-Combatants, edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram, Jemima 
Garcia-Godos, Johanna Herman, and Olga Martin-Ortega. 
London: Routledge, 2013.
Gerrits, Lasse, and Stefan Verweij. “Critical Realism as a Meta-
Framework for Understanding the Relationships between 
Complexity and Qualitative Comparative Analysis.” Journal 
of Critical Realism 12, no. 2 (2013), pp. 166–82. doi:10.1179/
rea.12.2.p663527490513071.
Grant, Thomas D. Aggression against Ukraine: Territory, Responsibility, 
and International Law. First edition. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015.
Haidt, Jonathan. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided 
by Politics and Religion. New York: Pantheon Books, 2012.
Holder, Cindy. “Truthfulness in Transition: The Value of Insisting 
on Experiential Adequacy.” In Jus Post Bellum and Transitional 
Justice, edited by Larry May and Elizabeth Edenberg. ASIL Studies 
in International Legal Theory. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013.
Holland, John H. Complexity: A Very Short Introduction. Very Short 
Introductions. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Huntington, Samuel P. “The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
20th Century.” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991). doi:10.1353/
jod.1991.0016.
International Court of Justice. “Application of the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and 
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation),” April 19, 
2017. https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/166/19410.pdf.
International Federation for Human Rights. “Eastern Ukraine. Civilians 
Caught in the Crossfire,” October 2015. https://www.fidh.org/IMG/
pdf/eastern_ukraine-ld.pdf.
Bibliography150
Kalyvas, Andreas. Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary: Max 
Weber, Carl Schmitt, and Hannah Arendt. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511755842.
Katrychenko, Tetiana. ““Na tebe chekaiut’ Vdoma”, abo kolyshni 
terorysty na hachku u SBU.” Ukraїns’ka Pravda, February 26, 2019. 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2019/02/26/7207668/.
Kim, Young. Justice: Classical Foundations and Contemporary Debates. 
Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018.
Konończuk, Wojciech. Fundament systemu: starzy i nowi oligarchowie 
na Ukrainie. Punkt Widzenia, no. 59. Warszawa: Ośrodek Studiów 
Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia, 2016.
Kowal, Paweł. “Oligarchy, Tyranny and Revolutions in Ukraine 
1991–2014.” In The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign 
Intervention: Ukraine’s Complex Transition, edited by Klaus 
Bachmann and Igor Lyubashenko, First edition. Studies in Political 
Transition, volume 4. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition,  
2014.
Kuzio, Taras. Putin’s War against Ukraine: Revolution, Nationalism, and 
Crime, 2017.
Lachowski, Tomasz. Perspektywa praw ofiar w prawie 
międzynarodowym: sprawiedliwość okresu przejściowego (transitional 
justice). Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2018.
Lyubashenko, Igor. “Euromaidan: From the Students” Protest to 
Mass Uprising.” In The Maidan Uprising, Separatism and Foreign 
Intervention: Ukraine’s Complex Transition, edited by Klaus 
Bachmann and Igor Lyubashenko, First edition. Studies in Political 
Transition, volume 4. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2014.
———. Transitional Justice in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: Swimming 
Upstream. Studies in Political Transition, volume 7. Frankfurt am 
Main: Peter Lang Edition, 2017.
Maddison, Sarah. Conflict Transformation and Reconciliation: Multi-
Level Challenges in Deeply Divided Societies. London, 
New York: Routledge, 2017.
Mahda, Yevhen. Hibrydna ahresiya Rosiyi: uroky dlya Yevropy. 
Kyiv: Kalamar, 2017.
Bibliography 151
Matuszak, Sławomir. The Oligarchic Democracy: The Influence of 
Business Groups on Ukrainian Politics. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern 
Studies, 2012.
May, Larry, and Elizabeth Edenberg, eds. Jus Post Bellum and 
Transitional Justice. ASIL Studies in International Legal Theory. 
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013.
McAuliffe, Pádraig. Transformative Transitional Justice 
and the Malleability of Post-Conflict States. Cheltenham, 
Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2017.
Media Initiative for Human Rights, Ukrainian Helsinki Human 
Rights Union, and Euromaidan Press. “V’iazni viiny. Mizhnarodna 
praktyka shchodo zvil’nennia polonenykh, zaruchnykiv i 




Ministry of Interior of Ukraine. On approval of the Instruction on the 
procedure for preventive detention in the area of the counter-terrorist 
operation of persons involved in terrorist activities and the special 
regime of pre-trial investigation in conditions of martial law, state 
of emergency or in the area of anti-terrorist operation, Pub. L. No. 
872/88/537 (2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/z1038-14.
National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. On urgent additional 
measures to counter hybrid threats to Ukraine’s national security, Pub. 
L. No. 62/2017 (2017). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/n0002525-17.
———. “Transcript of the Meeting of the National Security and Defence 
Council of Ukraine,” February 28, 2014. http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/
files/2016/stenogr.pdf.
Neitzel, Sönke and Harald Welzer. Żołnierze: protokoły walk, zabijania i 
umierania. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2014.
Nicolson, Donald. “Taking Epistemology Seriously: “Truth, Reason and 
Justice” Revisited.” The International Journal of Evidence & Proof 
17, no. 1 (2013), pp. 1–46. doi:10.1350/ijep.2013.17.1.417.
Nmaju, Mba Chidi. “The Role of Judicial Institutions in the Restoration 
of Post-Conflict Societies: The Cases of Rwanda and Sierra Leone.” 
Bibliography152
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 16, no. 2 (2011): 357–84. 
doi:10.1093/jcsl/krr012.
Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success In World Politics. 
New York: Public Affairs, 2009.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
“Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 May 
to 15 August 2015,” August 15, 2015. https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Countries/UA/11thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf.
Olsen, Tricia D., Leigh A. Payne, and Andrew G. Reiter. Transitional 
Justice in Balance. Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy. 
Washington.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010.
“Peretynaiuchy mezhu: nelehal’na torhivlia z okupovanym Donbasom, 
shcho pidryvaie oboronu.” Kyiv: The Independent Defence Anti-
Corruption Committee, 2017.
Popova, Maria. Politicized Justice in Emerging Democracies: A Study 
of Courts in Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014.
President of Ukraine. Decree on the decision of the Council of National 
Security and Defense of Ukraine of April 13, 2014 “On urgent 
measures to overcome the terrorist threat and preserve territorial 
integrity of Ukraine,” Pub. L. No. 405/2014 (2014).
———. Draft law “On Prevention of the persecution and punishment 
of persons - participants of events in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts,” 
Pub. L. No. 5082 (2014). http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/
webproc4_1?pf3511=52183.
Radnitz, Scott. “The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic 
Dispersion, and the Post-Soviet “Revolutions.”“ Comparative Politics 
42, no. 2 (2010), pp. 127–46.
Rescher, Nicholas. Complexity: A Philosophical Overview. Science and 
Technology Studies. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998.
Rieff, David. In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and Its Ironies. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016.
Ross, Lee. “Perspectives on Disagreement and Dispute 
Resolution: Lessons from the Lab and the Real World.” In The 
Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, edited by Eldar Shafir. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
Bibliography 153
Rothe, Dawn L., and Scott Maggard. “Factors That Impede or Facilitate 
Post-Conflict Justice Mechanisms?” International Criminal Law 
Review 12, no. 2 (2012), pp. 193–217. doi:10.1163/1571812
12X633262.
Sachs, Albie. “Archives, Truth, and Reconciliation.” Archivaria 62, no. 1 
(2006), pp. 1–14.
Samar, Valentina. “Gibridnyi yevroremont Donbassa.” ZN.Ua, June 2, 
2017. https://zn.ua/internal/gibridnyy-evroremont-donbassa-250324_.
html.
Sasse, Gwendolyn. “The Displaced Ukrainians. Who Are They, and 
What Do They Think?” Centre for East European and International 
Studies, March 2017. https://www.zois-berlin.de/publikationen/
zois-report/zois-report-12017/.
———. “The Donbas - Two Parts, or Still One? The Experience of War 
through the Eyes of the Regional Population.” ZOiS Report, May 
2017. https://www.zois-berlin.de/fileadmin/media/Dateien/ZOiS_
Reports/ZOiS_Report_2_2017.pdf.
Seils, Paul. “The Place of Reconciliation in Transitional Justice.” ICTJ 
Briefing. International Center for Transitional Justice, June 28, 2017. 
https://www.ictj.org/publication/reconciliation-transitional-justice.
Shynkarenko, Oleh. “Chy mozhlyvo otrymaty kompensatsiiu za 
zruinovane na Donbasi zhytlo?” Precedent_UA, August 8, 2016. 
https://precedent.in.ua/2016/08/08/chy-mozhlyvo-otrymaty-
kompensatsiyu-za-zrujnovane-na-donbasi-zhytlo/.
———. “Kaznacheistvo vidmovliaiet’sia vyplachuvaty dva miliony za 
zruinovane v ATO zhytlo,” May 30, 2018. https://helsinki.org.ua/
articles/kaznachejstvo-vidmovlyajetsya-vyplachuvaty-dva-miljony-za-
zrujnovane-v-ato-zhytlo/.
Skarżyńska, Krystyna. “Sprawiedliwość jako kryterium oceny systemu 
ekonomiczno-politycznego.” Civitas et Lex 5, no. 1 (2015), pp. 19–
30. doi:10.31648/cetl.2032.
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr. Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment 
in Literary Investigation. Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2007.
Sriram, Chandra Lekha. “Beyond Transitional Justice: Peace, 
Governance, and Rule of Law.” International Studies Review 19, no. 1 
(2017), pp. 53–69.
Bibliography154
Teitel, Ruti G. Transitional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002.
“The Code of Hammurabi.” Internet Sacred Text Archive. Accessed 
April 3, 2019. http://www.sacred-texts.com/ane/ham/ham06.htm.
The World Bank. “Ukraine. Recovery and Peacebuilding 
Assessment. Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern 
Ukraine,” March 2015. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/879011468188335375/pdf/96487-REPLACEMENT-FILE-WP-v1-
Box391453B-PUBLIC-RPA-A4-Vol1-Eng-Web.pdf.
Thompson, Janna. “Reparative Claims and Theories of Justice.” In 
Historical Justice and Memory, edited by Klaus Neumann and Janna 
Thompson. Critical Human Rights. Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2015.
“Ukraine Derogation from European Convention on Human 




Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union. “Zahubleni v 
papirtsiakh: dotrymannia sotsialnykh prav vnutrishn’o 
peremishchenykh osib,” 2017. https://helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/
uploads/2018/01/zagubleni_ukr.pdf.
United Nations. “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Societies. Report of the Secretary-General,” 
September 23, 2004.
Vandeginste, Stef, and Chandra Lekha Sriram. “Power Sharing and 
Transitional Justice: A Clash of Paradigms?” Global Governance 17, 
no. 4 (2011), pp. 489–505.
Verkhovna Rada of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine. Declaration 
on state sovereignty of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 55– XII (1990). https://
zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/55-12.
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Constitution of Ukraine, Pub. 
L. No. 254к/96-ВР (1996). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
go/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80.
———. Draft law “On amnesty for the persons who at the time of 
committing a crime participated in the counter-terrorist operation,” 
Bibliography 155
Pub. L. No. 4519 (2016). http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc
4_2?pf3516=4519&skl=9.
———. Draft law “On prevention of criminal persecution, bringing 
to criminal, administrative responsibility and punishment of 
participants of events in the territory of Donetsk, Luhansk oblasts, 
Pub. L. No. 2425 (2015). http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/
webproc4_1?pf3511=54470.
———. Law on special regime of local self-government in certain 
districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, Pub. L. No. 1680–VII 
(2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1680-18.
———. Law on the peculiarities of the state policy aimed at protecting 
the state sovereignty of Ukraine in temporarily occupied territories in 
the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, Pub. L. No. 2268– VIII (2018).
———. On amendments to article 1 of the Law of Ukraine “Law on 
special regime of local self-government in certain districts of Donetsk 
and Luhansk Oblasts,” Pub. L. No. 2588– VIII (2018). https://zakon.
rada.gov.ua/go/2588-19.
———. On amendments to subparagraph 4, paragraph 24, section VI 
“Final and Transitional Provisions” of the Budgetary Code of Ukraine, 
Pub. L. No. 1406– VIII (2016). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1406-19.
———. On amendments to the constitution of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 
2222– IV (2004). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/2222-15.
———. On amendments to the Criminal and Criminal Procedural 
Codes of Ukraine regarding the inevitability of punishment for certain 
crimes against foundations of national security, public security and 
corruption crimes, Pub. L. No. 1689-VII (2014). https://zakon.rada.
gov.ua/go/1689-18.
———. On amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 
1183-VII (2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1183-18.
———. On amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine on the abuse 
of power by the military officials, Pub. L. No. 290– VIII (2015). 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/290-19.
———. On creation of a free economic zone “Crimea” and the 
peculiarities of economic activity in the temporarily occupied territory 
of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 1636-VII (2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
go/1636-18.
Bibliography156
———. On declaration of independence of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 1427-
XII (1991). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1427-12.
———. On ensuring civil rights and freedoms, and the legal regime on 
the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 1207– VII 
(2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1207-18.
———. On ensuring the rights and freedoms of internally displaced 
persons, Pub. L. No. 1706-VII (2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
go/1706-18.
———. On fight against terrorism, Pub. L. No. 638-IV (2003). https://
zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/638-15.
———. On legal succession of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 1543-XII (1991). 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1543-12.
———. On preventing the manifestations of separatism and other attacks 
on the foundations of the national security of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 
756-VII (2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/756-18.
———. On self-abolition of the President of Ukraine from the exercise of 
his constitutional powers and the appointment of early elections of the 
President of Ukraine, Pub. L. No. 757-VII (2014). https://zakon.rada.
gov.ua/go/757-18.
———. On taking political responsibility for the situation in Ukraine, 
Pub. L. No. 753-VII (2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/753-18.
———. On the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the 
parliaments of the states - guarantors of security of Ukraine and 
international organizations, Pub. L. No. 845-VII (2014). https://zakon.
rada.gov.ua/go/845-18.
———. On the appeal of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to the United 
Nations, the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, the GUAM Parliamentary Assembly, the 
national parliaments of the countries of the world on the recognition 
of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state, Pub. L. No. 129-VIII 
(2015). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/129-19.
———. On the Statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Pub. 
L. No. 844-VII (2014). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/844-18.
———. On the statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On 
the recognition by Ukraine of the jurisdiction of the International 
Bibliography 157
Criminal Court over the crimes against humanity and war crimes 
committed by senior officials of the Russian Federation and the 
leaders of the terrorist organizations “DNR” and “LNR,” which led 
to particularly grave consequences and the massacre of Ukrainian 
citizens,” Pub. L. No. 145-VIII (2015). https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/
go/145-19.
———. On the text of the Constitution of Ukraine in the wording of 
June 28, 1996, as amended and supplemented by the Laws of Ukraine 
of December 8, 2004 No. 2222-IV, February 1, 2011 No. 2952-VI, 
September 19, 2013 No. 586-VII, Pub. L. No. 750-VII (2014). https://
zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/750-18.
Vetter, Greg R. “Command Responsibility of Non-Military Superiors in 
the International Criminal Court (ICC).” Yale Journal of International 
Law 25 (2000): 89.
Villa-Vicencio, Charles. “The Reek of Cruelty and the Quest for 
Healing: Where Retributive and Restorative Justice Meet.” 
Journal of Law and Religion 14, no. 1 (1999), pp. 165–87. 
doi:10.2307/1051783.
Wagner, Lynn, and Daniel Druckman. “Drivers of Durable Peace: The 
Role of Justice in Negotiating Civil War Termination.” Group 
Decision and Negotiation 26, no. 1 (2017), pp. 45–67. doi:10.1007/
s10726-016-9511-9.
Waldorf, Lars. “Institutional Gardening in Unsettled Times: Transitional 
Justice and Institutional Contexts.” In Justice Mosaics. How Context 
Shapes Transitional Justice in Fractured Society, edited by Roger 
Duthie and Paul Seils. New York: International Center for Transitional 
Justice, 2017. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ_Book_
JusticeMosaics_2017.pdf.
———. “Just Peace? Integrating DDR and Transitional Justice.” In 
Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and 
Ex-Combatants, edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram, Jemima García-
Godos, Johanna Herman, and Olga Martin-Ortega. Milton Park, 
Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2013.
Walker, Margaret Urban. “How Can Truth Telling Count as 
Reparations?” In Historical Justice and Memory, edited by 
Klaus Neumann and Janna Thompson. Critical Human Rights. 
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2015.
Bibliography158
Weiner, Bernard. Social Motivation, Justice, and the Moral 
Emotions: An Attributional Approach. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, 2006.
“What You Need to Know about the Case of Former 
Tornado Battalion Servicemen.” Ukraine Crisis 
Media Center, April 11, 2017. http://uacrisis.
org/55087-need-know-case-former-tornado-battalion-servicemen.
Wilson, Andrew. The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation. 2. ed. with new 
material. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.
———. Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2014.
———. Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2005.
———. Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World. 1st 
ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005.
Wolczuk, Kataryna. The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional 
Politics of State Formation. Budapest; New York: Central European 
University Press, 2001.
Annex 1. Timeline of events and development 
of policies discussed in the book.
 
 

























































































































































































































































Restoration of infrastructure in uncontrolled territories: bargaining and conditionality







Retribution becomes an object of 
negotiations
Increasing bids in political negotiations over accountability

















































Restoration of infrastruct re in uncontrolled territories: bar ai ing and c ditionality
Increasing bids n political neg tiations over accountability
Establishment of policies a dre sed at IDPs and inhabitants of uncontrolled territories
Notes: (a) data illustrating conflict intensity present the number of conflict-
related casualties per month for both combatants and civilians representing 
all sides of the conflict. Data do not reflect 1103 instances when the exact 
date of death is unknown. Data provided by coordinators of the Memory 
Map project (https://memorialmap.org/).
(b) In the part reflecting the “Official truth of the conflict,” the intensity of 
fill in fields illustrating the usage of narratives is not based on any data, it 
presents the intensity of used narratives in a symbolic way.
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Development of controlled territories: building soft power
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Annex 2. Description of database of court 
decisions used for the purpose of this book
The database is based on documents retrieved from the publicly avail-
able online register of Ukrainian court decisions (http://reyestr.court.gov.
ua/). It contains information about 1908 documents issued by Ukrainian 
courts between April 13, 2014, (beginning of ATO) and January 18, 2018 
(adoption of the “reintegration law” on the basis of which the ATO was 
ended). The documents were selected and downloaded manually (autom-
atized manipulations with the register are forbidden) and then processed 
and coded by a team of researchers. As a result, the following information 
were extracted from the documents:
 • the time and place of issuing judgement;
 • basic information about the accused (origin, citizenship, level of educa-
tion – however such information was not available in all cases);
 • information about the indictment and cooperation of the accused with 
the prosecution;
 • information about the final decision of the court (whether the accused 
was found guilty and, if so, information about the punishment).
The database does not contain any personal data or information allowing to 
indicate individuals (documents published in the register are anonymized).
The database should be regarded as a tool supporting essentially qual-
itative research.
The collected data have several limitations:
 1. Ukrainian experts underline the technical imperfection of the register, 
such as frequent technical problems with access, numerous mistakes in 
the classification of documents, and the irregular publication of new 
documents. Therefore, some court decisions issued in the mentioned 
period can be missing; this is a force majeure that cannot be overcome.
 2. Some documents in the register are classified and thus inaccessible; in 
such cases court decisions visible in the register are empty. No informa-
tion was extracted from such documents.
 3. The very construction of the register does not allow to systematically track 
the developments of specific cases in higher instances. Therefore, each 
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entry in the database provides no distinction between the first and second 
instances; each entry reflects one case of a court’s judgement of actions of 
one person, taking into account documented circumstances of the case.
 4. The database does not contain information about decisions on all conflict-
related crimes issued in the mentioned period. The reason is technical. The 
register allows for the selection of cases in accordance with type of crime 
(as defined by chapters of the Criminal Code of Ukraine; CCU) and arti-
cles of the CCU, which describe specific offences. Unfortunately, the reg-
ister does not provide any possibility of automatic selection of cases related 
to the Donbas conflict. Therefore, the identification of all relevant cases 
is virtually impossible, it can only be done manually by looking through 
all the available documents and assessing whether each specific case can 
be regarded as relevant; the register contains more than 360  thousand 
decisions on criminal cases issued for the mentioned period. As a result, 
cases that refer to wrongdoings that can be regarded as “compatible” with 
ordinary peaceful circumstances  – such as murders, tortures, rapes, but 
also crimes committed by the military in times of peace like desertion – 
were omitted and may become the object of another analysis in the future. 
In particular, it would require a different approach in case selection.
 5. The collection of data thus focused on those provisions of the CCU that 
may be utilized to address:
 a. the problem of separatism as a political idea;
 b. the problem of the active engagement of individuals in 
antigovernmental activities inspired by separatist ideas.
The table below presents the overall structure of the database. More details 
can be provided upon request.
Types of crimes Number of cases (not classified, 
relevant from the perspective of the 
topic of research)




Creation of illegal paramilitary or armed 
units
921
Planning, preparing, starting, and 
conducting an aggressive war
16
Annex 3. Contents of Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 
protocols
Points of Minsk-1 protocol (5 September 2014):
 1. immediate bilateral ceasefire;
 2. the establishment of monitoring and verification regime of the cease-
fire to be carried out by the OSCE;
 3. the decentralization of powers in Ukraine, including the introduction 
of a special regime of self-governance in the districts occupied by DNR 
and LNR forces;
 4. permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian border and verifica-
tion by the OSCE;
 5. immediate release of all hostages and illegally detained persons;
 6. amnesty for DNR and LNR combatants;
 7. continuation of an inclusive national dialogue;
 8. measures to improve the humanitarian situation in Donbas;
 9. early local elections in accordance with the law introducing the special 
regime of self-governance in the districts controlled by DNR and LNR 
forces;
 10. withdrawal of illegally-armed groups and military equipment as well 
as fighters and mercenaries from Ukraine;
 11. adoption of a program of economic recovery and reconstruction for 
the Donbas region;
 12. personal security for participants of the consultations.
Source: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, http://www.
osce.org/ru/home/123258?download=true.
Points of Minsk-2 protocol (12 February 2015):
 1. immediate and full ceasefire;
 2. pull-out of all heavy weapons by both sides;
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 4. start of dialogue on modalities of conducting local elections in the 
rebel-controlled territories in accordance with Ukrainian law;
 5. amnesty;
 6. release and exchange of all hostages and illegally detained persons;
 7. access to humanitarian aid by the ones in need;
 8. dialogue on the modalities of a full restoration of social and economic 
connections between the territories controlled by DNR and LNR and 
the rest of Ukraine;
 9. restoration of control by Ukraine over the state border;
 10. withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and 
also mercenaries groups from the territory of Ukraine;
 11. local elections in the territories controlled by the DNR and LNR;
 12. intensification of the work of the Trilateral Contact Group.
Source: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe: http://www.
osce.org/cio/140156.
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